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ARTICLES
Multiple Nationality and Refugees
Jon Bauer*
ABSTRACT
Persons with more than one nationality ("multiple
nationals") who flee persecution in their home country may have
compelling reasons to seek asylum elsewhere rather than go to a
second country of nationality where they have no ties or face
serious hardships. The 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees, however, expressly makes them ineligible for
refugee status unless they have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted in all their countries of nationality. The U.S. Refugee
Act omits this exclusionary language but nonetheless has been
read by immigration agencies as if it incorporated the
Convention's approach. This Article challenges the view that
multiple nationals should not be considered refugees. It argues
that asylum should be denied only when it would be reasonable,
under all the circumstances, to expect the person to resettle in a
second country of nationality after taking into account factors
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such as family ties, social and cultural constraints, and any
hardships the person would face.
The Refugee Act's text and historical context establish that
Congress intended to allow multiple nationals to qualify as
refugees if they face persecution in any one of their countries of
nationality. Drawing on archival research as well as a close
examination of legislative and administrative history, this
Article shows that the Refugee Act's drafters meant to preserve a
longstanding U.S. policy of accepting refugees with more than
one nationality as long as they had not "firmly resettled" in
another country of nationality before coming to the United
States-a policy especially salient to the Act's proponents
because it allowed for the continued admission of Soviet Jews as
refugees even though Israel welcomed them as citizens.
This Article also argues that other refugee-receiving
countries should reconsider their stance toward multiple
national asylum-seekers. The Convention's approach to multiple
nationality has become increasingly anomalous in light of the
wide international acceptance of the principle that persons who
could avoid persecution by going elsewhere-by relocating to a
different part of their home country, or seeking asylum in some
third country-should not be denied refugee status unless it is
reasonable, under all the circumstances to expect them to do so.
The Article concludes by discussing how the UNHCR and
European Union are well-positioned to play a leading role in
developing a new norm for the treatment of multiple nationals
who seek refuge from persecution.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider these situations:
1. Fatemeh is 30-year old citizen of Iran. Upon learning that
she is about to be arrested because of her on-line advocacy
for democratic reforms, she flees the country. She travels to
Los Angeles, where her aunt, uncle and cousins live, and
applies for asylum in the United States. Fatemeh is a dual
national; she inherited French citizenship from her mother,
a French citizen who married an Iranian man and moved to
Teheran before Fatemeh was born. She has never been to
France. No family members currently live there, and she
has no other ties to the country. She is fluent in English and
Farsi but does not speak French.
2. Maria is a citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where she was
born. She belongs to a Catholic family of Croatian descent
that has lived in Bosnia for more than a century. During the
Balkan war of the 1990s, when Maria was a child, her
father secured Croatian passports and citizenship papers for
all of his family in case they had to flee Bosnia. (Croatia's
citizenship law allowed ethnic Croats living anywhere in the
world to become citizens.1 ) The family remained in Bosnia
throughout the war. Later, when Maria was in her twenties,
she became involved in a relationship with a Muslim man
who was psychologically and physically abusive. He would
beat her and call her a "Catholic whore" while forcing her to
perform sex acts, and he threatened to kill her if she left
him. The authorities in Bosnia provided no protection to
1. See Francesco Ragazzi & Igor Stiks, Croatian Citizenship: From Ethnic
Engineering to Inclusiveness, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN THE NEw EUROPE 339, 347-
52 (Rainer Baubock et al. eds., 2009) ("[M]embers of the Croatian 'diaspora' .. . have
been able to obtain Croatian citizenship quite easily and maintain their other
citizenship.").
9072014/
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victims of domestic violence. Maria finally escaped her
situation by coming to the United States to work as an au
pair. Her abuser continued to threaten her by phone and
email. Fearing for her safety if she returns home, she
applies for asylum. Although her citizenship papers enable
her to enter and live in Croatia, she cannot imagine living
there. After having experienced the relative tolerance and
pluralism of the United States, she is frightened and
repulsed by the idea of returning to the region where she
endured her traumatic experiences, and where the ethnic
and religious hatreds that played out in her own persecution
play a central role in politics and culture.
3. A North Korean man fleeing political repression crosses the
border to China. The Chinese authorities return him to
North Korea, where he is detained and tortured. He escapes
again, and this time an uncle procures a fake passport for
him, which he uses to travel to Australia, where he applies
for refugee protection. Under South Korea's Constitution, all
of Korea is considered one country and citizens of the North
are recognized as citizens of the South.2 He does not want to
go to South Korea, however, because of the social stigma
and employment discrimination North Korean defectors
have experienced there. In addition, he fears that his
relatives in the North would be harmed; North Korea has a
history of retaliating against the families of those who
defect to the South.
Under the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, on which most countries'
refugee protection laws are based,3 none of these applicants can
qualify as a refugee. 4 Although they have a well-founded fear of being
2. See infra note 174 and accompanying text (discussing South Korea's
nationality laws).
3. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Convention]
(establishing the legal status and defining the rights of refugees displaced prior to
January 1, 1951); see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Protocol]
(expanding the protections established under the Convention to people made refugees
after January 1, 1951). About three-quarters of the world's countries have agreed to
abide by its obligations. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Status: Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg
no=V-5&chapter=5&lang-en (last visited Oct. 10, 2014) [http://perma.cc/K5J8-5D2C]
(archived Sept. 28, 2014) (listing 146 state parties).
4. The scenario of the Iranian applicant is drawn from the training manual
for U.S. asylum officers, which uses a similar example to explain that dual nationals
will not be considered eligible for asylum unless they can establish a well-founded fear
of persecution in both countries of nationality. See infra note 140. The Bosnian
woman's case was handled by students in a law school clinical program the author
directs. The client would have been found ineligible for asylum were it not for the fact
908 [VOL. 47905
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persecuted in the country of nationality that was their home, they are
also nationals of another country. Their connections to that second
country of nationality are minimal, and they have compelling reasons
for seeking refuge elsewhere. The Convention's definition of refugee,
however, expressly excludes persons with more than one nationality
unless the individual can show that he or she would be exposed to a
well-founded fear of persecution in all countries of nationality.5 In the
United States, despite a statutory refugee definition that differs in
wording from the Convention's and is most naturally read to allow a
person who has fled from any one country of his or her nationality
due to persecution to qualify for asylum, 6 administrative agencies
have followed the Convention's approach.7
The prevailing view that multiple nationals forced from their
homes by persecution should be required to go to a second country of
nationality-no matter how tenuous the individual's links to that
country, what hardships they would face there, or how strong their
ties to the place where they wish to seek asylum-rests on the idea
that the sole purpose of refugee status is to ensure safety from
persecution. In this view, international protection is unneeded if
national protection is available. As a U.S. administrative appeals
her abuser had once followed her to Croatia when she went on a beach vacation there,
enabling a sympathetic asylum officer to conclude that she would not be safe from her
persecutor if she lived in Croatia. The facts of the third case are drawn from decisions
of Australian refugee tribunals, which have found North Koreans ineligible for refugee
protection because they are citizens of South Korea and would not be persecuted there.
See RRT Case No. 0910048, [2010] RRTA 911, Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, 20
Oct. 2010 (invalidating North Korean national's protection visa due to his South
Korean citizenship); RRT Case No. 0909449, [2010] RRTA 763, Australia: Refugee
Review Tribunal, 7 Sept. 2010 (same); RRT Case No. N03/47934, [2004] RRTA 148,
Australia: Refugee Review Tribunal, 19 Feb. 2004, (declining to grant protection visa
for same reason); see also NBLC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural
& Indigenous Affairs (2005) 149 FCR 151 (Austl.) (dismissing appeal of North Korean
seeking refugee protection in Australia because he did not have a well-founded fear of
persecution in South Korea).
5. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2) (requiring, inter alia, that a
refugee be "outside the country of his nationality" and unable or unwilling to avail
himself of its protection owing to a well-founded fear of persecution, and adding that if
a person has more than one nationality "the term 'the country of his nationality' shall
mean each of the countries of which he is a national," and "a person shall not be
deemed to be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any
valid reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of
one of the countries of which he is a national"); see also Protocol, supra note 3, art. I, at
268 (applying same standards to those made refugees after January 1, 1951).
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014) [hereinafter INA] (defining the term "refugee" to include "any
person who is outside any country of such person's nationality. .. , and who is unable or
unwilling to return to . . . that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution . . . ," and omitting the Convention's provisions on persons with more than
one nationality; infra Part IV.A (discussing why the statutory text strongly supports an
any one country" interpretation).
7. See infra Part IV.B (discussing agency interpretations).
9092014/
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board put it in a recent decision denying a multiple national's asylum
claim, the core purpose of asylum is "to protect [refugees] with
nowhere else to turn," not provide "a broader choice of safe
homelands."8
This Article challenges the view that refugee status should be
unavailable to multiple nationals merely because they could avoid
persecution in a second country of nationality. The international
refugee regime serves as more than a last-resort surrogate for
national protection. It is also meant to restore a measure of self-
determination to the lives of those forced to flee their homes. Persons
displaced by persecution have suffered a loss of membership in the
political and social community in which they lived. When a refugee
cannot safely return home (which, when feasible, is the best way to
restore community membership), asylum provides a mechanism for
integrating the individual into a new community. Allowing refugees
some agency in choosing their destination, rather than forcing them
to go to a country of nominal nationality where they lack genuine ties
and would face significant barriers to successful integration, serves
these autonomy-restoring and integration-promoting goals.9
With respect to U.S. asylum law, this Article contends that the
governing statutory language, which differs significantly from the
Convention's refugee definition (the U.S. definition omits the
Convention's exclusionary clause about multiple nationals and states
that a person outside any country of his or her nationality and unable
or unwilling to return to that country because of persecution
qualifies), is properly read to allow multiple nationals who suffered or
reasonably fear persecution in any one country of their nationality to
be granted asylum.10 The text of the statute supports my proposed
reading, but ascertaining why Congress would want to depart from
the Convention's approach to multiple nationals' asylum claims is
more complex. One key Congressional purpose in enacting the
Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring U.S. law into compliance with the
Convention." If that were all, it might make sense to assume that the
1 8. Matter of B-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 119, 122 (BIA 2013) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting the U.S. refugee definition as
adopting the Convention's approach toward multiple nationality, despite its textual
differences).
9. See infra Part V (discussing the conceptual underpinnings for the approach
advocated in this Article).
10. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the statutory text).
11. Commentators have justly criticized U.S. decisions that disregard
internationally-accepted interpretations of the Convention when construing identically-
worded provisions in the statute. See, e.g., Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in
U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1059, 1121 (2011) ("[Albsent clear statutory language to the contrary, a
construction that is incompatible with international law on the Convention is
inconsistent with clear congressional intent to conform domestic refugee law with the
[VOL, 47905
MUL TIPLE NA TIONALITYAND REFUGEES
wording differences were inadvertent and Congress really meant to
incorporate the Convention's approach. Through a close examination
of the Refugee Act's legislative history and historical context, this
Article uncovers strong evidence that the law's Congressional
architects intended to preserve a longstanding approach in U.S.
refugee law and policy that viewed multiple nationality as no barrier
to refugee status so long as the individual did not actually resettle in
another country before seeking haven in the United States.12
Adopting the Convention's approach to multiple nationality also
would have called into question the highly popular policy of according
refugee status to all Soviet Jews who wished to come, despite the fact
that Israel recognized them as nationals-a result that Congress
clearly would not have intended.18
During the Refugee Act's first decade, its implementation by the
Executive Branch reflected an understanding that multiple nationals
were not excluded from asylum merely because they could avoid
persecution in a second country of nationality.' 4 More recently, the
immigration agencies have taken a contrary view, but those decisions
rest on an unreasonable interpretation of the statutory language and
are not entitled to judicial deference.' 5 This does not mean multiple
nation's obligations under the Protocol. . . ."); Joan Fitzpatrick, The International
Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1, 6-8 (1997) (decrying an
"unnecessary and potentially harmful gap between U.S. and international refugee law"
created by the Supreme Court).
12. See infra Part IV.C.3. These conclusions are based on an examination of
several decades of legislative history and executive branch practice leading up to the
passage of the Refugee Act, documents in the archives of the Jimmy Carter Library
and Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, and the work of historians of refugee policy. In
discussing the Refugee Act's history, this Article also calls attention to the central role
played by Joshua Eilberg, who chaired the House Judiciary Committee's immigration
subcommittee during most of the 1970s. Eilberg's contributions to U.S. refugee law are
often overlooked. He was somewhat more conservative than better-known proponents
of the Refugee Act like Senator Edward Kennedy and Representatives Peter Rodino
and Elizabeth Holtzman. A scandal forced his departure from Congress before the
Refugee Act was passed, but he, more than anyone else, gave shape to the refugee
definition that became part of U.S. law.
13. See infra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the U.S. policy of accepting Soviet Jews as
refugees). There is also evidence that the drafters of the U.S. refugee definition wanted
to ensure that persons fleeing persecution in Northern Ireland would be eligible to seek
asylum in the United States despite the fact that both the Republic of Ireland and the
UK considered them citizens. See infra text accompanying notes 278-89 (describing
statements made in committee and on the House floor and subsequent drafting
changes that reflect an intent to include Northern Irish refugees).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 362-69 (discussing Executive Branch
statements and regulations which reflected an understanding that multiple nationals
qualified as refugees as long as they had not firmly resettled in a second country of
nationality).
15. See infra Part IV.B. (concluding that the agencies' approach to multiple
nationality is inconsistent with the statutory language and runs counter to agency
regulations, prior decisions, and Congress's treatment of multiple nationals' eligibility
for humanitarian relief in subsequent legislation).
2014/ 911
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nationality can never be considered when assessing an asylum
application. Under U.S. law, a grant of asylum is discretionary.
Asylum could be denied as a matter of discretion in situations where,
under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the
applicant to resettle in another country of nationality, considering
factors such as family ties, social affinities, and hardships the person
would face.' 6
This Article also addresses how multiple nationals' asylum
claims should be treated in countries that apply the Convention's
definition of a refugee. The approach I propose clearly goes beyond
what the text of the Convention requires. It is, however, consistent
with the original vision set forth in the post-World War II UN
resolutions that laid the foundations of the international refugee
regime, which provided that refugees with "valid objections" and
"reasons other than personal convenience" for not returning to a
country of nationality would not be required to do so. 17 In drafting the
Refugee Convention, states seeking to cabin their obligations added a
multiple nationality clause that foreclosed refugee status whenever
another state would recognize the person as a national and protect
them from persecution.' 8 However, that approach has become
increasingly anomalous in light of the progressive interpretation of
the Refugee Convention by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and state parties.19 It has become a well-accepted principle
of refugee law that asylum claims should not be rejected merely
because a person could safely relocate to a different region within his
or her country of origin, or another country where asylum could have
been sought, unless it would be reasonable under all the
circumstances to expect the individual to do so. 2 0 Family ties, former
residence, and social and cultural constraints are all considered when
16. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the discretionary nature of asylum and
appropriate criteria for the exercise of discretion).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55 (citing and discussing several pre-
Convention UN documents relating to refugees).
18. See infra text accompanying note 52 (quoting the Convention's language);
infra text accompanying notes 57-58 (discussing the drafting history).
19. See infra Part V.B (discussing UNHCR and state interpretations that have
extended refugee protection to persons who could escape persecution within their home
country or by going to another country, if their reasons for not doing so are sufficiently
strong).
20. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, T 91, U.N. Doc. HCRJIP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1979,
re-edited Jan. 1992) [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook] ("[A] person will not be excluded
from refugee status merely because he could have sought refuge in another part of the
same country, if under all the circumstances it would not have been reasonable to
expect him to do so."); see also infra text accompanying notes 403-405 (discussing
international acceptance of this principle and UNHCR's similar stance that asylum
should not be denied merely because it could have been sought in another country).
912 [VOL. 47-905
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assessing whether expecting relocation elsewhere would be
reasonable. 21 There is no good reason why the same principles should
not extend to persons who are nationals of another country where
they lack significant ties or face substantial barriers to successful
integration.2 2
This Article proceeds in the following Parts. Part II explores the
factors that have given rise to the increasing prevalence of multiple
nationality and the problems that arise when multiple nationals seek
asylum. Part III examines the Refugee Convention's approach and
how refugee tribunals have responded to its frequently harsh results.
Part IV turns to an in-depth examination of the U.S. Refugee Act, and
concludes that both the statute's text and history show that Congress
intended to allow multiple nationals fleeing persecution in any one
country of their nationality to be eligible for a discretionary grant of
asylum. It also considers the standards that should govern the
exercise of that discretion.
Part V turns to the question of how refugee-receiving countries
that have traditionally applied the Convention's restrictive definition
should respond to the claims of multiple nationals. It argues that the
underlying purposes of refugee protection and widely accepted
interpretations of the Convention that have evolved in analogous
areas support the development of state practice allowing multiple
nationals who face persecution in the country that was their home to
qualify for refugee status, unless it would be reasonable, under all the
circumstances, to expect them to relocate to a second country of
nationality. It also considers the potential role of the UNHCR and
European Union in fostering a more inclusive approach toward
multiple nationals' refugee claims.
II. THE RISE OF MULTIPLE NATIONALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
REFUGEES
The number of people with more than one nationality2 3 has
grown immensely in recent decades. 24 A confluence of factors has
21. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(3) (2013) (requiring adjudicators to
consider, when assessing reasonableness, a broad range of factors including "social and
cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties"); see also
infra text accompanying notes 403 and 406-07 (discussing UNHCR guidance calling
for consideration of similar factors).
22. See infra Part V (explaining why allowing multiple nationals to qualify for
asylum in appropriate circumstances is consistent with the core purposes that underlie
the international refugee protection regime).
23. The term "nationality" overlaps but is not synonymous with "citizenship."
"Nationality" refers to the relationship between a state and an individual that creates
certain reciprocal rights and duties recognized by international law. "Citizenship"
refers to rights of political participation conferred by a country's own laws. A person
2014] 913
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contributed to this trend. Every country has the power to determine
under its own laws who its nationals are, and there is no uniformity
in the rules governing how nationality is conferred. Some states'
regimes are based primarily on the principle of jus soli (birth in the
territory of the state), others on jus sanguinis (birth to a citizen
parent, whether in or outside the state's territory); many combine
elements of the two. 25 States also set their own rules concerning
naturalization (acquisition of nationality through marriage,
residence, or other factors) and loss of nationality.26 When- people
move across borders, or marry or have children with a person of
differing nationality, opportunities for multiple nationality increase.
A person who settles in a new country may naturalize without losing
a prior nationality, and his or her descendants may be nationals of
both countries. If country A assigns its nationality by jus soli and
country B by jus sanguinis, a child born in country A to parents who
are nationals of B will be a national of both.27 Globalization and the
increased speed and ease of international travel and communication
have vastly multiplied the opportunities for the intersection of
national laws to produce multiple nationals.28
A parallel trend has been the increasingly tolerant or even
encouraging stance that states and the international community have
may be a country's national without being a citizen, as is the case for residents of some
U.S.-administered islands in the Pacific. See ALFRED M. BOLL, MULTIPLE NATIONALITY
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57-75 (2007) (discussing the history behind and distinctions
between the terms). For purposes of this Article, the distinction rarely matters, and the
terms will be used interchangeably. I will generally refer to "multiple" rather than
"dual" nationality. Dual nationality is the most common form, but some people have
three or more nationalities.
24. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer, Plural Nationality:
Facing the Future in a Migratory World, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY: GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES
AND PRACTICES 63, 79 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas Klusmeyer eds., 2001)
(estimating that multiple nationals number in the tens of millions worldwide).
25. See Ivan Shearer & Brian Opeskin, Nationality and Statelessness, in
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 93, 98-99 (Brian Opeskin et al. eds.,
2012) (discussing jus soli and jus sanguinis as alternative criteria employed by states
in attributing their nationality and citing a 2001 study of 25 countries finding that
more than half made use of both approaches).
26. See generally id. at 96-102 (describing the means by which people may
acquire or lose nationality).
27. Or of three countries, if the parents are nationals of two different jus
sanguinis countries. See Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of
Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1418 (1997) (noting this was often the case for
children born in America to immigrant parents).
28. See David A. Martin, Introduction: The Trend Toward Dual Nationality, in
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DUAL NATIONALS: EVOLUTION AND PROSPECTS 3, 4-5 (David A.
Martin & Kay Hailbronner eds., 2003) (noting that by UN estimates upwards of 185
million people live outside their countries of nationality, resulting in an increasing
number of children being born with multiple nationalities); PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND
CITIZENSHIP: AMERICAN IDENTITY AFTER GLOBALIZATION 67-68 (2008) (concluding that
dramatic growth in the number of multiple nationals in the last decade "is predicated
on enhanced mobility, a defining feature of globalization").
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taken toward multiple nationality. During the nineteenth century
and continuing into the middle decades of the twentieth, national
laws and international agreements generally looked upon multiple
nationality with distrust, viewing it a source of potential friction
between states and divided loyalties in individuals. 29 States often
sought to limit it by requiring people to abandon previous
nationalities when they naturalized, forcing women to give up their
old nationality and take on their husband's when they married or
ascribing only the father's nationality to the children, and/or
requiring dual national children to elect one or the other nationality
upon reaching the age of majority. In most countries, these.sorts of
restrictions have fallen away over time, reflecting the emergence of
an international consensus against gender-discriminatory laws and
the growing realization that multiple nationality no longer poses
serious dangers to state interests.30 Emigrant-producing countries
see benefit in allowing their diasporas to keep their nationality in
29. See Rey Koslowski, Challenges of International Cooperation in a World of
Increasing Dual Nationality, in RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DUAL NATIONALS, supra note
28, at 157-60 (describing how international tensions arising from dual citizenship,
including the War of 1812, which was triggered by Great Britain's impressment of
British-born American citizens into its navy, led to a proliferation of bilateral treaties
and the development of international norms disfavoring dual nationality); Peter J.
Spiro, Dual Citizenship as Human Right, 8 INT'L J. CONST. L. 111, 112-15 (2010) ("It is
perhaps because dual nationality was at one time so threatening to world order and so
immune to legal resolution that it became the object of fierce condemnation."). A 1930
Convention on nationality laws declared that "every person should have a nationality
and should have one nationality only." Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 93
(entered into force July 1, 1937). As recently as 1974, the German Constitutional Court
stated that "multiple nationality is regarded, both domestically and internationally, as
an evil that should be avoided or eliminated" so that states may "set clear boundaries
for their sovereignty" and be "secure in the duty of loyalty of their citizens." Aleinikoff
& Klusmeyer, supra note 24, at 70-71 (quoting Opinion of German Federal
Constitutional Court, May 21, 1974, 254-55). See also Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815,
831-36 (1971) (upholding law limiting the ability of some U.S. citizens born abroad to
keep their citizenship on the ground that Congress was legitimately concerned with the
potential for divided loyalties and entanglements with foreign governments stemming
from dual nationality).
30. See Koslowski, supra note 29, at 160-63 (noting that increased
international migration, the demise of patriarchal citizenship laws, and declines in
interstate conflict and military conscription have contributed to a trend toward
increasing toleration of dual nationality); Martin, supra note 28, at 4-11 (discussing
factors that have led to decline in legal restrictions on multiple nationality); David A.
Martin, New Rules on Dual Nationality for a Democratizing Globe: Between Rejection
and Embrace, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 3-14 (1999) (reviewing the arguments in support
of eliminating restrictions on multiple nationality); Spiro, supra note 27, at 1453-64
(discussing the trend toward toleration of multiple nationality and asserting that the
risks posed by divided loyalties have diminished due to changes in the nature of the
global system).
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order to encourage affective ties, remittances, and investment. 31
Nationality has even been offered as a form of reparation for historic
wrongs, as in Spain's recent decision to allow Sephardic Jews whose
ancestors were expelled in 1492 to become Spanish citizens without
giving up their citizenship elsewhere.32
The growth of multiple nationality to a large degree reflects the
reality that more and more people have genuine and important links
to more than one country. A person's second country of nationality
may be a former home, a place where many relatives and friends still
live, and a country to which the person feels closely bound by ties of
language and culture. In such cases, the legal fact of nationality
corresponds well with the definition given by the International Court
of Justice in the oft-quoted Nottebohm case: "a legal bond having as
its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of
existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of
reciprocal rights and duties."3 3
But the increasing ease with which multiple nationality can be
acquired and retained also means that there are more and more cases
in which nationality does not correspond with affective ties, social
links, participation, or even familiarity.3 4 Many people hold a second
citizenship in a country where they have never lived and have no real
31. See Kim Barry, Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an
Emigration Context, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 11, 28-34 (2006) (noting that emigrant-sending
states have strong incentives to allow emigrants to keep their citizenship because their
economies depend on remittances and capital inflows, while for many emigrants
continued citizenship satisfies a psychological need for continued involvement with
their homeland); Christian Joppke, Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn in
Europe?, 2 LAw & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 128, 152-58 (2008) (describing a trend in Europe
toward liberalizing the ability of expatriates and their descendants to maintain
citizenship, and providing examples of laws passed in the Netherlands, Spain,
Portugal, France, and Italy); Martin, supra note 28, at 7-8 (discussing factors that led
many emigration countries by the 1990s to change their policies so that emigrants
would not lose their original citizenship when they naturalized elsewhere).
32. See Raphael Minder, Spain: Citizenship Process Eased for Sephardic Jews,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2012, at A8 (reporting Spain's announcement that it will grant
automatic citizenship to Jews of Sephardic descent with no requirement of residence in
Spain); see also Raphael Minder, Many of Spain's Sephardic Jews Still Waiting for
Citizenship, May 20, 2013, at A5 (reporting that the policy, when put in effect, will
allow Sephardic Jews to obtain Spanish citizenship without renouncing their current
citizenship). Germany's Basic Law of 1949 similarly gives Jews and others stripped of
their nationality between 1933 and 1945 for political, racial or religious reasons-and
their descendants-the right to reclaim German nationality upon request, without any
requirement of residence or abandoning another nationality. See Hans Von Mangoldt,
The Right of Return in German Nationality Law, 13 TEL AVIV. U. STUD. L. 29, 40-43
(1997) (discussing the application of article 116, paragraph 2 of the Basic Law).
33. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6).
34. Cf. Linda Bosniak, Denationalizing Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP TODAY,
supra note 24, at 237, 240-41 (discussing how citizenship can be understood to include
not only formal legal membership but also "active engagement in the life of a polity"
and "an experience of identity and solidarity").
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connections. Some countries confer nationality on descendants of
citizens in perpetuity, and others for two or three generations.3 5 In
jus sanguinis systems, as Ayelet Shachar notes, "the offspring of an
emigrant parent gains automatic citizenship in the parent's country
of origin, even where the family has severed all effective ties to the
society that they have left behind."36 Jus soli can also result in
citizenship without real connection. A child born in a country during
a short-term visit by parents may hold that country's citizenship even
if he or she never returns there or establishes any ties with that
country.3 7
Nor is the possession of a second nationality necessarily based on
an individual's consent or choice; frequently it is assigned
automatically at birth or conferred non-consensually during childhood
as a result of a parent naturalizing.3 8 Territorial disputes or state
succession can result in entire populations acquiring dual citizenship
through no doing of their own, as with South Korea's conferral of
citizenship on North Koreans,39 or Portugal's law providing that
those born in its colonies before they gained independence in the
1970s kept their Portuguese citizenship. 40 Once a person has
acquired a second citizenship, there is little incentive to abandon it,
and some states make renunciation difficult or impossible.4 1
35. See SPIRO, supra note 28, at 25 (noting that Ireland, Greece and Italy
"extend citizenship to any person enjoying one grandparent citizen, even if the
intermediate generation-the person's parent-had never set foot in the country");
Patrick Weil, Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws, in
CITIZENSHIP TODAY, supra note 24, at 17, 20 (listing jus sanguinis provisions of twenty-
five countries, most lacking generational limits).
36. AYALET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY 122 (2009); see also Martin,
supra note 30, at 32-33 (arguing that states should limit jus sanguinis citizenship
transmission in order to avoid the persistence of dual nationality "long after the family
has lost real connection with the home society").
37. See SHACHAR, supra note 36, at 116 ("[T]he 'precious good of life-long
citizenship [is bestowed] on mere transients and passers-by.") (citation omitted).
38. As was the case with the Bosnian-Croatian dual national whose case is
described at the beginning of this Article. Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Plural Citizenships, in
DUAL NATIONALITY, SOcIAL RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CITIZENSHIP IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE
61, 70 (Randall Hansen & Patrick Weil eds., 2002) (arguing that the consensuality of a
person's acquisition of dual nationality should affect the consequences that flow from
it).
39. See infra note 174 (discussing South Korea's nationality laws).
40. See Ryszard Piotrowicz, Refugee Status and Multiple Nationality in the
Indonesian Archipelago: Is There a Timor Gap?, 8 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 319, 324-25
(1996) (quoting and discussing Portuguese nationality laws).
41. See, e.g., Kay Hailbronner, Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals: Changing
Concepts and Attitudes, in RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF DUAL NATIONALS, supra note 28, at
19, 25 (noting that Iranian law "makes it practically impossible to lose or surrender
nationality"); Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the
Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 239, 264-65 (1999) (discussing the difficulty of
renouncing Israeli nationality, which requires Israel's consent).
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Inevitably, some multiple nationals are forced to flee their
former homes due to persecution. Their multiple nationality does
provide them with one benefit mono-nationals do not have: another
country is obliged to let them enter its territory and live there.42 But
if this translates into an obligation on the part of the asylum-seeker
to go to a country of nationality where he or she has no real ties or
would face serious hardships, the multiple national is worse off than
other asylum-seekers, who can exercise some control over where to
seek asylum. As long as they can get to the country they wish to
resettle in, that country will generally be responsible for hearing
their asylum claim. 43
The question of how to handle cases like the ones described at
the beginning of this Article exposes a tension between two
underlying purposes of refugee protection. One purpose is
humanitarian, to effectively meet refugees' needs and alleviate their
suffering.44 Providing some agency to those who have been uprooted
42. See Shearer & Opeskin, supra note 25, at 120-21 (noting that it is an
established principle of international law that states must allow their own nationals
entry and cannot deport them); AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L LAW, THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
ACROSS BORDERS 39, 85 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992) (same). The
principle is not always honored in practice. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, No Exit: China
Uses Passports as Political Cudgel, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2013, at Al, A6 (describing
cases of China denying passport renewal and/or refusing entry to citizens living
abroad).
43. The Refugee Convention does not require that asylum be sought in the first
country arrived at; it contemplates that a refugee may pass through other countries
before reaching her intended destination and seeking asylum. Under Article lE, only
those who actually have "taken residence" in a country and been recognized by its
authorities as having rights equivalent to those of nationals are barred from claiming
refugee status elsewhere. James Hathaway has noted that this framework "effectively
allows most refugees to choose for themselves the country in which they will claim
refugee status." JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 46 (1991); see also
GUY S. GoODWIN-GILL & JANE McADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 265 (3d
ed. 2007) ("International law does not impose a duty on the asylum seeker to lodge a
protection claim at any particular stage of flight."). It is, however, increasingly common
for countries to enter into "readmission agreements" allowing for the return of an
asylum-seeker to a "safe country" the person passed through in which asylum could
have been sought, or diversion to another country willing to consider the asylum claim.
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum
Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE
L. 567, 575-78 (2003) (describing the recent proliferation of "safe third country"
restrictions and readmission agreements). However, the principle that family ties and
other connections and the asylum-seeker's intentions should be considered before
requiring an individual to seek asylum elsewhere has gained wide (although not
universal) acceptance. See infra notes 376, 403, 436 and accompanying text (discussing
U.S., UNHCR, and European Union decisions or directives endorsing this principle).
44. See Convention, supra note 3, pmbl. 1-2 (invoking the United Nations'
"profound concern for refugees" and desire to assure them "the widest possible exercise
of ... fundamental rights and freedoms"); GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 43, at
10 (noting that the Convention's "first point of reference is the individual . . . as a
rights-holder," and its refugee definition begins with the individual's fear of
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from their homes and allowing them a degree of choice in where to
seek asylum, especially when being forced to go elsewhere would
inflict further suffering and make it difficult to build a new life, is
consistent with this purpose. But refugee protection also rests on the
notion that states are responsible for protecting their own nationals
and have a sovereign right to refuse non-nationals admission to their
territory. Refugee law provides a backstop, a form of "surrogate or
substitute protection" that comes into play only when national
protection is unavailable. 45 From this state-centered perspective, it
seems unreasonable to ask one country to provide refuge if another
country has a preexisting duty to do the job.
As the next two Parts of this Article will show, the drafters of the
Refugee Convention privileged state-centered over humanitarian
concerns by inserting a clause that expressly excludes multiple
nationals from the definition of a refugee unless they can show that
none of their countries of nationality will protect them from
persecution. The U.S. refugee definition, however, is worded
decidedly differently, and both its text and its history warrant a
broader interpretation. Part V will return to the question of the
international refugee regime's underlying purposes, and argue that
the goals of refugee protection are best served by requiring multiple
nationals to seek refuge in a second country of nationality only when
it is reasonable, under all the circumstances, to expect them to do so.
III. MULTIPLE NATIONALITY UNDER THE REFUGEE CONVENTION
The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
requires states to adhere to certain minimum standards of treatment
toward people who meet the definition of a "refugee."46 The bedrock
obligation is Article 33's prohibition against expelling or returning a
refugee "in any manner whatsoever" to a place where the person's life
or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social, group, or political
opinion (the duty of non-refoulement).47 But satisfaction of the refugee
definition confers more than protection against non-refoulement. The
persecution and only secondarily turns to the availability of state protection); Kristen
Walker, Defending the 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee, 17 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 583, 587-96 (2003) (discussing the strong role humanitarian concern for meeting
refugees' needs played in the Convention's drafting).
45. HATHAWAY, supra note 43, at 135; see also id. at 124; UNHCR Handbook,
supra note 20, at 106 ("Whenever available, national protection takes precedence
over international protection.").
46. See Convention, supra note 3, art, 1A (defining "refugee").
47. Id. art. 33(1). The duty does not apply to persons reasonably regarded as a
danger to the country's security or who have been convicted of a "particularly serious
crime" that makes them a "danger to the community." Id. art. 33(2).
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Convention requires states to grant an array of social and economic
rights to refugees present in their territories, 48 and Article 34
provides that states "shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation
and naturalization of refugees."49 While the "as far as possible"
language effectively makes this provision non-binding, in many
developed countries meeting the refugee definition makes an
individual at least presumptively eligible for an asylum grant that
provides a path to permanent residence.50
The refugee definition set out in Article 1A(2) 5 1 applies to any
person who:
. . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable,
or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his former habitual residence . . . is unable, or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to return to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term
"the country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of
which he is a national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking
the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid
reason based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the
protection of one of the countries of which he is a national.5 2
The second paragraph unequivocally denies refugee status to
multiple nationals unless they can show that their unwillingness to
return to each country of nationality is justified by a well-founded
fear of persecution.
48. See id. arts. 2-31 (detailing refugee rights in areas such as freedom of
religion and association, education, housing, employment, and travel). Some rights are
limited to refugees "lawfully" in a country's territory; others extend to all refugees
present in the country.
49. Id. art. 34.
50. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(A), 1159(b), 1427 (2014) (providing that
those who satisfy the -refugee definition are eligible for asylum then permanent
residence and citizenship); Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27,
§§ 20-21 (Can.) (providing that persons determined to be Convention refugees may
become permanent residents); OLGA FERGUSON SIDORENKO, THE COMMON EUROPEAN
ASYLUM SYSTEM 65, 73, 121-22 (2007) (describing EU Directives that make persons
meeting the refugee definition eligible to remain as refugees and subsequently qualify
for long-term resident status).
51. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A. Article 1A(1) included within the
definition all those who had already been classified as refugees under previous
international arrangements, such as the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization, the UN agency that assisted refugees from 1946 until 1951, when its
functions were taken over by UNHCR.
52. Id. art. 1A(2). The Convention also contained language limiting the
definition's scope to those made refugees by events occurring before 1951, and allowed
contracting states to narrow it further by covering only those displaced by events in
Europe. See id. arts. 1A(2) and lB. The 1967 UN Protocol eliminated these temporal
and geographic restrictions. Protocol, supra note 3, art. I.
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The Convention's refugee definition was the result of
considerable debate and compromise, and the approach ultimately
taken toward multiple nationals was far from inevitable. As
originally envisioned by the UN General Assembly in a 1946
resolution setting forth general principles for a refugee protection
regime, displaced persons who "expressed valid objections to
returning to their countries of origin" would not be compelled to do
so. 53 The Constitution of the UN's first refugee agency, the
International Refugee Organization, defined refugees within the
agency's concern as persons outside their country of nationality or
former habitual residence who had "valid objections to returning to
those countries," which could include not just risk of persecution but
also "objections of a political nature, . . . compelling family reasons
arising out of previous persecution, or, compelling reasons of infirmity
or illness."54 The General Assembly's 1950 statute creating the office
of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees similarly gave the
UNHCR a mandate to assist persons who had fled persecution who
were unwilling to seek the protection of a country of nationality
either because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted "or for
reasons other than personal convenience."5 5 These formulations
provided some scope for considering multiple nationals refugees, even
if they could avoid persecution in one such country, if they had
sufficiently strong reasons not to seek refuge there.56
The Convention's multiple nationality provision had its origins
in language proposed by a British delegate who objected to treating
persons with "dual or even plural nationality" as refugees if
53. G.A. Res. 8 (I), U.N. Doe. A/RES/8(I) (Feb. 12, 1946); see also LOUISE W.
HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HISTORY AND WORK, 1946-1952, 29-33 (1956) (discussing the
origins of this resolution in the Western powers' resistance to Soviet demands for the
speedy repatriation of refugees).
54. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization annex I., pt. I,
§§ A(1)-A (2), C(1), opened for signature Dec. 15, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, 18 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter IRO Constitution].
55. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428 (V), I 6(A)(ii), U.N. Doe, AIRES/428(V) (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter UNHCR
Statute]; see 1 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
407-09 (1966) (discussing the broad range of factors that could constitute "reasons
other than personal convenience"); Richard Plender, Admission of Refugees: Draft
Convention on Territorial Asylum, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 45, 52 (1977) (discussing the
UNHCR Statute's broader coverage than the Convention in this regard).
56. The UNHCR Statute states that the High Commissioner's competence does
not extend to a person with more than one nationality "unless he satisfies the
provisions of the preceding paragraph in relation to each of the countries of which he is
a national." UNHCR Statute, supra note 55, 7. Because the preceding paragraph
contains the "for reasons other than personal convenience" provision, UNHCR's
mandate can be read to include dual nationals who fear persecution in one country and
have other good reasons for not seeking protection in the other.
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protection could be found in one of those countries.57 That view
prevailed in the Economic and Social Council and at the Conference
of Plenipotentiaries that finalized the Convention. It reflected the
desire of many states to limit their obligations toward refugees, which
can also be seen in the decisions to restrict coverage to those
displaced by pre-1951 events and to abandon the "valid objections to
returning" approach in favor of limiting refugee status to those who
would still face persecution if they returned.58
The UNHCR's Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status, which has wide international acceptance
as a guide to interpreting the Convention, explains that the second
paragraph of Article 1A(2) rests on the principle that, "Wherever
available, national protection takes precedence over international
protection."59 As a corollary, it cautions that "possession of a
nationality in the legal sense" does not necessarily show "the
availability of protection by the country concerned"; a nationality may
be "ineffective" if it "does not entail the protection normally granted
to nationals"-i.e, the right to enter and remain in the country
without being persecuted or subjected to refoulement.60
Many refugee-receiving countries have embraced the
Convention's multiple nationality provision, either applying it
directly or incorporating it into their domestic laws.61 Canada's
57. United Kingdom Proposed Text to be Substituted for Article I of the Draft
Convention in E/1618, ECOSOC Social Committee, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/L.63 (Aug. 1,
1950); see also ECOSOC Social Comm., Summary Record of Meeting, U.N. Doc
E/AC.7/SR.160 (Aug 2, 1950), at 6-7 (comments of Mr. Fearnley of the UK); see
NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES: ITS
HISTORY, CONTENTS AND INTERPRETATION 54 (1953) (discussing origins of the
Convention's multiple nationality provision in the UK proposal).
58. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise of
Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129, 153-54 (1990) (discussing countries' reluctance
to provide a "blank check" for future refugees of unknown origin); Andreas
Zimmermann & Claudia Mahler, Article 1A, para. 2, in THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 281,
310-11 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 2011) (noting that the Conference of
Plenipotentiaries removed the phrase "or for reasons other than personal convenience"
from the refugee definition). A remnant of the old approach remained in a provision
that allowed those already recognized as refugees under the IRO Constitution or other
pre-1951 refugee arrangements to keep their status even if they no longer had reason
to fear persecution if they had "compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution"
for refusing to return to their country of former residence. See Convention, supra note
3, art. IC(6).
59. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 1 106.
60. Id. 107. The Handbook adds that before a nationality is deemed
ineffective, an applicant generally should be required to show that he or she requested
and was refused protection. Id.
61. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 96
(Can.) (defining a "Convention refugee" as a person who by reason of well-founded fear
of persecution "is outside each of their countries of nationality and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, unwilling to avail themself of the protection of each of those
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Supreme Court described it as the natural outgrowth of "the rationale
underlying international refugee protection ... to serve as 'surrogate'
shelter coming into play only upon failure of national support."6 2 "If a
person has a nationality of a country where he is not at risk of
persecution," reasoned a UK refugee tribunal, "he ought not to be of
any international concern." 63
The Convention's multiple nationals clause affords no room for
considering the reasonableness of asking an asylum-seeker to go to
another country. Whether the person has ever set foot in that
country, speaks its language, would have any family or social ties,
would face economic hardship or a lack of political freedom, or
exercised any choice in acquiring the nationality are all deemed
irrelevant. Refugee tribunals troubled by the harsh results this can
produce in individual cases have struggled to find ways to limit the
sweep of the exclusion. Courts have shown particular angst in
situations where nationality has been conferred on broad classes
based on tenuous links. When Indonesia annexed East Timor and
repressed its populace, many East Timorese (now Indonesian
citizens) sought refuge in Australia, but having been born in a
Portuguese colony they also held the citizenship of a hated colonial
power half a world away.64 Under Israel's Law of Return, virtually
any Jew in the world can acquire Israeli nationality simply by
expressing a desire to immigrate and setting foot on Israeli soil. 6 5
And, as described in one of the scenarios at the beginning of this
Article, South Korea recognizes all North Koreans as citizens.
Does this mean that there can be no such thing as a Jewish,
North Korean, or East Timorese refugee? Some tribunals have not
shied away from this conclusion. A Canadian court, for example,
ruled against a Jewish citizen of Azerbaijan who fled religious
persecution and sought asylum in Canada, where her daughter
lived.66 She had no relatives or friends in Israel, but the court found
that since Israeli citizenship was open to her "by simple demand" she
countries"); Migration Act 1958, (Cth) s 36(3) (Austl.) (amended 1999) ("Australia is
taken not to have protection obligations in respect of a non-citizen who has not taken
all possible steps to avail himself or herself of a right to enter and reside in . . . any
country apart from Australia, including countries of which the non-citizen is a
national"); KK & ors v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 92 (I.A.C.),
2-3, aff'd sub nom. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. SP (North Korea) & ors,
[2012] EWCA Civ. 114 (C.A. 2012) (directly applying Convention's multiple nationals
provision); Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand, Refugee Appeal
No. 2067/94, 9-13 (July 4, 1996) (same).
62. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 709, 752.
63. KK & ors, [2011] UKUT 92, 3.
64. See Piotrowicz, supra note 40, at 320, 332 (noting that many East Timorese
with Portuguese nationality "regard Portugal as an oppressor State").
65. See Shachar, supra note 41, at 234-36 (describing the broad citizenship
rights conferred by the Law of Return).
66. Grygorian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995]
F.C.J. No. 1608, 1-4.
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could not be considered a Convention refugee; "any other more liberal
result or less stringent obligation would violate the underlying
rationale of refugee law as a remedy of last resort."67 But others have
recoiled from the "exquisite irony," as an Australian jurist put it, of
finding that a Convention adopted in the shadow of the Holocaust
would have meant from its very outset that Jews could not be
refugees. 68
Efforts to find coherent limiting principles, however, have not
been very successful. One approach, which UNHCR has endorsed, is
to draw a bright line between a nationality currently held and a
potential nationality, which would not count even if available by
right.69 While textually defensible-the Convention's multiple
nationality provision refers to "countries of which [a person] is a
national" 7 0-this approach yields some arbitrary and irrational
results. It saves Jews from exclusion (under Israeli law they do not
67. Id. T 8--15; see also MZXLT & Anor v Minister for Immigration & Anor
[2007] FMCA 799, TT 1-14 (Austl.) (describing decision of Australia's Refugee Review
Tribunal that denied a protection visa to a woman gang-raped by anti-Semites in
Russia who had never been to Israel, spoke no Hebrew, and was married to an
Australian man, on the ground that as a Jew she had a right to Israeli nationality);
NAEN v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC
6, 1-3 (Austl.) (upholding denial of protection visa to a Jewish woman from Russia
and her Christian husband because both could obtain citizenship under the Law of
Return). Australian tribunals denied the claims of several East Timorese asylum
seekers because of their Portuguese nationality. See Ryszard Piotrowicz, Lay Kon Tji v.
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs: The Function and Meaning of Effective
Nationality, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 544 n.2 (1999) (listing Refugee Review Tribunal
decisions). For decisions holding that North Koreans whom South Korea would
recognize as citizens are ineligible for refugee status, see, for example, X (Re), 2013
CanLII 76469, T 66-67 (CA IRB) (Can.) (holding that North Koreans cannot be
granted refugee status without establishing a well-founded fear of persecution in South
Korea), and supra note 4 (citing Australian cases).
68. NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6, 30 (Austl.); see also id. TT 95-98 (Kirby, J.,
concurring) (observing that it would be "astonishing" if the Law of Return had the
effect of eliminating international protection obligations toward Jews, given that the
Convention was in part a response to the international community's failure to provide
refuge to Jews fleeing Nazi persecution). The High Court of Australia, while rejecting
the view that Jews with prospective citizenship rights in Israel cannot qualify as
refugees, acknowledged that § 36(3) of the Migration Act (quoted supra note 61), which
was not yet in effect when the case was filed, might require a different result in future
cases. Id. 11 10, 58-60, 87-88.
69. In comments on the EU's 2004 directive establishing uniform minimum
standards for refugee qualification, UNHCR objected to a provision allowing
adjudicators to consider whether an applicant "could reasonably be expected to avail
himself of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship" on the
ground that the Convention's multiple nationals clause creates no obligation to claim a
nationality not already held. UNHCR Annotated Comments on the EC Council
Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, at 14-15, OJ L 304/12 (Sept. 30, 2004)
(comment on Article 4(3)(e)) [hereinafter UNHCR Comments on QD].
70. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2) (emphasis added).
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become citizens unless and until they arrive in Israel), but not North
Koreans or East Timorese (because the nationality laws of South
Korea and Portugal already treat them as citizens). People who are
nominally citizens of a country where they lack any genuine ties
would be denied refugee status, while others who have real and close
ties with a country in which they have a right to citizenship upon
request could qualify as refugees, merely because they refuse to
apply. Unsurprisingly, refugee tribunals in a number of countries
have concluded that the surrogate state protection principle requires
treating a nationality available by right no differently than a
currently held nationality.7'
Another limiting strategy is to adopt the standard of the
International Court of Justice's Nottebohm decision, which stated
that only a nationality that reflects a "genuine connection" and "social
fact of attachment" between the individual and the country concerned
is valid under international law.72 Although a few refugee tribunals
have endorsed this approach,73 most have rejected it. Nottebohm's
test for effective nationality has generally been understood as limited
to its context of determining when a state can exercise diplomatic
protection and assert a claim on behalf of its national against another
state.74 Nationality serves a very different function in the
71. See KK & ors, [2011] UKUT 92, 82 (concluding that for purposes of the
Refugee Convention, "if [a person] is entitled to nationality, subject only his making an
application for it, he is ... to be regarded as a national of the country concerned");
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Williams, [2005] FCA 126, IT 19-
34 (Can.) (holding that "if it is within the control of the applicant to acquire the
citizenship of another country with respect to which he has no well-founded fear of
persecution, the claim for refugee status will be denied"); see also supra note 61
(quoting Australian statute requiring the applicant to take all possible steps to take
advantage of a right to citizenship elsewhere).
72. Nottebohm Case, 1955 I.C.J. at 22-23, discussed supra text accompanying
note 33. The ICJ held that only a "real and effective" nationality provides a basis for
one state to assert a claim on behalf of its national against another state, with
effectiveness to be determined by factors such as "the habitual residence of the
individual concerned . . . [,] the centre of his interests, his family ties, his participation
in public life, attachment shown by him for a given country and inculcated in his
children, etc."
73. See Katkova v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1997]
40 Imm. L.R. (2d) 216 (Can.) (holding that a Russian Jew who never lived in Israel and
had no immediate family there should not have been denied refugee status in Canada,
even though Israel would recognize her as a national); see also Matter of Fatoumata
Toure, No. A24 876 244, 1990 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 1435, at *21, *29 (BIA June 26,
1990) (relying in part on Nottebohm to hold that a passport issued by an Ivory Coast
diplomat to a Guinean woman with few real ties to Ivory Coast did not confer effective
nationality).
74. See Shearer & Opeskin, supra note 25, at 97-98 (stating that Nottebohm
now has limited value as authority and can be understood as merely restricting, in
certain circumstances, a state's right to provide diplomatic protection to a national
with whom it lacks genuine ties); BOLL, supra note 23, at 110-13, 279 (discussing
Nottebohm's limited scope).
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Convention's multiple nationality provision, where it is a marker for
the availability of protection against persecution.75 In any event, the
links of ancestry or birthplace which underlie jus sanguinis and jus
soli citizenship have been uniformly found sufficient to meet any
effectiveness requirement that may exist under international law.76
Applying Notttehohm's standard thus does nothing to help most
asylum-seekers who lack real ties to their second country of
nationality. If they are descended from distant ancestors who
emigrated, or were born in a country but left it during infancy, or are
still considered citizens by a former colonial power, they are out of
luck.
Another strategy sometimes used to avoid harsh outcomes is
seize on any discretionary or contingent element in a country's
nationality laws as a basis for finding that national protection is not
assured. Some refugee judges have reasoned that because Israel's
Law of Return confers a right to nationality on "every Jew who has
expressed his desire to settle in Israel," Jews lacking a genuine desire
to live in Israel have no entitlement to its nationality.77 That
approach is hard to square with the Convention refugee definition's
exclusion of those who fail to seek a country of nationality's protection
for any reason other than a well-founded fear of persecution.78 (It also
75. See KK & ors, [2011] UKUT 92, 62-67, 90 (concluding that when
assessing whether a person meets the refugee definition, "there is no separate concept
of 'effective' nationality; the issue is the availability of protection in the country in
question"); Jong Kim Koe v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs, (1997) 74
FCR 508, 143 ALR 695, 1997 AUSTR FEDCT LEXIS 179, at *17-20, *28-34 (holding
that for purposes of the Refugee Convention, the issue is whether a country that
recognizes the person as a national will provide protection, and not its effectiveness
under Nottebohm); see also supra text accompanying note 60 (discussing similar view
taken by the UNHCR Handbook).
76. See Lay Kon Tji v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1998) 158
ALR 681, 1998 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 909, at *26, *20-27 (discussing international law
authorities); see also Piotrowicz, supra note 40, at 327-29 (discussing the range of
acceptable links under international law).
77. MZXLT, [2007] FMCA 799, TT 62-67 (Austl.); Katkova, [1997] 40 Imm.
L.R. (2d) 216; see also Lay Kon Tji, 1998 AUST FEDCT LEXIS 909, at *37-*47 (relying
on evidence that Portugal would recognize as nationals only East Timorese who
expressed a desire for Portuguese nationality as basis for finding that Portuguese
nationality was not effective for those who lacked such a desire, and thus did not
preclude refugee protection in Australia).
78. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2) ("[A] person shall not be deemed to
be lacking the protection of the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason
based on well-founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the
countries of which he is a national."); see also Andrew Wolman, North Korean Asylum
Seekers and Dual Nationality, 24 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 793, 812 (2012) ("The Refugee
Convention . . . at no point implies that individuals should be considered refugees if
they lack the desire to go to their country of nationality."); MA (Ethiopia) v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 289, [83] (Eng.) ("[R]efugee status is not a
matter of choice. A person cannot be entitled to refugee status solely because he or she
refuses to make an application to her embassy, or refuses or fails to take reasonable
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presupposes the existence of other options-presumably an asylum-
seeker would have a genuine desire to go to Israel if the only other
choice were returning to the country of persecution.) A provision that
allows Israel's immigration minister to deny entrance if a person has
a "criminal past" or poses a danger to public health or security has
also been cited as reason to treat Israeli nationality as discretionary
rather than available by right.79 But it is unclear why, in the absence
of any facts suggesting that one of these exceptions would apply, a
person who satisfies the main standard for claiming citizenship
should not be viewed as entitled to it.80
None of this is to fault courts for trying to find ways to avoid
requiring people to go to a nominal country of nationality in
situations where it seems unfair and unreasonable to do so. But it is
an inevitable byproduct of the Convention's stance toward multiple
nationals that, as a Justice of Australia's High Court put it, many are
left "hostage to arrangements . .. made affecting their nationality by
countries with which they may have no real connection."8i
IV. MULTIPLE NATIONALITY UNDER THE U.S. REFUGEE ACT
The Refugee Act of 1980 adopted a refugee definition modeled on
but not identical to the Convention definition. 82 A person who
satisfies the statutory definition may be admitted as a refugee from
abroad through the refugee resettlement program, or, if already
present in the United States or at its borders, may be granted
asylum.83 Both forms of relief are discretionary.84
steps to obtain recognition and evidence of her nationality."); see also cases cited supra
note 71.
79. Katkova, [1997] 40 Imm. L.R. (2d) 216 (reasoning that because Israel
retains discretionary authority to deny citizenship in certain circumstances, a Jewish
applicant should not be denied Convention refugee status on the ground that she holds
an entitlement to Israeli nationality); see also KK & ors, [2011] UKUT, 80 (dicta)
(endorsing Katkova's reasoning).
80. Cf. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 107 (stating that as a general rule
there should be a request for and refusal of protection before it is established that a
nationality is ineffective).
81. NAGV and NAGW of 2002 v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural &
Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 6, T 93 (Austl.) (Kirby, J., concurring).
82. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102-03
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2014)).
83. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2014).
84. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(1), 1158(b)(1)(A) (2014); see Matter of Salim, 18 I. & N.
Dec. 311, 314 (BIA 1982) (discussing asylum's discretionary nature under the Refugee
Act). Providing the opportunity to be considered for refugee admission or asylum was
enough to satisfy the requirement of Article 34 of the Refugee Convention that
countries "as far as possible facilitate" the assimilation of refugees. See INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 441 (1987) (explaining that Article 34 "is precatory [and] does
not require the implementing authority actually to grant asylum to all who are
eligible").
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To bring U.S. law into conformity with the Convention's
obligation of non-refoulement, the Refugee Act beefed up an already-
existing provision that gave the Attorney General discretion to
withhold deportation to a country where an individual would face
persecution.85 The Act made such withholding mandatory when a
person's "life or freedom would be threatened in such country on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion"-language drawn directly from
Article 33 of the Convention. 86 Unlike asylum and refugee admission,
withholding of removal confers no path to permanent residence;87 it
merely guarantees that for as long as the likelihood of persecution
remains, the person will not be deported to the country where the risk
exists. If any other country is willing to accept the person, he or she
can be deported there.88 Thus, multiple nationals who could be safe in
one of their countries of nationality are not eligible for withholding of
removal. What turns on whether the refugee definition covers them is
whether they may be considered for a discretionary grant of asylum
or refugee admission.
Although the U.S. refugee definition closely resembles the
Convention's, there are a number of textual differences. While the
Convention requires that a refugee be "outside the country of his
nationality," the Refugee Act added a subsection allowing the
President to designate persons still inside their home countries as
refugees.89 The U.S. definition also goes beyond the Convention by
allowing those unwilling to return to a country either "because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution" to qualify, whereas
the Convention definition covers only those with a current well-
founded fear.90 These differences in wording have long been
understood as significant departures from the Convention that evince
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
86. Refugee Act of 1980 § 203(e), 94 Stat. 102, 107 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2014)). See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.)
(explaining that the withholding of deportation language was adopted "with the
understanding that that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol").
87. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2014) (permitting refugees and asylees to adjust their
status to permanent residents after one year).
88. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(1), (2) (2014) (authorizing the removal of an alien to
any country of his or her citizenship or nationality, or, if push comes to shove, to any
country whose government will accept the person); Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15,
18 (BIA 1981) (explaining that "withholding of deportation is country-specific, barring
deportation only to a single place" and does not bar removal to "any other place to
which an alien may be deported").
89. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2014).
90. Compare id. at § 1101(a)(42)(A), with Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2)
(containing no reference to past persecution as a basis for refugee status).
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Congressional intent to provide a broader scope of coverage under
U.S. law.91
Some other minor wording differences are most plausibly read as
reflecting the drafters' stylistic preferences rather than any intent to
diverge from the international definition's substance. For example,
the U.S. definition refers to persecution "on account of' one of the five
protected grounds, while the Convention speaks of persecution "for
reasons of' those grounds. It is hard to imagine any difference in
meaning was intended.92
In contrast, the differences concerning nationality are fairly
striking. First of all, the U.S. definition completely omits the second
paragraph of the Convention definition, which defines "the country of
his nationality" to mean "each of the countries of which [the person] is
a national" and declares multiple nationals ineligible for refugee
status unless they have well-founded fear-based reasons for not going
to each such country.9 3 Second, the U.S. definition changes "the
country of his nationality," the phrase used in the Convention, to "any
country of such person's nationality." In full, the main clause of the
U.S. definition reads:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country
of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection
of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, .. 94
Under the approach to statutory interpretation espoused by the
U.S. Supreme Court,9 5 the starting point for construction is the
91. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 9 (1979); see also S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4
(1979) (acknowledging that the U.S. refugee definition's in-country provision covers
persons not considered refugees under the Convention); Matter of L-S-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
705, 710 n.5 (BIA 2012) (explaining that the U.S. refugee definition's language makes
clear that "the experience of past persecution itself' renders a person a refugee).
92. The Convention itself seems to use the terms interchangeably; Article 33
refers to threats to life or freedom "on account of' any of the five protected grounds.
Convention, supra note 3, art. 33. The U.S. definition also changes the Convention's
phrase "owing to" to "because of' when expressing the idea that persecution must be
the cause of the individual's unwillingness to return, rewords "membership of a
particular social group" to read "membership in" and changes the Convention's
reference to a stateless person's country of "former habitual residence" to the country
where the person "last habitually resided." Compare id. art. 1A(2), with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014).
93. See supra text accompanying note 52 (quoting the second paragraph of
Article 1A(2)).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2014) (emphasis added).
95. See generally LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2011) (summarizing the
Supreme Court's statutory construction jurisprudence).
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statute's language. If the "plain meaning" of the text points clearly in
one direction, that generally ends the inquiry.96 When statutory
language is ambiguous, courts will defer to an authoritative
interpretation issued by an administrative agency charged with the
law's implementation, provided that the administrative
interpretation is reasonable.97 In the absence of a reasonable
administrative construction that warrants deference, courts will
consider the statute's language, structure, purpose and legislative
history to determine what reading best furthers Congressional
intent.98
A. The Statutory Text
The U.S. refugee definition's use of the phrase "any country of
such person's nationality" clearly contemplates that a person may
have more than one nationality. Considered in isolation, that phrase
could be referring to one country of which a person is a national (no
matter which one), or to all such countries. In common usage "any"
can take on either meaning. Its dictionary definitions include "one or
some of whatever kind or sort" (as in "any plan is better than no
plan"); "one or more: not none" (e.g., "I can't find any stamps"); and
"all" (e.g., "give me any letters you find").99 In linguistic terms, "any"
is a "function word" whose primary role is to do something to the
semantic structure of a sentence rather than to stand for something
in itself. Thus, the meaning of a phrase using "any" is heavily
dependent on its grammatical surroundings.100 And in statutory
construction, it is axiomatic that "language must be read in context
since a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it."101
96. See, e.g., Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)
("[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous ... judicial inquiry is complete") (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
97. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (setting standards for judicial deference to agency decisions).
98. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214-24 (1984) (employing these
tools to interpret a statute after finding that the agency's construction was
unreasonable).
99. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 97 (1986). The Supreme Court has said that "[r]ead naturally,
the word 'any' has an expansive meaning," United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5
(1997), but this tells us little, since all of the senses in which the word can be used are
expansive in their own ways. As the Supreme Court noted in another case, 'any' can
and does mean different things depending upon the setting." Nixon v. Mo. Mun.
League, 541 U.S. 125, 132 (2004).
100. See Jill C. Anderson, When Words Fail Us (forthcoming, on file with
author).
101. Gen. Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 596 (2004).
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The wording of the rest of the U.S. refugee definition strongly
suggests that "any" is being used in the sense of "one, no matter
which," not "all." The same sentence goes on to require that a person
"outside any country of such person's nationality" be unable or
unwilling to return to and seek the protection of "that country," in the
singular. It does not say "each such country" or something along those
lines, which is what one would expect to see if "any" meant "all." 02
The grammar of the sentence signifies that what a multiple national
needs to show is the existence of a country of nationality to which he
or she is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution, not
that this would be true for all her countries of nationality. 03
Another change from the Convention's wording made by the
Refugee Act's drafters lends further support to the "any one country"
interpretation. The U.S. definition refers to the inability or
unwillingness of a person outside any country of his or her nationality
(or last habitual residence, if stateless) "to return to, and . . . avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country . . . ." The
Convention, in contrast, omits "return to" and speaks only of a
national's inability or unwillingness to avail himself of the country of
102. The Convention definition also uses the phrase "that country," but the
phrase there refers back to "the country of his nationality," which is then explicitly
defined to mean "each of the countries of which he is a national," and is further
clarified by language stating that a multiple national does not qualify as a refugee if he
lacks valid, well-founded fear based reasons for not returning to "one of the countries of
which he is a national." Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2).
103. The Dictionary Act states that "unless the context indicates otherwise ...
words importing the singular include and apply to several persons, parties, or things."
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2014). However, the Supreme Court has declined to apply this
presumption when Congress uses the singular in a setting where one would expect to
see a plural had a plural meaning been intended. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S.
415, 421-22 (2009) (reasoning that because Congress used the singular word "element"
in a statute, while referring to "elements" in other provisions, it meant to describe only
one required element). The Court noted: "On the rare occasions when we have relied on
[the Dictionary Act] rule, doing so was 'necessary to carry out the evident intent of the
statute."' Id. at 422 n.5 (quoting First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis V. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640,
657 (1924)). Here, both the grammatical structure of the sentence and other aspects of
the statute's wording point toward a singular meaning. See infra text accompanying
notes 103-117.
Had Congress adopted the Convention's phrasing ("outside the country of his
nationality"), there would be a stronger case for applying the singular-includes-the-
plural presumption, because that wording leaves unclear what is to be done if the
person has more than one country of nationality. When "the country" becomes "the
countries," the next phrase, which refers to the person's inability or unwillingness to
return to "that country," can correspondingly be transformed into "those countries."
But the language Congress instead employed ("outside any country of such person's
nationality") already contemplates the existence of more than one country of
nationality. The subsequent use of the singular (such person's inability or
unwillingness to return to "that country") indicates that "any" is referring to one of
those countries, not all of them. And as will be discussed in Part IV.C, legislative
history provides no "evident intent" that would require reading the singular to include
the plural; on balance, it supports the "any one country" interpretation.
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nationality's protection.104 (The phrase "return to" is used in the
Convention only when referring to the "former habitual residence" of
a stateless person.) To avail oneself of a country's protection is
something that can be accomplished whether or not a person has
previously been there. To "return to" a country, in contrast, is
something that can only occur if the person was previously located in
that country and left. The U.S. definition's requirement that the
person establish an inability or unwillingness to "return to" any
country of nationality thus only makes sense if "any country" is
referring to the country in which the person was persecuted or faced a
well-founded fear of persecution-which generally would be the place
where the person previously lived. 05 If it meant all countries of a
person's nationality, it frequently would include countries a person
never resided in or even visited, which, by definition, a person could
not "return to."
A reading of the refugee definition that would allow claims by
multiple nationals facing persecution in any one country of their
nationality is bolstered by Congress's decision to entirely omit the
sentence in the Convention's refugee definition that requires multiple
nationals to establish a well-founded fear of persecution with respect
to each such country. When Congress incorporates language from a
treaty into domestic legislation, it is generally presumed that it
intends to adopt the internationally-accepted meaning of that treaty
language.106 But when Congress consciously borrows language from a
treaty, but omits a significant provision, it is reasonable to assume
that Congress meant something by the omission.107 The absence of
the Convention's multiple nationality clause from the U.S. definition,
together with the wording changes discussed previously, suggest that
104. The legislative history shows that Representative Joshua Eilberg, the
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee's subcommittee on immigration, viewed this
wording change as meaningful. See infra text accompanying notes 213-15.
105. The Board of Immigration Appeals noted in a non-precedential decision
that "[tihe Act's use of the phrase 'return to' suggests that a country of nationality was
contemplated as a country of origin, or at least the person's usual place of abode."
Matter of Fatoumata Toure, No. A24 876 244, 1990 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 1435, *17 (BIA
June 26, 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 130-39 (discussing Toure).
106. See Yusupov v. AG of the United States, 518 F.3d 185, 204 n.32 (3d Cir.
2008) (stating that Congress's use of language essentially identical to a provision
appearing in the Convention and Protocol provided "one of the strongest indicators that
Congress intended to incorporate the understanding of the Protocol developed under
international law into the U.S. statutory scheme").
107. A similar, oft-cited principle of statutory construction, which the Supreme
Court has applied when interpreting the Refugee Act, provides that when Congress
"includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 421 U.S.
421, 432 (1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Congress meant to take a different approach than the Convention on
this issue.1 08
The contrast in wording between the Refugee Act's provisions on
withholding of removal and asylum also supports this interpretation.
The withholding section requires the applicant to establish a risk of
persecution in each specific country of potential removal in order to
avoid deportation to that country.10 9 The asylum provisions do not
limit relief to the country or countries where a risk of persecution has
been shown; if an applicant faces persecution in "any country of such
person's nationality," the U.S. government "may grant asylum." 110
The regulations echo this statutory difference by requiring
immigration judges to advise an alien who expresses a fear of harm in
"any of the countries to which the alien might be removed" of the
right to "apply for asylum in the United States or withholding of
removal to those countries.""n
The only textual clue that arguably cuts in favor of construing
the U.S. definition as if it contained the Convention's multiple
nationality language is a section in the asylum statute, added by
Congress in 1996, that provides for termination of asylum if, inter
alia, "the alien has acquired a new nationality and enjoys the
108. In Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.),
Canada's Supreme Court, interpreting a statutory refugee definition that tracked
Article 1A(2) but omitted its multiple nationality provision, nonetheless read the
statute to incorporate the Convention's approach, citing the surrogate state protection
rationale for refugee protection and the statutory construction principle that that
"words in the singular include the plural." Id. at 751-55. The Canadian statute,
however, signaled by its use of the phrase "Convention refugee" (which does not appear
in the U.S. refugee definition) that congruence with the Convention definition was
intended, and it lacked the U.S. definition's other textual departures from the
Convention discussed above (such as the change from "the country" to "any country").
Subsequent to Ward, Canada amended the definition of "Convention refugee" in its
immigration law to expressly provide that applicants must be "outside each of their
countries of nationality" and unable or due to a well-founded fear "unwilling to avail
themself of the protection of each of those countries." Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, § 96 (Can.).
109. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2014) ("The Attorney General may not remove
an alien to a country if . .. the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in that
country. . . ."); see also supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
110. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2014); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining
"refugee").
111. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(c)(1) (2013); see also C.F.R. §§ 1240.33(a)(1),
1240.49(c)(2). Relying on these regulations, a Court of Appeals held that eligibility for
asylum was established when an applicant demonstrated a well-founded fear of
persecution in a country of his nationality; he was not required to prove that he would
also be at risk of persecution in another country that had been designated as the
country to which he would be deported. Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033, 1042 n.14
(9th Cir. 1999).
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protection of the country of his or her new nationality."1 12 This
language was taken verbatim from a Convention clause on cessation
of refugee status which echoes the Convention refugee definition's
approach to multiple nationality.113 This later addition, however,
sheds little light on what Congress meant when it enacted the U.S.
refugee definition in 1980, or even what the 1996 Congress
understood the refugee definition to mean. The Refugee Act of 1980
provided that asylum could be terminated only if the person was "no
longer a refugee within the meaning of [the statutory definition]
owing to a change in circumstances in the alien's country of
nationality."1 4 That formulation suggests that in using the phrase
"country of nationality," the 1980 Congress had in mind only the
specific country in which the applicant had experienced or feared
persecution. When Congress added additional grounds for asylum
termination in 1996, it did not amend the refugee definition, and
there is little reason to think that Congress meant clarify or change
its meaning.115 The acquisition of a new nationality by a person
granted asylum but not yet a U.S. permanent resident would be a
rare event, 116 and unlike an asylum applicant's possession of a second
nationality (typically acquired at birth or in childhood), it would
almost never occur without a voluntary act.' 17 Congress could have
reasonably viewed those choosing to pledge allegiance to another
country after being granted asylum in the United States as less
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2)(E) (2014) (originally enacted as part of Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [hereinafter IIRIRA],
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604(a), div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 693).
113. Convention, supra note 3, art. IC(3); see HATHAWAY, supra note 43, at 210
(noting Article 1C(3)'s "substantive symmetry" with the multiple nationality provision
of Article 1A(2)'s refugee definition).
114. Refugee Act of 1980 § 208(b), 94 Stat. 102, 105 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b) (1982)) (language concerning stateless persons omitted).
115. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469 Part I, at 81, 260 (1996) (setting forth the new
termination of asylum language with no discussion of its purpose or implications for
the definition of refugee).
116. Asylees become eligible for permanent resident status one year after the
asylum grant. See supra note 87.
117. An asylum-seeker who married a person of a different nationality might
acquire the spouse's nationality without applying for it, by operation of the laws of that
country. By 1996, however, this would have been unusual. The widely-adopted 1957
Convention on the Nationality of Married Women obliged state parties to not
automatically confer nationality on a woman marrying one of its nationals, a duty
reaffirmed in 1981 by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). CEDAW art. 9(1), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981); Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women art. 1, Feb. 20, 1957, 309 U.N.T.S. 65 (entered into force Aug. 11,
1958); see Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT'L L.
694, 713 (2011) (noting that the Convention on the Nationality of Married Women was
widely adopted, although sex-discriminatory nationality practices have persisted).
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deserving of continuing protection than persons who were multiple
nationals to begin with.
The language of the U.S. refugee definition, in the eyes of a
textually-inclined court, could be dispositive; taken as a whole, it
points toward the "any one country" interpretation. Several Courts of
Appeals, without directly confronting the issue of whether a multiple
national facing persecution in only one of those countries is eligible
for asylum, have noted that the "plain language" of the statute calls
for assessing whether the applicant satisfies the terms of the refugee
definition with respect to "one test country," regardless of what the
situation might be with respect to other countries.118
Arguably, there is some degree of ambiguity; perhaps Congress
meant "any country" to mean "every country" and the tension
between that reading and the rest of the section's wording was merely
the result of sloppy drafting.1 9 Courts sometimes depart from a
"plain meaning" approach in situations where reading a statute to
mean what it says would produce results that seem arbitrary or
clearly at odds with the statute's purpose. 120 If there were no good
118. See Tesfamichael v. U.S. Attorney General, 469 F.3d 109, 112-15 (5th Cir.
2006) (reading the phrase "that country" in the refugee definition to mean that asylum
eligibility must be determined with reference to "one 'test country"'). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit similarly relied on the "plain language" of the statute to
hold that an individual can satisfy the refugee definition by showing she has a well-
founded fear of persecution in a country of which she is a national, even if she was born
and raised in another country, could be removed to that country, and would not face
persecution there. Dhoumo v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 416 F.3d 172, 174-75 (2d
Cir. 2005); accord, Wangchuck v. Dep't of Homeland Security, 448 F.3d 524, 528-29 (2d
Cir. 2006). The facts of these cases did not require the courts to opine on the dual
national situation, but their reading of the statutory language would support the idea
that satisfying the statutory test with respect to "one test country" of nationality is
sufficient.
The case that came closest to addressing the issue was Palavra v. INS, 287 F.3d
690 (8th Cir. 2002), involving a Bosnian family denied asylum because they possessed
Croatian passports and did not fear persecution in Croatia. The court held that the
agency had impermissibly ignored evidence that the applicants were not in fact
Croatian nationals, and therefore found it unnecessary to rule on their separate
argument that even if dual nationals, they satisfied the refugee definition because they
faced persecution in one of their countries of nationality. Id. at 692-94. A dissenting
judge would have upheld the agency on the ground that dual nationals are ineligible
for asylum unless they show a risk of persecution in both countries, but gave no
reasoning to justify that conclusion. Id. at 694-95 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
119. The existence of some ambiguity does not always lead courts to seek
meaning from sources beyond the statutory text. In one recent decision, the Supreme
Court rejected a "literally possible" reading of statutory language when "all of the
textual clues" cut against it. Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 314-16 (2010); see also
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519, 525 (2009) (stating that presence of
some ambiguity in statutory language does not preclude rejecting an administrative
interpretation as contrary to the statute).
120. See, e.g., Sebelius v. Cloer, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1896 (2013) (stating that courts
must follow the plain meaning of statutory language "at least where the disposition
required by the text is not absurd").
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explanation as to why Congress would want to deviate from the
Convention approach, reading the Convention meaning into the U.S.
statutory language despite the textual differences might be
appropriate. As will be discussed in Part IV.C, the Refugee Act's
legislative history in fact provides strong indications that Congress
meant to preserve past practices which had allowed multiple
nationals fleeing persecution in their former homes to come to the
United States as refugees even if they could have found safety in
another country of nationality. Courts, however, sometimes give
decisive weight to administrative interpretations of statutory
language without considering legislative history. I will therefore first
examine whether the immigration agencies' reading of the refugee
definition warrants deference.
B. Administrative Interpretations
Under the framework developed by the Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc.,121 if
Congress has not unambiguously expressed its intent with respect to
a particular issue, controlling weight will be given to an
interpretation made by an agency entrusted with the statute's
enforcement, provided the agency's interpretation is reasonable.122
Only agency interpretations resulting from formal processes through
which Congress has authorized the agency "to speak with the force of
law," such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or precedential
adjudication, are entitled to Chevron deference.123 The INA
authorizes the Attorney General to issue regulations and make
"controlling" rulings "with respect to all questions of law" arising
under the immigration statutes; thus, immigration regulations and
121. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
122. Id. at 842-45. Some Supreme Court decisions refuse to look beyond the
statute's language and structure in assessing whether Congress has unambiguously
expressed its intentions, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988),
while others also examine legislative history in making this assessment, e.g., INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-43 (1987). The Refugee Act's legislative history,
considered in conjunction with its language and structure, could bolster a court's
conclusion that the statute unambiguously allows a person facing persecution in any
one country of his or her nationality to qualify as a "refugee." For purposes of this
section, however, I will assume that the statute is ambiguous.
123. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001); see also Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-87 (2000) (indicating that documents which lack
the force of law, like opinion letters, should not receive Chevron deference). Less
authoritative agency pronouncements are examined under the standard of Skidmore v.
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which holds that an agency's interpretation of the law
is "entitled to respect," but only to the extent it has "power to persuade based on factors
such as "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
[and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements." Id. at 140.
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precedential decisions issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), the administrative review board created by the Attorney
General to decide appeals, are reviewed under Chevron's standard.124
No agency regulations directly address the meaning of the
phrase "any country of such person's nationality" in the refugee
definition.125 Starting in 1990 a series of informal agency
pronouncements declared, with little supporting reasoning, that the
U.S. definition incorporates the Convention's approach to multiple
nationality.126 In 2013, the BIA issued a precedential decision to this
effect,127 but its logic is severely flawed. It fails to adequately account
for the statutory language and misconstrues legislative history. Most
importantly, it cannot be reconciled with longstanding regulations
issued by the Attorney General, which treat multiple nationals as
eligible for refugee admission or asylum unless they have actually
gone to and "firmly resettled" in another country before coming to the
United States.128 Congress has endorsed the regulations' approach in
subsequent legislation.129 The BIA's interpretation ignores all this,
and cannot qualify as a reasonable interpretation that deserves
Chevron deference.
The BIA first addressed the multiple nationality issue in a 1990
non-precedential decision involving a Guinean citizen who fled to the
United States after a coup removed her uncle from the presidency. An
Ivory Coast diplomat issued her a passport that on its face appeared
to confer that country's nationality. 30 The BIA held that the word
"any" in the U.S. refugee definition refers to all countries of a person's
nationality, but apart from noting that the Convention and UNHCR
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1), (g) (2014). The Attorney General has delegated to the
BIA the authority to issue controlling legal rulings when deciding appeals and
authorized the BIA to designate selected decisions as precedents binding on
immigration judges and agency personnel in all matters concerning the same issue. 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), (d)(3)(ii), (g) (2013). Accordingly, courts give Chevron deference to
interpretations of the immigration laws that take the form of regulations or
precedential BIA decisions, INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999), but
apply Skidmore's standards when deciding whether to accept interpretations contained
in non-precedential BIA decisions or in manuals or guidelines issued by the
immigration agencies. See Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2011)
(noting that non-precedential statements by the Board are "less formal" agency
statements not entitled to Chevron deference).
125. The regulations provide that asylum and refugee applicants must satisfy
the Act's refugee definition, but do not define or interpret the definition's "outside any
country of . .. nationality" language. See 8 C.F.R. § 207.1(a) (2013) (eligibility criteria
for refugee admission); 8 C.F.R § [1]208.13(a) (2013) (asylum eligibility standards).
126. See infra text accompanying notes 130-43.
127. Matter of B-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 119 (BIA 2013); see infra text accompanying
notes 144-54.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 155-68.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 169-86.
130. Matter of Fatoumata Toure, No. A24 876 244, 1990 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS
1435, at *6-7 (BIA June 26, 1990).
9372014/
VANDERBILTIOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
take this approach it gave no reasons for reading the statutory
language this way. 131 Nonetheless, the BIA found that the Refugee
Act's use of the phrase "return to"132 and its declared statutory
purpose of aiding persons "subject to persecution in their
homelands"33 "compel an interpretation of the phrase 'any country of
such person's nationality' consonant with notions of home or place of
habitual residence."134 It therefore rejected a formalistic approach to
nationality that would "require the deportation of an asylum
applicant to a country to which she has little or no connection merely
because she has been designated as a 'national' under that country's
laws."'35
But the BIA stressed that this did not mean a person must have
lived in a country in order to be considered its national, but only that
there must be "a sufficient and genuine connection . . . such that the
applicant may rightfully be said to owe permanent allegiance to that
country."136 It equated this with Nottebohm's test for effective
nationality under international law.137 As we have seen, this
standard does nothing for the vast majority of multiple nationals
seeking asylum, given that any link of ancestry or place of birth, no
matter how attenuated, is considered effective for international law
purposes.' 38 The Guinean applicant was saved from deportation only
because the BIA was able to find that her Ivory Coast passport was a
mere "passport of convenience," conferred as a favor, that signified no
permanent allegiance on her part and no permanent obligation by the
Ivory Coast to provide her with sanctuary.139
This decision, if convoluted in its reasoning, at least grappled
with some of the relevant considerations. The same cannot be said for
the training manual for asylum officers, which since the mid-1990s
has instructed that "[a] dual citizen must establish persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution in both countries of nationality to be
eligible for asylum . . . even if the applicant never resided in, or
131. See id. at * 10-11 (stating that the statute's use of the word "any" indicates
that asylum is not warranted if "an individual has a second country of nationality to
which she can safely return").
132. Id. at *17-18; see supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
133. Id. at *18 (emphasis added) (quoting Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(a), 94 Stat.
102).
134. Id. at *21.
135. Id. The BIA noted that U.S. courts generally determine a person's
nationality by applying the municipal law of the country in question, but found "there
are good reasons for tempering the determination of nationality with a careful
examination of the purpose of the nationality provision in the definition of
refugee ..... Id. at *15-16.
136. Id. at *21.
137. Id. at *21, *29.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34 and 72-76.
139. Toure, 1990 Immig. Rptr. LEXIS 1435, at *22-26.
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established personal ties to, a country of citizenship."140 As rationale,
it erroneously asserts that the statutory refugee definition "provides
that the applicant must be unable or unwilling to return to 'any
country of such person's nationality .... "' 141 (What the law actually
says is that a person must be outside "any country of such person's
nationality" and unable or unwilling to return to "that country.") 42
The manual cites the Convention and UNHCR Handbook as support
for this approach, but takes no account of how the U.S. definition is
worded differently than the Convention's.143
It was not until May 2013 that the BIA addressed the question of
multiple nationality in a precedential decision. The case, Matter of B-
R-,144 involved a citizen of Venezuela who fled to the United States
after being attacked and threatened by pro-Chavez groups. Because
his father had been born in Spain, he also held Spanish citizenship.' 45
The BIA held that to be eligible for asylum an applicant with more
than one nationality must establish a well-founded fear of
persecution in all such countries. 146 It acknowledged that the
statute's phrase "any country" could be taken "to mean that he need
only fear returning to one of the countries in which he has nationality
or citizenship."147 The BIA ignored all of the textual considerations
that cut in favor of that reading.148 Instead, it rested its conclusion on
140. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES [USCIS], ASYLUM DIVISION,
ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE, ELIGIBILITY PART I: DEFINITIONS; PAST
PERSECUTION 10-11 (Mar. 6, 2009) [hereinafter AOBTC]; USCIS, REFUGEE, ASYLUM,
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, RAIO COMBINED TRAINING COURSE,
REFUGEE DEFINITION TRAINING MODULE 15-16 (Mar. 29, 2013) [hereinafter RAIO
Training]. Similar guidance has appeared in agency training manuals since 1995. See
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Basic Law Manual: U.S. Law and INS
Refugee/Asylum Adjudications § III.B.1(b), reprinted in CHARLES GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE (Matthew Bender rev. ed., 1996) (Special Supp.
1995).
141. AOBTC, supra note 140, at 10; RAIO Training, supra note 140, at 15.
142. See supra text accompanying note 94 (quoting the statute).
143. AOBTC, supra note 140, at 10-11; RAIO Training, supra note 140, at 15
n.34.
144. Matter of B-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 119, 121 (BIA 2013).
145. Id. at 119-20.
146. Id. at 122.
147. Id. at 120.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 99-111. The BIA claimed to find textual
support for its interpretation in the statutory provision making acquisition of a new
nationality a ground for terminating asylum. Id. at 122. However, as discussed
previously, that 1996 amendment sheds little light on the refugee definition's meaning.
See supra text accompanying notes 112-17. The BIA also referenced an INA provision
authorizing an alien's removal "to a country of which the alien is a ... national." Id. at
122 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(D) (2006)). That provision is irrelevant because it
applies only to persons who have been denied asylum or other relief and ordered
removed. The fact that Congress would allow multiple nationals who fail to establish
eligibility for asylum to be deported to any country that will take them reveals nothing
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the Refugee Act's legislative history. Citing a Senate report statement
that the Act's refugee definition eliminated the geographical and
ideological restrictions that had previously limited refugee status to
persons fleeing Communist and Middle Eastern countries,149 the BIA
concluded that "the most reasonable reading of the word 'any' in the
'refugee' definition is to allow aliens from any country to qualify as a
refugee, not just those from the Middle East or Communist
countries."15 0
As a textual matter, that reading makes little sense. To be sure,
"any" can be read to have a broadening effect on the word "country,"
implying that any country will do. But as used in the sentence, "any"
modifies the phrase "country of such person's nationality." The BIA's
interpretation has the strange effect of taking "any" to mean "one or
more, no matter which" when read as part of the phrase "any
country," but then having it switch its meaning to "every" when read
as part of the phrase "any country of such person's nationality."
The BIA's "any country" explanation also fails to provide a
plausible account of Congress's motivations. The Convention refugee
definition clearly is not limited to persons fleeing Communist or
Middle Eastern countries. Had Congress simply adopted the
Convention's wording, there would have been no ambiguity
whatsoever that persons fleeing persecution anywhere in the world
are covered.' 5 ' Why would Congress unnecessarily depart from the
Convention's wording in order to demonstrate that it was following
the Convention's approach?' 5 2
about Congress's intent as to whether having more than one nationality renders a
person ineligible for asylum.
149. Matter of B-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 121-22 (citing S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4, 15
(1979)). The BIA mischaracterized the Senate Report by claiming that it "clarifies that
the phrase 'any country' in section 101(a)(42) of the Act referred to the elimination of
the geographical and ideological restrictions in the former [law]." The Senate Report
simply stated that the new refugee definition eliminated those restrictions; it did not
say or suggest that the phase "any country" was used to refer to this change. S. REP.
No. 96-256, at 15-16.
150. Matter ofB-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 121.
151. In fact, the Refugee Act's legislative history frequently speaks of bringing
U.S. law into compliance with the Convention by eliminating the current geographic
and ideological restrictions. See 125 CONG. REC. 4798, 4799-800, 23232 (1979) (remarks
of Reps. Rodino and Holtzman and Sen. Kennedy) (discussing, in consecutive
sentences, how the bill removes geographical and ideological restrictions in the current
law and basically conforms to the Convention's refugee definition); Admission of
Refugees Into the United States Part II: Hearings on Indochina Refugees and U.S.
Refugee Policy Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int'1 Law of the
H. Comm. on Judiciary, 95th Cong. 235 (1977-78) (remarks of Rep. Eilberg)
[hereinafter 1978 House Hearings] (same).
152. The BIA pointed to the Senate report's statement that the new definition
"basically conforms" to the Convention. Matter of B-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 121 (citing S.
REP. No. 96-256, at 14-15 (1979)). But a desire to "basically" conform to the
Convention is not inconsistent with providing broader coverage where Congress chose
different wording, and the legislative history shows that Congress understood that the
[VOL, 47,905940
MULTIPLE NATIONALITYAND REFUGEES
The BIA also reasoned that the statute's "firm resettlement"'5 3
bar shows that asylum's core purpose "is not to provide applicants
with a broader choice of safe homelands, but rather, to protect
refugees with nowhere else to turn."154 The BIA here ignored the
clear import to the contrary of the Attorney General's regulations on
"firm resettlement," 5 5 which have the force of law and are binding on
the BIA.156 By statute, someone who meets the definition of a
"refugee" is nonetheless barred from asylum or refugee admission if
"firmly resettled" in another country.'5 7 From the earliest days of the
Refugee Act, the regulations implementing this provision have been
drafted in a way that clearly indicates that the possession of a second
citizenship in a safe country does not preclude asylum eligibility
unless the person actually travels to that country before coming to
the United States. 5 8 The current version of the regulation provides
statutory definition went beyond the Convention's minimum requirements. See infra
Part IV.C.1.
153. 8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2014) (providing that asylum is not available if
"the alien was firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United
States").
154. Matter of B-R-, 26 1. & N. Dec. at 122 (quoting Tchitchui v. Holder, 657 F.3d
132, 137 (2d Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The BIA also pointed to
the "safe third country" bar to asylum as evidence of Congressional intent to protect
only those who would face persecution in all countries they could go to. Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2012)) (precluding those who may be removed pursuant to a
bilateral or multilateral agreement to a safe country from applying for asylum unless
the Attorney General finds it is in the public interest for the person to receive asylum).
This provision was added in 1996, long after Congress's enactment of the refugee
definition. IIRIRA, supra note 112, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 690-91. The United
States has entered into only one such agreement, with Canada; it generally provides
that asylum-seekers entering from Canada will be returned to have their asylum
claims heard there unless they have family members in the United States. See
DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 6:44 (2014) (detailing
terms of the agreement). Given these limitations, and the fact that Congress expressly
preserved the Attorney General's discretion to grant asylum, the "safe third country"
provision sheds little light on Congress's intentions in enacting the refugee definition.
155. 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.15 (2013).
156. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2013) ("The Board shall resolve the questions
before it in a manner that is . . . consistent with the Act and regulations.").
157. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(1), 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2014). The Refugee Act made firm
resettlement a bar to refugee admission, but omitted any reference to it in its asylum
provisions. Refugee Act, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(b), 94 Stat. 102, 103, 105.
Nonetheless, the House-Senate Conference Report treated the "determination of
whether a refugee is 'firmly resettled"' as part of the "refugee" definition and directed
the Attorney General to issue regulations defining firm resettlement. H.R. REP. NO. 96-
781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). Those regulations made firm resettlement a bar to
asylum as well as refugee admission. See infra note 158. In 1996, Congress amended
the statutory asylum provisions to expressly include firm resettlement as an asylum
bar. IIRIRA, supra note 112, § 604(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -691.
158. 8 C.F.R. §§ 207.1(b), 208.8(f)(1)(ii), and 208.14 (1981). The 1980 interim
regulations issued by the Attorney General provided that an alien would be considered
firmly resettled "if he was offered resident status, citizenship, or some other type of
permanent resettlement by another nation and travelled to and entered that
nation...." Id. (emphasis added). The asylum portion of the regulations technically
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that "[a]n alien is considered to be firmly resettled if, prior to arrival
in the United States, he or she entered into another country with, or
while in that country received, an offer of permanent resident status,
citizenship, or some other type of permanent resettlement . . . ."159
And even if the person enters a country with rights of citizenship or is
granted citizenship while there, the firm resettlement bar is
inapplicable if the person can show that he or she stayed only as long
as needed to arrange onward travel, and did not establish significant
ties in that country. 60
Decisions of the BIA and federal courts interpreting the firm
resettlement bar have recognized that individuals holding a second
citizenship in a safe country are not automatically ineligible for
asylum. In Matter of Soleimani,161 a precedential decision issued in
1989, the BIA addressed the situation of a Jewish asylum applicant
who fled persecution in Iran and then lived in Israel for ten months
before coming to the United States. The BIA found the evidence
insufficient to prove that Israel offered her citizenship, since the
government had failed to introduce the specific provisions of the Law
of Return. But it went on to hold that even if Israel did confer
citizenship, she merited a grant of asylum.162 Applying the standards
of the firm resettlement doctrine, the BIA concluded that her stay in
Israel did not "constitute a termination of the original flight in search
of refuge" because she displayed no intent to remain in Israel
permanently and traveled onward to the United States within a
reasonable time.163 None of this would be relevant if acquisition of
Israeli citizenship would have meant that she failed to meet the
definition of a "refugee" and was thus ineligible for asylum.
applied only to determinations made by INS District Directors, not immigration judges,
but the BIA decided in a series of early cases that similar firm resettlement standards
should be considered by immigration judges when deciding whether to grant asylum.
See Matter of Lam, 18 I. & N. Dec. 15, 18-19 (BIA 1981) (holding that asylum will not
be granted if an alien was firmly resettled); Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99,
104-05 (BIA 1989) (clarifying that firm resettlement was not a mandatory bar under
the regulations but nonetheless "would normally preclude a grant of asylum as a
matter of discretion"). In 1990, the regulations were amended to make firm
resettlement a mandatory ground for denial of an asylum application, whether by an
immigration judge or an asylum officer. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.14(c)(2), 208.15 (1991).
159. 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.15 (2013) (emphasis added).
160. The regulations excuse an alien from the firm resettlement bar if he or she
shows, inter alia, "[t]hat his or her entry into that country was a necessary
consequence of his or her flight from persecution, that he or she remained in that
country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel, and that he or she did
not establish significant ties in that country." Id.
161. 20 I. & N. Dec. 99 (BIA 1989).
162. Id. at 106.
163. Id. at 106-07. The BIA considered the facts that she was recuperating from
an illness, did not seek out permanent status or government benefits (although she did




In the more recent case of She v. Holder,164 the asylum
applicant, after fleeing Burma, lived in Taiwan for eighteen months
and obtained Taiwanese citizenship. An immigration judge held that
she was ineligible for asylum because she was a citizen of a country to
which she could safely return.165 Instead of upholding that reasoning,
the BIA and a federal appeals court found that the applicant's
eligibility for asylum hinged on whether she was firmly resettled
before arriving in the United States.166 The Court of Appeals, in
vacating the BIA's denial of asylum on firm resettlement grounds and
remanding the case for further consideration, emphasized that the
acquisition of citizenship does not necessarily establish firm
resettlement under the regulatory standards.167
If the mere fact of holding citizenship in a safe country meant
that an individual could not satisfy the refugee definition-the
essential prerequisite for asylum consideration-a firm resettlement
doctrine that allows grants of asylum in situations where the
applicant not only holds citizenship but has actually spent time in
that country would make no sense. The BIA's reading of the refugee
definition in Matter of B-R- cannot stand as a "reasonable" agency
interpretation worthy of Chevron deference because it is
fundamentally inconsistent with the Attorney General's binding
regulations and prior decisions-and does not even attempt to
address or explain that inconsistency.168
The BIA interpretation also fails to take into account that twice
since the Refugee Act's passage, Congress has made amendments to
the INA that apply the firm resettlement test, rather than a
threshold exclusion from eligibility, to the claims of individuals who
could be safe in a second country of nationality.169 In 1990, Congress
164. She v. Holder, 629 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
165. Id. at 960-61.
166. Id. at 961-62.
167. Id. at 962-64 and 963 n.3; see also Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 611-12
(8th Cir. 2004) (holding that Azerbaijani citizens who fled to Israel, where they were
granted citizenship and lived three years before coming to the United States, were
ineligible for asylum because they had firmly resettled, an approach that would have
been unnecessary if their acquisition of Israeli citizenship had meant they were not
"refugees" within the meaning of the U.S. refugee definition); Yasin v. Holder, 530 Fed.
Appx. 466 (6th Cir. 2013) (upholding denial of asylum to a dual national because he
had firmly resettled in his second country of nationality and had failed to show a well-
founded fear of persecution in either one of his countries of nationality).
168. Cf. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney General, 663 F.3d 582, 603-07 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that BIA's failure to account for inconsistency with its own precedents
rendered a statutory interpretation unreasonable and unworthy of Chevron deference);
see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 41-42 (1983) (holding that if an agency abandons a prior rule's approach it must
provide reasoned analysis for the change).
169. See EIG, supra note 95, at 47-50 (stating that although "subsequent
legislative history," such as later statements by a legislator or legislative committee
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filled a gap in the coverage of the refugee definition by allowing the
Attorney General to confer "temporary protected status" (TPS) on
nationals of designated countries who would face danger if returned
to their home states due to natural disaster or ongoing armed
conflict.170 All of the statutory bars to asylum eligibility, including
firm resettlement, were made applicable to TPS, but with respect to
nationality, the statute requires only a showing that the applicant "is
a national of' one of the designated states.171 The immigration
agencies have recognized that under the plain statutory language, a
national of a designated country is eligible, even the person also holds
the nationality of another country and could be safe there, provided
the person did not firmly resettle in that second country of nationality
before coming to the United States.1 72 If Congress had taken the view
that the possession of a safe nationality made a person ineligible for
asylum, it is hard to understand why it would not have placed that
limitation on TPS eligibility as well.
More recently, Congress intervened to reject an agency
interpretation that denied access to asylum on dual citizenship
grounds. In 2002, a number of North Koreans seeking asylum at U.S.
consulates in China were told by State Department staff that their
only option was to go to South Korea. 173 South Korea's Constitution
regards the entire Korean peninsula as one country and its laws
confer citizenship on anyone with Korean parentage.174 For this
about what an earlier law was intended to mean, is generally given little weight by
courts, subsequent legislation that clarifies the intent of an earlier statute is often
weighed heavily in statutory construction).
170. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5030-31 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2014)); see H.R. REP. No. 101-245, at
8-9 (1989) (explaining that TPS addresses the plight of persons who face danger in
their home countries for reasons other than persecution and therefore fall outside the
refugee definition).
171. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1) and (c)(2)(B)(ii) (2014). The incorporation by
reference of the asylum bars was added in 1996 by IIRIRA, supra note 112,
§ 308(g)(7)(E)(i), 110 Stat. 3009-546, -624.
172. 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (2013); U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Questions and Answers: Designation of Syria for Temporary Protected Status, Mar. 29,
2012, at 2 (stating that an applicant who is both a national of Syria and a national of
another country will satisfy the nationality requirement for TPS, but will be ineligible
if the individual firmly resettled in that other country).
173. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, North Korean Migrants Pull U.S. Into a
Diplomatic Mess, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2002, at 4 (discussing a "recent spate" of North
Koreans entering U.S. consulates in China and seeking asylum in the United States);
H.R. REP. No. 108-478(), at 16 (2004) (noting reports that State Department officials
denied North Koreans' requests for asylum and pressured them to resettle in South
Korea instead).
174. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-691, HUMANITARIAN
ASSISTANCE: STATUS OF NORTH KOREAN REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT AND ASYLUM IN THE
UNITED STATES 25 (2010) (noting that "the South Korean Constitution considers all
Koreans on the Korean Peninsula, including North Koreans, to be citizens of South
Korea"); Wolman, supra note 78, at 798 (explaining that North Korean escapees are
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reason the State Department-reading the U.S. refugee definition as
following the Convention approach to multiple nationals-considered
them not to be refugees under U.S. law. 75 Members of Congress
responded by introducing bills to overturn this interpretation, which
were enacted as part of the North Korean Human Rights Act of
2004.176
Section 302 of the NKHRA declares that nationals of North
Korea shall not be considered nationals of South Korea when
determining asylum or refugee eligibility.177 This was not presented
as an exception to the Refugee Act's standards; the NKHRA states
that its purpose is "to clarify that North Koreans are not barred from
eligibility for refugee status or asylum in the United States on
account of any legal right to citizenship they may enjoy" in South
Korea.178 The statute states that it does not apply to "former North
Korean nationals who have availed themselves of those rights," 79
thus making clear that those who actually go to South Korea may be
barred on firm resettlement grounds.180
automatically South Korean nationals under provisions of South Korea's Constitution
and Nationality Act).
175. See Andrew Salmon, Measure Would Let Refugees Seek Asylum: North
Riled by U.S. Bill on Koreans, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2004) (quoting U.S. diplomat's
statement that South Korean citizenship makes North Koreans ineligible for asylum);
Senate Omnibus Appropriations Bill Passes with NSEERS Funding Cut; New Bills
Introduced, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 153 (2003) ("The State Department currently
believes it is barred from granting refugee status to any escapees from North Korea
because those escapees are automatically granted citizenship by South Korea, and thus
are not considered to be refugees under U.S. law . . . .").
176. North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004 [hereinafter NKHRA], § 302, Pub.
L. No. 108-333, 118 Stat. 1287, 1295-96; see articles cited supra note 175 and infra
note 184.
177. NKHRA, supra note 176, § 302(b).
178. Id. § 302(a) (emphasis added). The legislative history explains the purpose
of this provision:
[It] [c]larifies that North Koreans are eligible to apply for U.S. refugee and
asylum consideration (as anyone else is), and are not presumptively
disqualified by any prospective claim to citizenship they may have under the
South Korean Constitution. This does not change U.S. law but makes it clearer,
explicitly endorsing the approach of U.S. Immigration Courts in proceedings
involving North Koreans, in which their asylum claims were adjudicated with
reference to the actual circumstances they faced inside North Korea. It is
meant to put to rest the erroneous opinion (proposed by some State
Department personnel) that, because North Koreans may be able to claim
citizenship if and when they relocate to South Korea, they must be regarded as
South Koreans for U.S. refugee and asylum purposes, irrespective of whether
they are able or willing to relocate to South Korea.
H.R. REP. No. 108-478(I), at 22 (2004).
179. NKHRA, supra note 176, § 302(a).
180. See Matter of K-R-Y- & K-C-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 133, 135-37 (BIA 2007)
(holding that the NKHRA left the firm resettlement bar to asylum undisturbed and
finding that that two North Korean applicants who had lived for extended periods in
South Korea were firmly resettled and ineligible for asylum).
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Congress's clarification of U.S. law with respect to North Korea
is hard to square with an interpretation of the U.S. refugee definition
that requires people with dual nationality to show a well-founded fear
of persecution in both countries. One possible reading of the
legislative history is that Congress took issue only with the State
Department's interpretation of South Korean nationality law and
believed that North Koreans are not citizens of the South unless they
actually go there and are given citizenship papers.18' The statutory
language, however, which "clarifies" that North Koreans are not
ineligible for refugee status or asylum "on account of any legal right
of citizenship they may enjoy under the Constitution of the Republic
of Korea," 182 is broad enough to make it clear that the Act applies
even if under South Korean law North Koreans are already
citizens.183 Congress's more basic concern was that turning aside the
claims of people facing horrendous persecution in their country of
residence due to the "legal technicality"' 84 that another country also
deemed them citizens was contrary to the American tradition of
"generous, humanitarian solicitude toward displaced and persecuted
people."185 The North Korea controversy exposed the tension between
the administrative interpretation of the refugee definition and the
more generous view of dual nationality implicit in the firm
resettlement standards. In rejecting the former and endorsing the
latter, Congress took the view that the U.S. refugee definition should
not be read to exclude individuals with more than one country of
nationality merely because they could safely go to one such
country. 86
In conclusion, no deference is due to administrative
interpretations that read the U.S. refugee definition as if it contained
the Convention's multiple nationality language. They are not
reasonable interpretations because they fail to account for the
statute's wording and contradict the approach taken in the
regulations on firm resettlement, which Congress has repeatedly
endorsed. The next section of this article will show that interpreting
181. See id. at 136 (BIA statement suggesting they took this view: "[Tlhe
legislative history confirms our interpretation that North Koreans cannot be denied
asylum based on their right under the South Korean Constitution to apply for and
become a citizen of South Korea." (emphasis added)).
182. NKHRA, supra note 176, § 302(a) (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying notes 177-78.
183. As is in fact the case. See supra note 174.
184. See U.S. Senator Introduces Bill to Grant Asylum to NK Refugees, YONHAP
ENGLISH NEWS, Oct. 19, 2002 (quoting statement of Senator Sam Brownback: "[T]he
moral obligation that we have for refugees everywhere seeking basic human liberties
should not be laid aside because of that legal technicality. . .
185. H.R. REP. NO. 108-478(I), at 16 (2004).
186. NKHRA, supra note 176, § 302(a); see supra text accompanying notes 177-
78 and 182-85.
[VOL. 47-905
MUL TIPLE NA TIONALITYAND REFUGEES
the refugee definition to allow multiple nationals facing persecution
in any one country of their nationality to qualify is consistent with
Congress's purposes in enacting the 1980 Refugee Act.
C. Legislative History
The Refugee Act of 1980 was the culmination of a decade of
legislative efforts to bring U.S. immigration law into compliance with
the UN Protocol, which the United States had ratified in 1968, by
eliminating the INA's restriction of refugee status to those fleeing
Communist countries or the Middle East.187 During the same period,
Congressional frustration was mounting over the ad hoc and reactive
nature of U.S. refugee policy,' 88 which since the end of World War II
had dealt with refugee crises through a mixture of periodic special
legislation 89 and Executive branch use of its "parole" authority.190
Bills introduced as early as 1969 sought to broaden the definition of a
refugee and provide a regular, ongoing process for refugee
admission.' 9 ' The House Judiciary Committee held hearings on
immigration bills containing refugee reforms in the early 1970s;192
one secured House passage in 1973, but none made it into law.193
187. INA § 203(a)(7) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976)).
188. See, e.g., 1978 House Hearings, supra note 151, at 215 (Rep. Joshua Eilberg
stating that the goal of his Refugee Act was to eliminate "[tihe present system of ad hoc
piece-meal measures" and "haphazard, stop-gap parole programs and replace them
with an orderly and workable refugee policy").
189. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 2-4 (1979) (describing pre-1980 refugee
legislation).
190. INA § 212(d)(5) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976)). The INA gave the
Attorney General discretionary authority to temporarily parole otherwise inadmissible
aliens into the United States "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in
the public interest." Id. Parole was used to admit large numbers of Hungarians after
the 1956 Soviet invasion, Cubans in the 1960s, and Indochinese and Soviet Jews in the
1970s. It was also resorted to at various points for Chinese refugees from Hong Kong,
post-World War II refugees lingering in European refugee camps, Czechs fleeing the
1968 Soviet invasion, and persons of Asian descent expelled from Uganda. See H.R.
REP. No. 96-608, at 3-4 (1979). Many in Congress viewed these group-based paroles as
an abuse of the parole statute and a usurpation of Congress's responsibility to set
policy on immigration and refugees. See David A. Martin, The Refugee Act of 1980: Its
Past and Future, 3 MICH. YEARBOOK INT'L LEGAL STUD. 91, 93-94 (1982) (citing
statements in committee reports and hearings casting doubt on the legal foundation for
large-scale refugee paroles).
191. Edward M. Kennedy, Refugee Act of 1980, 15 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 141,
143-44 (1981).
192. See Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 9112, 15092 and 17370 to Amend the
Immigration and Nationality Act and for Other Purposes Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. (1970) [hereinafter 1970 House Hearings];
Western Hemisphere Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 981 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 House Hearings];
Western Hemisphere Immigration: Hearings on H.R. 367, 981 and 10323 Before
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship and Int'1 Law of the H. Comm. on the
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The Indochinese refugee crisis triggered by the fall of Saigon in
1975, which coincided with a rapid surge in Soviet Jewish emigration,
gave reform efforts renewed urgency. 194 In 1976, Joshua Eilberg, who
chaired the House Judiciary Committee's immigration subcommittee,
introduced a stand-alone Refugee Act.195 In 1977-78, that committee
devoted seven days of hearings to the refugee crisis and Eilberg's
bill.'9 6 Senator Edward Kennedy, a longstanding proponent of
refugee reform, introduced his own version in 1978, when he was
about to become chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee. 9 7 Early in
1979, the key Congressional players and the Carter Administration
worked out a compromise bill,' 9 8 which was introduced in the Senate
by Kennedy and in the House by Peter Rodino (chair of the House
Judiciary Committee) and Elizabeth Holtzman (who became chair of
the immigration subcommittee when Eilberg, enmeshed in a
corruption scandal, failed to win reelection in 1978).199 The Senate
and House Judiciary Committees held hearingS20 0 and made
Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975-76) [hereinafter 1975-6 House Hearings]; see also Deborah
E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the
Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 20-30 (1981) (describing the history of
early refugee reform proposals).
193. A 1973 Western Hemisphere immigration bill that included a revised
refugee definition and new parole procedures was passed by the House but died in the
Senate. H.R. 981, §§ 5-6, 93rd Cong. (1973); see H.R. 93-461, at 2-3, 9-12, 17-19 (1973)
(reprinting bill and discussing refugee provisions); 119 CONG. REC. 31477-78 (1973)
(House passage); Anker & Posner, supra note 192, at 28 (discussing Senate Judiciary
Committee's failure to act on the bill).
194. From 1975 to 1979, the Ford and Carter Administrations repeatedly
invoked the parole power to admit over 300,000 Indochinese refugees. During the same
period, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union outstripped the available refugee
visas and led to further group-based paroles. See Martin, supra note 190, at 92-93;
David W. Haines, Refugees and the Refugee Program, in REFUGEES IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 3, 5-6 (David W. Haines ed., 1985).
195. H.R. 14386, 94th Cong. (1976); see also H.R. 3056, 95th Cong. (1977); H.R.
7175, 95th Cong. (1977) (subsequent versions of Eilberg's bill).
196. Admission of Refugees Into the United States: Hearings on H.R. 3056 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and Int'l Law of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977) [hereinafter 1977 House Hearings]; 1978 House Hearings,
supra note 151.
197. See S. 2751, 95th Cong. (1978); see also Kennedy, supra note 191, at 144.
198. See Kennedy, supra note 191, at 144. The bill was the result of intensive
consultations between Executive Branch officials and House and Senate Judiciary
Committee staffers between November 1978 and February 1979. Id.
199. See S. 643, 96th Cong. (1979), 125 CONG. REC. 4881-86 (1979); H.R. 2816,
96th Cong. (1979), 125 CONG. REC. 4798-4802 (1979); see also Eilberg Pleads Guilty;
Bargain Sets Penalty at Probation and Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1979, at 1, 16
(discussing Eilberg's indictment two weeks before the election).
200. See The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 Senate Hearing]; Refugee Act of 1979:
Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law
of the H. Comm. on Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Judiciary
Hearings]. Hearings were also held before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Refugee Act of 1979: Hearings on H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of
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amendments.2 0 ' By year's end, the Refugee Act was debated on the
House and Senate floors and approved, in different versions, by both
bodies. 202 A conference committee worked out the differences, and the
Act won final passage and was signed into law in March 1980.203 Its
main provisions included the new refugee definition, an increase in
annual refugee admissions to 50,000 per year (up from 17,400 in the
prior law), a procedure for the President, in consultation with
Congress, to set a higher level or go beyond the cap in situations of
unanticipated emergency, the creation of an ongoing structure and
funding mechanism for resettlement assistance, and the
establishment of a statutory procedure for persons in the United
States or arriving at its borders to apply for asylum.204
The Refugee Act emerged against a backdrop of not only
widespread sympathy for the plight of Indochinese "boat people" and
Soviet Jews, but also great concern about the sheer number of refugee
arrivals and the costs of resettlement. Its legislative history features
extensive debate about how many refugees the United States could
absorb and whether other countries were doing their "fair share."20 5
Given these Congressional concerns, it may seem odd to attribute to
Congress the intent to accord refugee status to multiple nationals
excluded under the UN definition. These are, after all, people who
could go to another country that would be obliged to take them.
Statements in the Refugee Act's legislative history emphasizing that
the U.S. refugee definition is based on the Convention's and designed
to bring the United States into compliance with its treaty
obligations206 might also be taken as reason to disregard wording
differences and assume that Congress intended to incorporate the
Convention's approach to multiple nationality.
But there are countervailing themes in the legislative history
that provide strong reason to believe that Congress meant to provide
a broader scope of coverage when it departed from the Convention's
the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Foreign
Affairs Hearings].
201. See generally S. REP. NO. 96-256 (1979); H.R. REP. NO. 96-608 (1979); see
also Anker & Posner, supra note 192, at 50-56 (discussing amendments incorporated
into the House and Senate reports).
202. 125 CONG. REC. 23224-54 (1979) (Senate); 125 CONG. REC. 35812-27,
37198-247 (House); see Kennedy, supra note 191, at 148 (noting that "the House bill
differed on a number of substantive points from the Senate bill").
203. S. REP. No. 96-590 (1980) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. No. 96-781 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.); see Kennedy, supra note 191, at 141, 148-52 (describing the Conference
Committee's actions, final passage, and signing).
204. See generally Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. The
50,000 limit was put in place only for fiscal years 1980-1982; after that, the Act
provided that the number would be set annually by the President in consultation with
Congress. Id. § 201(b).
205. Kennedy, supra note 191, at 145-48; see infra Part IV.C.2.
206. See infra notes 210, 224-25.
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wording.207 The bill's main sponsors repeatedly acknowledged that
the new U.S. definition was not identical to the Convention's and
signaled that they viewed the differences as meaningful. Objections to
the definition's broad scope were overcome with the argument that
refugee admission remained discretionary and an expansive
definition would provide maximum flexibility to select refugees of
concern. Most importantly, the legislative history contains strong
indications that the new refugee definition was meant to build on and
broaden the definition of refugee in prior U.S. law in a way that
would ensure compliance with the Convention but also preserve
eligibility for those who had been welcomed as refugees in the past.
Under the conception of a refugee that had become well-established
during the three decades leading up to the Refugee Act's adoption,
the fact that an individual could have sought refuge in another
country, even a second country of nationality, was not seen as a bar.
The legislative history includes significant evidence that Joshua
Eilberg, who drafted the relevant language in the Act's refugee
definition, wanted this to continue to be the case. Congress's strong
support for maintaining the U.S. policy of admitting as refugees all
Soviet Jews who wanted to come, despite the fact that they left the
USSR with Israeli immigrant visas which entitled them to
citizenship,208 provides additional grounds for concluding that
Congress did not want the possession of a second nationality to stand
as an obstacle to refugee status.
1. Congressional Awareness of Differences from the Convention
As the Supreme Court noted in its first decision construing the
Refugee Act's refugee definition, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,209 it is
"clear from the legislative history . .. that one of Congress' primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the . .. United Nations [Convention and] Protocol . "210 But
the key proponents of the legislation, when describing the new
refugee definition, were careful to acknowledge that although the
Convention definition was a model and the source of much of the
language, the U.S. definition was not identical. They understood that
the differences had implications for who would qualify as a refugee.
207. Each of the themes summarized in this paragraph are discussed below in
Parts IV.C.1 to 4.
208. This policy even extended to Soviet Jews who entered Israel as citizens,
spent some time living there, and then changed their minds and decided they preferred
to go to the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 313-17 and 344-51.
209. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
210. Id. at 436-37; see S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4 (1979) (stating that "the new
definition will bring United States law into conformity with our international treaty
obligations" under the Convention and Protocol).
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When Joshua Eilberg opened the 1977 House hearings, he
described his bill's refugee definition (which stayed in the Refugee Act
virtually unchanged thereafter)21' as being "[w]ith slight
modifications . . . almost identical" to the Convention definition.2 12
Later, Eilberg elaborated on one of these wording changes-the
requirement that a person be unable or unwilling both to "return to"
and "to avail himself of the protection" of a country213 -explaining
that it was deliberate and intended to signify a difference from the
Convention's approach.214 This attentiveness to slight differences in
the drafting makes it reasonable to assume that other
modifications-including the change to "any country" of nationality-
were meant to signify something. 215
The Act's proponents were also conscious of the implications of
omitting language contained in the Convention. Elizabeth Holtzman,
presiding over the House Judiciary Committee's 1979 hearings,
expressed concern that the absence from the U.S. refugee definition of
a Convention clause that excludes persons who committed crimes
against humanity 216 could result in persecutors qualifying as
refugees.2 17 The committee responded by adding language stating
that the term "refugee" did not include persons who participated in
211. The refugee definition in Eilberg's 1977 bill was essentially identical to
subsection A of the definition as enacted in the 1980 Refugee Act. Compare H.R. 3056,
95th Cong. § 2(a) (1977), reprinted in 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 2-3
(containing the phrase "outside any country of his nationality" and omitting the
Convention's multiple nationality provision), with 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982)
(using identical wording except language made gender-neutral). Eilberg's first version
of the Refugee Act, filed in 1976, and Kennedy's initial Senate version omitted the
Convention's multiple nationals provision but used the Convention's phrase "outside
the country of his nationality." H.R. 14386, § 2(a), 94th Cong. (1976); S. 2751, § 2(a),
95th Cong. (1978). Kennedy adopted Eilberg's revised wording of 1977 in the bill he
brought before the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1979. S. 643, § 201(a) (1979),
reprinted in 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 200, at 73-74.
212. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 14; see also 1973 House
Hearings, supra note 192, at 327 (describing the bill's refugee definition as a
"broadened definition of refugee, close to but not identical with the U.N. protocol").
213. The Convention, in contrast, uses "return to" only in connection with a
stateless person's country of former residence. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2). As
discussed previously, this wording change has implications for persons with multiple
nationalities: the use of "return to" suggests that "any country" of nationality does not
mean all countries of nationality, which would include countries where the individual
never lived and thus could not "return to." See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
214. 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 64 (noting, in a colloquy with a
State Department witness, that his bill's definition "requires that both conditions be
met . . . whereas the U.N. Protocol . . . indicat[es] that only one of the conditions is
required to be met").
215. In the hearings he presided over, Eilberg stressed that the refugee
definition in his bill was one that "we have struggled long and hard in coming up with."
1978 House Hearings, supra note 151, at 235.
216. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1F(a).
217. 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 71.
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persecution.2 18 Neither she nor anyone else raised concerns about the
omission of the Convention's multiple nationality clause, which could
support a similar inference that those not excluded are covered.
In March 1979, when introducing the Refugee Act on the floor of
Congress, Kennedy, Holtzman, and Rodino were careful to describe
its refugee definition not as identical to, but rather as "essentially,"
"basically," or "substantially" conforming to the Convention. 219
Similar qualifying language can be found in the Committee reports
and subsequent floor debateS220 and in numerous statements made by
Administration officials.221
Congress's goal of bringing U.S. law into compliance with treaty
requirements was not seen as precluding more generous protections;
the Convention definition was regarded as a floor but not a ceiling.
The Refugee Act's definition added a second subsection that has no
counterpart in the Convention, authorizing the President to designate
persons still within their country of nationality as refugees. 222 The
218. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 10, 38 (1979).
219. 125 CONG. REC. 4798 (1979) (statement of Rep. Rodino describing the new
refugee definition as "bringing us closer to conforming to the definition we subscribed
to in the U.N. Protocol"); id. at 4800 (quoting Rep. Holtzman saying "[t]he new
definition essentially conforms"); id. at 4883-84 (State Department memo and section-
by-section analysis entered into record by Sen. Kennedy using the phrases "in
substantial conformity" and "basically conforms"). These qualifications could not have
been referring to the subsection of the U.S. refugee definition that went beyond the
Convention by covering persons still within their own countries, which was not yet in
the bill.
220. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9 (1979) (stating that "[t]he first part of the
new definition essentially conforms to that used under the [Convention and Protocol]");
125 CONG. REC. 35814 (1979) (quoting Rep. Holtzman describing the definition
similarly in summarizing the bill at the outset of House debate); id. at 23232 (quoting
Sen. Kennedy, at the start of Senate debate, describing the new refugee definition as
one that "basically conforms" to the Convention definition). But see H.R. REP. NO. 96-
781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (stating that the House and Senate bills "incorporated"
the Convention definition as well as additional coverage for internally displaced
persons).
221. See 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 40 (quoting Dick
Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, stating that the bill "essentially adopts"
the Protocol's refugee definition); 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 193, at 11 (same);
1979 House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 200, at 69 (quoting Clark stating that
the new definition "comes much closer" to the UN definition); 1978 House Hearings,
supra note 151, at 217-18 (quoting INS Commissioner Leonel Castillo stating that the
expanded refugee definition in Eilberg's H.R. 7175 "will conform substantially" to the
Convention). But see 1979 House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 193, at 71-72
(quoting Justice Department official Doris Meissner saying that the bill "simply
incorporated" the UN definition and the State Department's David Martin stating that
the United States will continue to use the UN standard in asylum cases).
222. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2014). The bill passed by the Senate also
extended refugee status to another group not covered by the Convention, those
displaced by military or civil disturbance. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4, 20 (1979); 125
CONG. REC. 23252 (1979). That provision was dropped in Conference. H.R. REP. No. 96-
781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).
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legislative history expressly acknowledges that such persons would
not be covered under the UN definition.22 3
The House-Senate Conference Report does contain a statement
expressing Congress's intent that provisions "based directly on the
language of the Protocol" be "construed consistent with the
Protocol." 224 However, this was said not in reference to the refugee
definition, but to provisions barring eligibility for withholding of
deportation that are modeled on the Convention's exceptions to the
obligation of non-refoulement.225 To interpret those statutory bars in
a way that would allow the deportation of an individual to a country
where he or she would face persecution would be a clear violation of
U.S. treaty obligations under the Protocol. There is no inconsistency
with the Protocol's requirements in interpreting language in the U.S.
refugee definition that differs from the treaty's wording to confer
broader coverage. 226 This is clear from the Convention's drafting
223. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 9 (1979); S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 4 (1979).
224. H.R. REP. No. 96-781, at 20 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).
225. See id. (explaining that while the Senate bill made withholding unavailable
if deportation would be allowed under the UN Convention and Protocol, the Conference
adopted the House version listing four specific bars to withholding, with the
understanding that those four bars are "based directly upon the language of the
Protocol and it is intended that the provision be construed consistent with the
Protocol"). The Supreme Court's statement in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437,
that the Conference Report called for the refugee definition to be construed consistently
with the Protocol, was incorrect. It makes sense, of course, to read the U.S. refugee
definition consistently with the UN definition when the wording is the same (as was
the case with the phrase "well-founded fear" at issue in Cardoza-Fonseca), but it does
not follow that Congress meant to incorporate the Convention's meaning when it chose
different language.
The Senate report includes one statement which, if read out of context, could be
misinterpreted to mean that the U.S. definition was meant to be coextensive with the
Convention's. In discussing the Senate bill's asylum provisions, the report states,
"[Alsylum will continue to be granted only to those who qualify under the terms of the
United Nations Protocol. . . ." S. REP. No. 96-256, at 9 (1979). The Senate bill, however,
made asylum available only if the individual's deportation would be barred under the
bill's section on withholding of deportation, which required a showing that the person's
life or freedom would be threatened in the country of proposed removal-the standard
of Article 33 of the Convention. See id. at 16, 26, 29. What the Senate Report was
saying was that only those refugees who qualified for non-refoulement under Article 33
would be eligible for asylum. Elsewhere, the report expressly acknowledged that the
bill's definition of "refugee" was broader than the Convention's. See id. at 4 ("The new
definition has been amended . . . to include 'displaced persons' who are not technically
covered by the United Nations Convention."). The Senate's limitation of asylum to
those who could meet the withholding of deportation standard did not remain in the
final bill, which made anyone satisfying the refugee definition eligible for a
discretionary grant of asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982); see Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
at 435 n.17 (noting that this provision of the Senate bill was rejected by Congress).
226. See 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 180 (quoting
witness Hurst Hannum of Amnesty International, responding to a question about
whether it is "contradictory" for U.S. law to define "refugee" differently than the
Convention: "[Tihe international obligation sets a minimum level for our
concerns.... [Broader coverage] should not cause any problem.").
2014/ 953
954 VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
history; the '1951 UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries accompanied
the Convention with a unanimously-adopted Final Act urging nations
to treat it as "an example exceeding its contractual scope" and to as
far as possible grant those "who would not be covered by the terms of
the Convention, the treatment for which it provides."227
2. "Floodgate" and Fair Share Concerns
Congress's concern with controlling a refugee flow that had come
to seem overwhelming228 might seem to cut against the idea that it
would have been willing to go beyond its treaty obligations by
conferring eligibility on multiple nationals. However, the Refugee
Act's Congressional supporters emphatically and consistently made
the case that a broad refugee definition would not open the
floodgates, since eligibility conferred no right to admission, but rather
would serve U.S. interests by providing maximum flexibility in
227. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, July 2-25, 1951, Final Act, § IV.E, July 28, 1951, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.2/108/Rev.1 (Nov. 26, 1952); see Plender, supra note 55, at 59 (noting that the
Convention's drafters assumed that states were free to grant refugee status to those
not qualifying under the Convention). There is, however, some indication in the
Convention's drafting history that delegates believed that granting refugee status to
internally-displaced persons still inside their country of nationality would be an
impermissible infringement of state sovereignty under international law. See ECOSOC
Social Comm., Summary Record of Meeting, U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.172, at 4 (Aug. 12,
1950) (remarks of Mr. Rochefort of France); see also Matthew T. Clyde Pace, What You
Are Depends on Where You're Standing: How Expanding Refugee Protections to the
Internally Displaced Through the Refugee Act of 1980 Violates International Law, 74 U.
PITT. L. REV. 107 (2012) (arguing that the Refugee Act violates international law by
expanding the definition of "refugee" to include internally displaced groups). Whether
this conclusion remains valid in light of the post-1951 evolution of international law,
which increasingly recognizes the legitimacy of states acting to protect against
violations of fundamental human rights in other countries, is open to doubt. See
HATHAWAY, supra note 43, at 32 (suggesting that the legitimate reach of refugee law to
deal with the problems of internally displaced persons has expanded over time because
of increasing recognition of the international community's authority over human
rights). In any event, non-intervention principles clearly pose no barrier to granting
refugee status to a person with more than one nationality who is not inside any of
those countries.
228. In 1979, the crucial year in Congressional deliberations, over 200,000
refugees arrived in the United States, exceeding by more than a factor of ten the 17,400
refugee visas then authorized by law. See Kennedy, supra note 191, at 145-46 (noting
that the large influx created political pressures both for and against the Refugee Act).
The influx strained resettlement resources and sparked community tensions. In
September 1979, Congressional supporters stressed "[w]e have to get this bill through
while we can" because "a great negative wave will get there at any moment .... [T]he
backlash on this problem is unbelievable." 1979 House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra
note 200, at 56, 58 (remarks of Subcomm. Chair Dante Fascell and Rep. Joel
Pritchard).
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deciding whom to let in.2 29 Viewed through this lens, it is not
implausible that Congress would want to provide for discretionary
authority to grant admission or asylum, in appropriate
circumstances, to people fleeing persecution who could go elsewhere
but have good reasons for seeking refuge in the United States.
The fact that 13 or 14 million people around the world could
meet the criteria of the expanded refugee definition was brought up
repeatedly during Congressional deliberations. 230 The carefully-
scripted response of the bill's proponents was that satisfying the
refugee definition resulted in no automatic right to admission. 231 The
entrance of refugees would be subject to numerical limits and the
requirement that those admitted "be of special humanitarian concern
to the United States" 232 based on factors such as "the extent of
persecution [suffered], . . . family ties, historical, cultural or religious
ties, the likelihood of finding sanctuary elsewhere, and previous
contact with the United States government."233 Asylum was also
made discretionary, so that meeting the refugee definition would be
no guarantee of a right to remain permanently. 234
229. See, e.g., 125 CoNG. REC. 35814 (1979) (remarks of Rep. Holtzman: "[T]his
expanded definition will in no way open the floodgates to hordes of refugees. ... This
expanded definition will simply give our Government the flexibility to admit refugees
of special humanitarian concern . . . .").
230. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 96-608, at 61 (1979) (minority views of Reps. Hyde and
Sawyer); 125 CONG. REC. 35814, 37225-26 (1979) (remarks of Reps. Holtzman, Fish,
and Collins).
231. See 1979 House Foreign Affairs Hearings, supra note 200, at 69-70
(exchange between Rep. Fascell and U.S. Refugee Coordinator Clark agreeing that
meeting the criteria of the definition does not entitle a person to entry); 1979 Senate
Hearing, supra note 200, at 22 (Kennedy-Clark exchange); H.R. REP. 96-608, at 10
(1979); 125 CONG. REC. 35814 (1979) (Rep. Holtzman stating that "[m]erely . . .
com[ing] within the new definition does not guarantee resettlement in the United
States"); id. 23232 (similar statement by Sen. Kennedy).
232. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1) (2014).
233. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 13 (1979). The Senate Report acknowledged that
U.S. "foreign policy interests" would also play a role in deciding whom to admit. S. REP.
NO. 96-256, at 6 (1979).
234. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) (providing that an alien meeting the refugee
definition "may be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General").
Congress gave asylum much less attention than refugee admissions from abroad. No
one anticipated the mass arrivals that would begin with the Mariel boatlift from Cuba
just a few weeks after the Refugee Act was signed into law, soon to be followed by a
surge in asylum-seekers from Central America. The Refugee Act set a cap of 5,000 on
the number of asylees to be granted permanent resident status each year, which
seemed ample in comparison with the annual flow of asylum cases during the late
1970s. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (1982); see Doris Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of
1980, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS 57, 60 (David A. Martin ed., 1988) ("Providing for
political asylum in the Refugee Act was almost an afterthought . . .. an annual number
of 5,000 was authorized . . .. [t]he number was arbitrary but was seen as most
generous and highly unlikely to be needed . . . ."); NORMAN L. ZUCKER & NAOMI FLINK
ZUCKER, The GUARDED GATE: THE REALITY OF AMERICAN REFUGEE POLICY 141-42
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In discussing the Act's extension of the refugee definition beyond
the Convention's to cover individuals still within their own countries,
the committee reports reframe the large potential pool as a policy
advantage rather than a risk. The change was viewed as
"essential . .. to give the United States sufficient flexibility to respond
to situations involving political or religious dissidents and detainees
throughout the world,"23 5 thus "insur[ing] maximum flexibility in
responding to the needs of the homeless who are of concern to the
United States."2 36 When the refugee definition is viewed as menu
from which the United States can pick and choose, there is no
intrinsic reason why Congress would not have wanted multiple
nationals to be eligible for consideration. Their ability to find refuge
elsewhere might be one factor to weigh against them, but other
factors such as family ties or cultural/political affinities with the
United States could militate in favor of admission. 237
Many in Congress were also concerned that the United States
should not take in large numbers of refugees unless other countries
were prepared to do the same.2 38 From a pure burden-sharing
perspective, accepting someone if they have another country of
nationality to go to might not make much sense. But the debates in
Congress also reflected strongly-expressed views that humanitarian
considerations and the United States' historical role as a nation of
refugees require a generous response regardless of what other
countries are willing to do.239 Objections to the Refugee Act premised
(1987) ("Five thousand was a very generous number, since fewer than one thousand
refugees received asylum each year.").
235. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 9 (1979).
236. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4 (1979); see also 125 CONG. REC. 35814 (1979)
(remarks of Rep. Holtzman describing the broadened refugee definition as providing
"flexibility to admit refugees of special humanitarian concern").
237. Regulations issued shortly after the Refugee Act's passage authorized
consideration of an applicant's ability to go elsewhere as part of the discretionary
balance: "Among other grounds, the district director may deny a request for asylum ...
in the exercise of discretion if. . . there is an outstanding offer of resettlement by a
third nation where the applicant will not be subject to persecution and the applicant's
resettlement in a third nation is in the public interest." Dep't of Justice, INS, Refugee
and Asylum Procedures, 45 Fed. Reg. 37,392, 37,395 (June 2, 1980) (codified at 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.8(f)(2) (1981)). The "public interest" proviso provided ample room to consider
countervailing factors that might make it unreasonable to expect the person to go to
another country, or ways in which granting asylum might serve the interests and
values of the United States. In 1990, the regulations were amended to eliminate any
reference to the factors to be considered in exercising discretion. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.14(a) (1991) (giving adjudicators discretion to grant or deny asylum but
containing no reference to standards for exercising it).
238. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 23235, 35813, 35818, 37201, 37224, 37226 (1979)
(remarks of Sen. Kennedy and Reps. Lott, Sensenbrenner, Butler, Sawyer, and
Collins).
239. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 37226-27 (1979) (quoting Rep. Buchanan, who
responded to "fair share" arguments by "remind[ing] my colleagues this day that this is
a Nation of immigrants"); see also infra text accompanying notes 299-304. Moreover, as
will be discussed in Part IV.C.4, there was strong support in Congress for the U.S.
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on the idea that other countries weren't doing their "fair share" were
in any event largely assuaged in July 1979 when a UN Conference in
Geneva led to a vast increase in other countries' commitments to
accept Indochinese refugees and contribute money to the resettlement
effort. 240 As long as a person's ability to resettle elsewhere may be
considered as one factor in the exercise of discretion, there is no
reason to think that this strand in Congressional sentiment would
rule out Congress's willingness to confer eligibility on multiple
nationals.
3. Continuity with the Approach of Prior U.S. Law to Refugees of
Multiple Nationality
The Refugee Act's legislative history emphasizes that the new
refugee definition was meant to build on the conception of a refugee
already established in U.S. law, eliminating Cold War-era restrictions
while maintaining eligibility for all who had been previously
considered refugees. The Supreme Court in Cardoza-Fonseca,
reviewing the Act's history, concluded that "Congress in no way
wished to modify the standard that had been used under § 203(a)(7),"
but sought only to eliminate the old definition's "unacceptable
geographic and political distinctions" while otherwise leaving the
standard as broad as it had been before. 24 1
Congress viewed the new refugee definition as an amendment
and expansion of the old one. The House Judiciary Committee's
report begins with a statement that the Act "amends the definition of
refugee to eliminate current discrimination on the basis of outmoded
geographical and ideological considerations." 242  Similar
characterizations can be found throughout the legislative history.24 3
policy of accepting all Soviet Jewish refugees who wanted to come to the United States
even though Israel was eager to have them as citizens.
240. Strom Thurmond, the ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary
Committee, who had previously taken steps to block the Refugee Act in the Senate,
changed his position and endorsed it as a direct result of the Geneva Conference. See
125 CONG. REC. 23237-38 (remarks of Sen Thurmond referencing the encouraging
international response to the world refugee problem in connection with his decision not
to oppose the bill); Kennedy, supra note 191, at 147 (describing the Geneva
Conference's impact in securing Congressional support).
241. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 434-36 (1987) (concluding that
Congress intended no change in pre-Refugee Act U.S. jurisprudence requiring less than
a probability of persecution to establish refugee status).
242. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 1 (1979); see also id. at 9 (stating the new
definition "eliminates the ... restrictions now applicable ... under section 203(a)(7) ...
which is limited to those fleeing communist countries or the Middle East").
243. The Senate Report states that the bill "repeals the current immigration
law's discriminatory treatment of refugees," "eliminat[ing] the geographical and
ideological restrictions now applicable ... under section 203(a)(7)." S. REP. No. 96-256,
at 1, 4 (1979). During the hearings and floor debates, the refugee definition was
repeatedly described as an expansion of § 203(a)(7)'s definition that would eliminate its
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At the same time, Congress wanted to ensure that refugees who had
been eligible under the old definition and past parole practices would
remain so. The House report stressed that the new definition merely
"regularizes and formalizes the policies and practices that have been
followed in recent years,"244 and the Senate report declared that the
bill "places into law what we do for refugees now by custom."24 5
Amendments added in committee to extend coverage to persons still
inside their own countries were explained as being needed to
maintain the U.S.'s ability to respond as it had done in the past when
Cuban dissidents and evacuees from the fall of Saigon were brought
directly from their home countries to the United States. 246
Section 203(a)(7), which governed refugee admissions from 1965
to 1980, authorized an annual quota of "conditional entrant" visas for
applicants who could show that,
because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion they have fled from any Communist or
Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within the
general area of the Middle East, and are unable or unwilling to return
to such country or area on account of race, religion, or political
opinion . 247
This standard was carried forward essentially unchanged from a
definition of "refugee-escapee" that had appeared in a 1957
amendment to the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,248 and was similar to
the 1953 Act's "refugee" and "escapee" definitions.249
limitation to those fleeing Communist and Middle Eastern countries. See, e.g., 1979
Senate Hearing, supra note 200, at 9 (statement of U.S. Refugee Coordinator Dick
Clark); id. at 19 (statement of Associate Attorney General Michael Egan); 1978 House
Hearings, supra note 151, at 235 (Rep. Eilberg describing purpose of his bill's refugee
definition); 125 CONG. REC. 4798, 4800, 23232 (1979) (remarks of Reps. Rodino and
Holtzman and Sen. Kennedy).
244. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 10 (1979).
245. S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1979).
246. See 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 24, 66-67 (Rep.
Holtzman expressing concern that without such amendment the refugee definition
would not "include persons who are in the country of their origin, such as Cuba or
Vietnam"); H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 9-10 (1979); S. REP. No. 96-256, at 4 (1979)
(explaining purpose of the committee amendments); see also Martin, supra note 190, at
101-02 (describing the addition of the in-country provision as an effort to deal with the
fact that "[h]istorically, some of the largest groups resettled as refugees by the United
States had moved directly from their home countries" and would not have qualified as
refugees under the UN definition).
247. INA § 203(a)(7) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976)) (internal section
designations omitted).
248. See Act of Sept. 11, 1957, § 15(c)(1), Pub. L. 85-316, 71 Stat. 639, 643
(defining "refugee-escapee" as "any alien who, because of persecution or fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion has fled or shall flee (A)
from any Communist, Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied area, or (B) from
any country within the general area of the Middle East, and who cannot return to such
area, or to such country, on account of race, religion, or political opinion."). The Fair
Share Law of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 1, 74 Stat. 504, incorporated the 1957 Act's
definition of "refugee-escapee," but added an additional requirement that the person
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The pre-1980 U.S. refugee definition was broader than the
Convention definition in two significant ways. First, it applied to
persons who fled their countries and were unwilling or unable to
return "because of persecution or fear of persecution," as compared
with the Convention's "owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted."250 Thus, people who had been subjected to past
persecution could be granted refugee status in the United States even
if they no longer had reason to fear further persecution if they
returned home, and therefore would not have qualified as Convention
refugees.251 The language of the 1980 Refugee Act evinces a clear
Congressional intent to carry this approach forward, by using the
phrase "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution"
in place of the Convention's sole focus on the latter.
The second difference is somewhat more subtle, but significant in
its implications for individuals with multiple nationality. Under the
pre-1980 U.S. definition, the defining feature of refugee status was
flight from persecution in a former home country. As the Senate
Judiciary Committee explained in 1957, the term refugee was
"carefully defined - . . so as to include any alien who was forced to flee
fall within the UNHCR's mandate. The Fair Share Law was enacted for the specific
purpose of helping UNHCR close out the remaining refugee camps in Europe, and its
restriction to those within UNHCR's mandate was congruent with that goal. It was not
intended to change the underlying definition of a "refugee" for purposes of U.S. law. See
Shen v. Esperdy, 428 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[T]he specialized purpose of the
Fair Share Law-participation in the World Refugee Year in order to close out the D.P.
camps of Europe-cuts against any interpretation of this enactment as a pervasive
declaration of immigration policy."). The legislative history of the 1965 Act, which
repealed the Fair Share Law and replaced it with § 203(a)(7), shows that Congress
viewed the elimination of the restriction to those within UNHCR's mandate as a
restoration of underlying U.S. definition that would "again permit the United States to
determine who is or who is not a refugee." H.R. REP. NO. 89-745, at 15 (1965); see Shen,
428 F.2d at 300-01 (citing further legislative history indicating that this was
Congress's goal).
249. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953, § 2(b), 67 Stat. 400 [hereinafter RRA],
defined "escapee" as "any refugee who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinion, fled from the [Soviet Union] or other
Communist, Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied area of Europe ... and
who cannot return thereto because of fear of persecution on account of race, religion, or
political opinion." It defined "refugee" as a person "who because of persecution, fear of
persecution, natural calamity or military operations is out of his usual place of abode
and unable to return thereto, who has not been firmly resettled, and who is in urgent
need of assistance . . . ." Id. § 2(a). The first major U.S. refugee statute, the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, had defined its operative term, "displaced person," by
incorporating by reference those identified in the Constitution of the International
Refugee Organization as refugees or displaced persons of concern to the IRO. § 2(b), 62
Stat. 1009.
250. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976) ("because of persecution or fear of
persecution"), with Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2) ("owing to well-founded fear of
being persecuted").
251. The Convention allowed only certain "statutory refugees" (those recognized
pre-1951) to maintain refugee status based on past persecution alone. See supra notes
51 and 58.
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from [covered areas] . . . and who is unable to return to the place from
which he fled because of persecution or fear of persecution . " 252
Under the Convention, the issue is not flight and an inability to
return home; instead, the focus is on whether a country of nationality
can provide protection. The implications of this state protection
approach are drawn out in the Convention definition's paragraph
excluding multiple nationals from refugee status unless they have
reason to fear persecution in every country of which they are
nationals. 253 In contrast, the flight-from-home focus of the U.S.
definition gave rise to a "firm resettlement" jurisprudence which did
not preclude granting refugee status merely because an individual
could have safely relocated to a second country of nationality, but did
not actually do so.254
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its most significant pre-1980 refugee
decision, Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 255 characterized the "central
theme" of refugee legislation from 1948 forward as "the creation of a
haven for the world's homeless people," as reflected in the statutory
focus on flight from home, and the concomitant notion of "firm
resettlement" as a factor that "must [be] take[n] into account to
determine whether a refugee seeks asylum in this country as a
consequence of his flight to avoid persecution."256 The first fully-
articulated refugee definition in U.S. law, in the Refugee Relief Act of
1953, had expressly included a requirement that the person "has not
been firmly resettled."257 Although the "firmly resettled" language did
252. S. REP. No. 85-1057, at 6 (1957).
253. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 1A(2) (excluding those who could avail
themselves of the protection of one of their countries of nationality without a well-
founded fear of being persecuted); supra Part III.
254. Section 203(a)(7) of the 1965 Act did include one nationality-focused
provision: a requirement that a person seeking refugee admission from abroad not be a
national of the country in which the application was made. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)(A)(iii)
(1976). That limitation must be understood in the context of the regulations in effect at
the time, which allowed, applications for refugee visas to be submitted only at INS
offices in seven countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and
Lebanon. 8 C.F.R. § 235.9 (1970). It did not foreclose refugee applications from persons
who held or acquired the nationality of any other country, nor did it apply to persons
who sought refugee status after arriving in the United States. See Shen v. Esperdy, 428
F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1970) (concluding that the provision was relevant only to aliens
who were nationals of one of the seven listed countries and submitted a refugee
application in that country). The Supreme Court, in Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo,
endorsed Shen's analysis and found that the "not a national" provision did not displace
flight from home and the absence of firm resettlement as the central considerations in
determining refugee status. 402 U.S. 49, 54, 57 (1971).
255. 402 U.S. 49 (1971).
256. Id. at 55-56. For discussion of the firm resettlement doctrine's
development, see Robert D. Sloane, An Offer of Firm Resettlement, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 47 (2004).
257. RRA, supra note 249, § 2(a), 67 Stat. 400. The Displaced Persons Act of
1948 had similarly limited those eligible for certain displaced persons visas to those
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not appear in the 1957, 1960 and 1965 statutes, the Supreme Court
endorsed INS interpretations that kept the doctrine alive, reasoning
that subsequent statutes continued to reflect a policy of providing
refuge to "homeless persons" who have not "found shelter in another
nation and . . . begun to build new lives."258 As long as a person's "aim
to reach these shores has [not] in any sense been abandoned" by
putting down roots in another country after fleeing from persecution,
the person would not be considered "firmly resettled" and would
continue to qualify as a refugee.25 9
Under the firm resettlement framework, it was well-established
that holding or acquiring citizenship in a safe country did not stand
as a bar to refugee status as long the individual did not establish a
protracted and stable residence in that country after fleeing from his
or her homeland. The House-Senate Conference Report on the
Refugee Relief Act of 1953 states that "the term 'firm
resettlement' . . . is not designed automatically to exclude aliens from
the refugee category solely on the ground that they have been
collectively, by law or edict, granted full or limited citizenship rights
and privileges in any area of their present residence."2 60 In a
frequently-cited 1966 precedential opinion that addressed the
continued application of the firm resettlement doctrine under the
1965 Immigration Act, the INS denied refugee status an applicant
who was a citizen of both Communist China and Taiwan-but only
because after he fled China he had lived in Taiwan for 13 years, and
therefore was found to have been firmly resettled and no longer in
flight from persecution.261 In a subsequent decision, the INS Regional
who "on January 1, 1948, had not been firmly resettled." § 2(c)(1), 62 Stat. 1009. The
1948 Act's general definition of the term "displaced person" also incorporated the
concept of firm resettlement by referring to those deemed of concern by the
International Refugee Organization. Id. § 2(b). Under the IRO Constitution, displaced
persons ceased to be of concern when they acquired a new nationality or had otherwise
"become firmly established." IRO Constitution, supra note 54, annex I, pt. I, § D. See
Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 489-90 (BIA 2011) (detailing the IRO
Constitution's treatment of displaced persons who had become "firmly established");
Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. at 54 n.3 (noting that the 1948 Act incorporated a firm
resettlement test through its reference to the IRO Constitution).
258. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. at 55-56.
259. Id. at 57 n.6.
260. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 83-1069, at 10 (1953). This did not preclude
considering a person's voluntary decision to acquire citizenship in a country of
residence as a factor probative of firm resettlement. Under INS guidelines issued in
1978 acceptance of a status conferring permanent residence rights could be considered
in determining whether a refugee had firmly resettled, but in itself would not lead to a
firm resettlement finding unless one or more of the other listed factors was also present
(e.g., residence of more than a year, voluntarily serving in the military, taking
employment of a permanent nature). INS, Guidelines for Firm Resettlement, reprinted
in U.S. Refugee Programs: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong. 34-35 (1980).
261. Matter of Sun, 12 I. & N. Dec. 36, 38-39 (Reg. Comm'r BIA 1966). Several
subsequent administrative decisions cited Sun as the leading case on firm
9612014]
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Commissioner found that a young woman who fled with her family
from Communist China to Hong Kong had not been firmly resettled
and was eligible to be classified as a refugee in the United States,
despite the fact that she had acquired citizenship in Hong Kong and
lived there for six or seven years before coming to the United States
as a student. 262
Pre-1980 practice, as reflected in Executive Branch use of parole
to admit groups of refugees and Congressional allocation of visas
through refugee legislation, also had frequently provided for the entry
of refugees who were citizens of a country that would not persecute
them. Most of the 209,000 individuals admitted to the United States
as refugees during the three-year term of the Refugee Relief Act of
1953 were nationals of the non-Communist European countries in
which they were living,263 including large numbers of ethnic German
expellees from Eastern Europe residing in West Germany (which had
granted them the rights of nationals under its Basic Law),264 internal
refugees in Italy and Greece, 265 and Dutch nationals expelled from
Indonesia who were living in overcrowded conditions in the
Netherlands. 266 Statutes enacted in 1957 and 1958 extended refugee
resettlement. Matter of Chai, 12 I. & N. Dec. 81, 82 (BIA 1967); Matter of Hung, 12 I. &
N. Dec. 178, 180 (BIA 1967); Matter of Ng, 12 I. & N. Dec. 411, 411-12 (BIA 1967); see
also Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 486, 490-91 (BIA 2011) (discussing Sun as
exemplar of firm resettlement doctrine during the period from 1957 to 1990).
262. Hung, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 181 (determining that the applicant was not firmly
resettled because she was a minor during her time in Hong Kong, her parents had
subsequently been paroled into the United States, and she no longer had "any close
family ties or equities in Hong Kong"). In the initial decision that the Regional Director
overturned, an INS District Director, while denying her application for refugee status
on firm resettlement grounds, had acknowledged that "[an applicant's nationality per
se is not a basis for finding an applicant ineligible." Id. at 178.
263. See GIL LOESCHER & JOHN A. SCANLON, CALCULATED KINDNESS: REFUGEES
AND AMERICA'S HALF-OPEN DOOR 45-46 (1986) (discussing the numbers and origins of
entrants under the 1953 Act).
264. See RRA, supra note 249, §§ 2(c), 4(a)(1), 67 Stat. 400 (allocating 55,000
visas to German expellees residing in West Germany, West Berlin or Austria); H.R.
REP. NO. 83-974, at 11 (1953) (discussing how West Germany had taken in millions of
German ethnics expelled from countries falling under Communist domination). Under
section 116 of Germany's Basic Law, these expellees would have been considered
German nationals as soon as they entered German territory-or at least would have
been so recognized by early 1955, when clarifying legislation was enacted. See Von
Mangoldt, supra note 32, at 33-36 (discussing automatic acquisition of nationality
under the Basic Law).
265. RRA, supra note 249, § 4(a)(5) and (7); see H.R. REP. No. 83-974, at 13-14
(1953) (discussing Greece's "internal refugee problem" necessitating resettlement for
many of its "own citizens" and the need to relieve "surplus population" in Italy).
266. RRA, supra note 249, § 4(a)(9); see H.R. REP. No. 83-974, at 15 (1953)
(discussing plight of Dutch Indonesians whose families lived in Indonesia for
generations "return[ing] to a country badly devastated by the war, and already
seriously overcrowded"). Visa allocations for the Dutch Indonesians were extended by
subsequent legislation, and by 1962 the United States had taken in over 30,000 of the
300,000 who had left Indonesia for the Netherlands. See Richard Feree Smith,
Refugees, 367 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 43, 47 (1966) (chronicling the
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admissions for some of these groups.267 The 1958 law added visas for
residents of the Azores uprooted by a volcanic eruption, although they
were Portuguese nationals and could have gone to Portugal. 268
Taking in these groups was seen by Congress and the State
Department as fully consistent with "our traditional policy of aiding
refugees who have been forced by circumstances beyond their control
to flee their homes." 269
The U.S. stance toward refugees fleeing the Communist regime
in China is also instructive. They were a problematic case under the
UN's refugee definition, given that they were nationals of the UN-
recognized Republic of China in Taiwan and arguably could avail
themselves of that government's protection. 270 Despite a massive
refugee crisis as escapees from the mainland crowded into Hong
Kong, the UN took the position that they did not fall under the
UNHCR's mandate because national protection was available. 271
That did not stop the United States from using both refugee
movement of Dutch Indonesians from Indonesia to the Netherlands to the United
States).
267. See Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. 85-892, 72 Stat. 1712, 1712-13 (extending
visa allotments for specified groups); Act of Sept. 11, 1957, § 15, Pub. L. 85-316, 71
Stat. 639, 643 (same); S. REP. No. 85-1057, at 6 (1957).
268. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1712, 1712-13; H.R. REP. No. 85-2558, at 2-6
(1958).
269. H.R. REP. No. 85-2558, at 8-9 (1958) (reprinting State Department letter
expressing support for the Senate-passed bill aiding "refugees from the Azores Islands"
and requesting the House to add relief for the "Dutch refugees from Indonesia").
270. The protection available from the Nationalist government was more
theoretical than real; despite the fact that it viewed them as citizens, it allowed very
few to enter, and did not agree until 1962 that it would accept all who wished to come.
See Decision Shunned on China Refugees; U.N. Agency to Study Problem but No One
Will Take Red Victims Now in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1953 (discussing the
plight of Chinese refugees stranded in Hong Kong and Taiwan's refusal to take them);
Taiwan Offers to Accept Refugees from Red China, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1962, at 1
(reporting Taiwan's 1962 decision to finally accept the refugees).
271. A report commissioned by UNHCR questioned whether the Chinese could
be considered refugees from a legal point of view, given that Nationalist China
recognized them as citizens. In 1957, the UN General Assembly issued a resolution
empowering the High Commissioner to use his "good offices" to raise money to assist
the refugees, without regard to whether the UNHCR Statute applied to their situation.
See GIL LOESCHER, THE UNHCR AND WORLD POLITICS 92-95 (2001) (discussing UN
responses to the Hong Kong refugee problem); Refugee Chinese Puzzle for U.N.; Large
Hong Kong Group Has Complex Legal Status That Blocks Aid Program, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 1955, at 3 (summarizing report that found the UN could not concede the Hong
Kong Chinese needed UNCHR protection given that they were nationals of the UN-
recognized Chinese government in Taiwan); Kathleen Teltsch, U.N. to Consider China
Refugees; U.S. to Present Problem of 700,000 now in Hong Kong to Assembly in Fall,
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1957, at 10 (describing the lack of legal refugee status and the
1957 push for a UN resolution to authorize UNCHR assistance). Three years later, a
General Assembly resolution explicitly stated that the Chinese refugees were among
those "who do not come within the immediate competence of the United Nations." See 1
LOUISE W. HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME: THE WORK OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES 436 (1975) (quoting and discussing UN
General Assembly Res. 1499[XV] of Dec. 5, 1960).
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legislation and parole to admit Chinese refugees. 272 As long as they
could show that they fled from persecution in their former home and
were not firmly resettled, their possession of another nationality was
deemed irrelevant.2 7 3
To be sure, there were other situations in which the United
States declined to take groups of refugees on the ground that they
were nationals of a country that would accept them. In 1972, when
Ugandans of Asian descent were stripped of citizenship and expelled
by Idi Amin, the United States granted parole to 1,000 left stateless,
leaving it to Britain to take those with British passports. 274 In the
mid-1970s, when hundreds of thousands of Portuguese nationals fled
Angola and Mozambique as those former colonies gained
independence, the United States provided financial aid and planes for
an airlift to Portugal but did not take any of the refugees. 275 But
these were understood to be discretionary decisions based on
272. The Refugee Relief Act of 1953 included allocations of 3,000 visas for "Far
Eastern" refugees and an additional 2,000 specifically set aside for Chinese refugees.
RRA, supra note 249, § 4(a)(12)-(13), 67 Stat. 400, 402. Later, persons fleeing
Communist China could qualify for visas set aside for "refugee-escapees" under the
1957 Act and for refugee admission or adjustment of status under § 203(a)(7) of the
1965 Act. The parole authority was used to admit more than 15,000 Chinese refugees
residing in Hong Kong between 1962 and 1965. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note
196, at 22 (providing a table listing the approximate numbers of refugees accepted by
the United States under various programs).
273. See cases discussed supra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
274. See 1973 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 94 (discussing the Attorney
General's 1972 authorization of parole for "up to 1,000 stateless Ugandan Asians");
Kathleen Teltsch, Refugee-Aid Unit Bids U.S. Take More Ugandan Asians, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1973 (noting that 27,000 Ugandan Asians who held British passports were
admitted by Britain, while those left stateless had been resettled in the United States
or remained in UN refugee camps).
275. See David Binder, $85 Million Aid to Go to Lisbon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1975 (reporting U.S. announcement of economic aid package and airlift); U.S. Linking
Airlift of Angola Refugees To Shifts in Lisbon, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1975 (discussing
U.S. willingness to offer aid provided that Portugal's new government did not align
itself with Communism and press reports asserting that resettling some of the refugees
in the United States was under discussion). U.S. officials were highly suspicious of the
revolutionary regime in Portugal. This may have contributed to the United States'
decision not to relieve Portugal's burden by taking in some of the refugees. Absorbing
nearly a million returnees caused hardship and unrest in Portugal and inserted a new
right-wing element into Portuguese politics. See Marvine Howe, Refugees Are a Major
Factor in Portuguese Election, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1976 (discussing the returnees'
right-wing orientation and the prospect that their votes could bring about "a decisive
shift" in a country that had been heavily Socialist); Marvine Howe, The Ex-Colonizers:
Still Not at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1976 (discussing the economic hardship caused
by the mass influx into "Western Europe's poorest country"). U.S. leaders may well
have desired these results. Cf. Mario Del Pero, 'Which Chile, Allende?' Henry Kissinger
and the Portuguese Revolution, 11 COLD WAR HISTORY 625 (2011) (discussing the
Secretary of State's hostility toward, and efforts to undermine or isolate, Portugal's
government).
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humanitarian, resource and foreign policy considerations.276 During
the same time period, refugee status was routinely being granted to
Soviet Jews who could easily acquire (and in some cases already had)
Israeli nationality.2 7 7
An exchange during a 1973 committee hearing, and the drafting
changes that followed, provide strong indications that Joshua Eilberg,
Chair of the House immigration subcommittee, agreed with the
traditional U.S. approach of allowing multiple nationals to qualify as
refugees and wanted to preserve it in the new refugee definition he
was developing. John Collins of the American Irish National
Immigration Committee complained that the U.S. government
routinely rejected asylum applications from Catholics facing
persecution in Northern Ireland.2 7 8 Eilberg then asked Collins for his
reaction to a State Department letter opposing a bill that would have
authorized visas for persons fleeing persecution in Northern
Ireland2 79 on the ground that they were nationals of both the
Republic of Ireland and the UK and could relocate anywhere in those
countries. 280 Collins responded, "[T]hat is a shoving off of
responsibility," and pointed out that with respect to "a number of
other nationalities" the State Department "do[es] not say well you can
go to X space, Y space, Z country, so why are you coming here to
us?"28 1 Eilberg expressed sympathy with Collins's viewpoint and
indicated that he believed that those genuinely fearing persecution in
Northern Ireland would be eligible for asylum under the bill then
before the committee, which contained a refugee definition similar in
structure to section 203(a)(7) of the 1965 Act but without its
276. See 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 51 (Rep. Eilberg asking State
Department witness whether the United States had taken any of the "Angolan
refugees who have fled"; response explains that only financial assistance has been
provided but does not dispute that they could be admitted as refugees); see also 1978
House Hearings, supra note 151, at 268 (State Department witness explaining that the
exodus from Angola and Mozambique was not deemed a refugee emergency because
Portugal was able to resettle them); supra text accompanying note 233 (discussing
criteria traditionally used to determine whether refugees should be deemed of "special
concern" and accepted for resettlement).
277. Because of the political salience of this issue to the Refugee Act's drafters,
it will be discussed separately, infra Part IV.C.4.
278. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 323-29. Collins attributed this to
the executive branch's desire not to "embarrass Great Britain." Id. at 326.
279. Applicants from Northern Ireland were ineligible for refugee admission
under INA § 203(a)(7) because they were not fleeing a Communist or Middle Eastern
country. See id. at 326.
280. Id. at 329-30 (quoting State Department letter).
281. Id. at 330. The transcript quotes Collins as stating "they take the same
attitude with regard to a number of other nationalities," but when read in conjunction
with Collins' next sentence, which is quoted above, it is clear he meant that the same
reasoning was not being employed to reject applicants of other nationalities. Id.
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geographic and ideological restrictions. 282  He asked for
documentation of cases of deserving Northern Irish asylum
applicants for the committee to consider as it continued to work on a
revised refugee definition for U.S. law. 283
The immigration bill that emerged from Eilberg's committee
three months later included a refugee provision based on the
Convention definition,284 but structured in a way that allowed
persons with more than one nationality to qualify. H.R. 981 would
have amended section 203(a)(7) to cover
aliens who are outside the country of which they are nationals, or in the
case of persons having no nationality, are outside the country in which
they last habitually resided, who . . . (A) are unable or unwilling to
return to the country of their nationality or last habitual residence
because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, (B) are not nationals of the countries in which their
application for conditional entry is made, and (C) are not firmly
resettled in any country; ... 285
In order to satisfy the first part of the definition, the applicant would
already have to be outside the country of nationality where he or she
suffered or feared persecution. Clause (B) could only be referring to
persons who had a second nationality as well. Under clause (B), a
multiple national would be disqualified only if he or she went to that
second country of nationality and applied for admission to the United
States from there, while clause (C) would come into play only if the
person had firmly resettled in that (or any other) country. One of the
representatives who spoke in support of the bill on the House floor
expressly stated that "residents of Northern Ireland" facing
persecution in their homeland would be eligible under this
definition. 286
After H.R. 981 failed to win Senate passage, Eilberg included an
identical refugee provision in his 1975 immigration bill.2 87 When he
began to pursue separate refugee legislation, his proposed Refugee
Act of 1976 contained a refugee definition substantially identical to
282. Id.; see also id. at 327-28 (Eilberg calling attention to refugee definition in
bill and getting Collins to agree that it would take care of some of the cases he is
concerned with); id. at 15 (reprinting the refugee definition in the version of H.R. 981
then under consideration).
283. Id. at 330.
284. H.R. 981, 93d Cong. § 5 (1973); see H.R. REP. No. 93-461 (1973) (report by
Eilberg for House Judiciary Committee sending bill to House floor); supra note 193
(discussing House passage of the bill).
285. H.R. 981, § 5, reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 93-461, at 2 (1973).
286. 119 CONG. REC. 31366 (remarks of Rep. Biaggi, who also gave Soviet Jews
as an example of eligible refugees).
287. H.R. 367, § 5, 94th Cong. (1975), reprinted in 1975-6 House Hearings, supra
note 196, at 14, 17.
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the first part of H.R. 981's definition, but without clauses (B) and
(C).288 Without those additional clauses, the use of the Convention's
phrase, "outside the country of his nationality," might have been
interpreted to incorporate the Convention's definition of that phrase
to mean all countries of which a person is a national. Although
Eilberg never stated his reasons for changing "the country" to "any
country" in his 1977 version of the Refugee Act,28 9 this background
suggests that the change was meant to clarify that under U.S. law,
unlike the Convention, being outside any one country of nationality
where the individual would face persecution is enough.
The Refugee Act's legislative history contains no further
discussions of the multiple nationality issue, but it does contain many
indications that Congress meant to carry forward the prior conception
of a refugee in U.S. law as a person uprooted from home who has not
yet become firmly settled in a new one. The Act begins with the
statement, "The Congress declares that it is the historic policy of the
United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to
persecution in their homelands . . ."290 The refugee definition's
requirement that the individual be unwilling or unable to "return to"
the country of nationality indicates that the country Congress had in
mind is the one the person previously lived in and fled.2 9 ' When
referring to the "outside any country of . .. nationality" element of the
definition, legislators and Executive Branch officials routinely used
phrases like "home country," "country of origin" or "his or her
country," reflecting an assumption that the country in question is the
person's former home.29 2 The Act's proponents repeatedly
characterized the law's basic purpose as providing a haven for the
"homeless" or "uprooted."293
288. H.R. 14386, § 2(a), 94th Cong. (1976).
289. H.R. 3056, § 2(a), 95th Cong. (1977), reprinted in 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 196, at 2-3. The language relating to nationality remained unchanged in
subsequent versions through the Act's 1980 passage. See supra note 211.
290. Refugee Act of 1980, § 101(a), 94 Stat. 102 (emphasis added); see supra text
accompanying notes 132-35 (discussing BIA's consideration of that language).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
292. See, e.g., 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 67 (U.S.
Refugee Coordinator Dick Clark stating that the bill's definition "provide[s] that a
refugee is someone outside his or her country of origin, and would be subject to
persecution upon return"); 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 30 (Rep. Eilberg
using the phrase "unwilling to return to his home country" in describing what a person
must prove to satisfy the refugee definition); H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 9 (1979) (using
the phrase "outside ... [his or her] country") (brackets in original); 125 CONG. REC.
37201 (1979) (Rep. Fascell interchangeably using "home country," "country of
residence," and "country of nationality").
293. See, e.g., 1979 Senate Hearing, supra note 200, at 1 (introductory statement
by Sen. Kennedy); 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 1 (Rep.
Holtzman's introductory statement); 1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 18, 21
(testimony of State Department's James Carlin); S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1979) ("It
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The Refugee Act expressly required a determination that a
person had not been "firmly resettled in any foreign country" as a
prerequisite to refugee admission or the grant of permanent residence
to an asylee.2 9 4 While the no-firm-resettlement requirement was set
forth separately from the refugee definition, the House-Senate
Conference Report treated it as part of the definition of a "refugee."295
The legislative history reflects close attention by the relevant
Congressional committees to the firm resettlement standard and how
it was being applied during the years preceding the Refugee Act's
enactment. 296 The Conference Report directed the Attorney General
to issue regulations to govern firm resettlement,29 7 and those
regulations, issued just a few months later, followed settled practice
by not treating the possession of another country's citizenship as an
eligibility bar unless the person actually traveled to and resided in
that country after fleeing persecution.2 9 8 Reading the refugee
definition to exclude anyone who could safely live in a second country
of citizenship would produce the anomalous result that persons
viewed as eligible for refugee admission or asylum under the firm
reflects one of the oldest themes in America's history-welcoming homeless refugees to
our shores."); H.R. REP. NO. 96-608, at 2 (1979); 125 CONG. REC. 23232 (1979) (Kennedy
remarks presenting bill).
294. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1157(c)(1), 1159(b)(4) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 96-256, at 9,
15 (1979) (stating that refugee applicants must show they have not become firmly
resettled); H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17-18 (1979) (also noting the "not firmly resettled"
requirement for asylees adjusting their status to permanent resident). The Refugee Act
did not expressly make firm resettlement a bar to an initial grant of asylum, which
appears to have been an oversight. The regulations issued by the Attorney General
shortly after the Act's enactment prohibited INS District Directors from granting
asylum to an applicant who had been firmly resettled, and Congress later added it to
the statute as an asylum bar. See supra notes 157-58 (discussing the regulations and
statutory change).
295. See H.R. REP. No. 96-781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing under the
heading "Definition of 'Refugee"' the "determination of whether a refugee is 'firmly
resettled' under the statutory definition"); see also Arnold H. Liebowitz, The Refugee
Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional Concerns, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
SC. 163, 167 (1983) (special counsel to U.S. Senate immigration subcommittee
describing the firm resettlement standard as part of the statute's definition of refugee).
296. See 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 193, at 70 (Rep. Holtzman
raising with the State Department whether a definition of firm resettlement is needed);
1977 House Hearings, supra note 196, at 94-95 (information provided by INS to Rep.
Eilberg regarding the denial of requests for asylum from Chinese nationals who fled to
Hong Kong and resided there for a substantial period of time); 1973 House Hearings,
supra note 196, at 98-99, 105-06, 254-55, 260, 268-69 (discussing firm resettlement as
a question of fact in the context of the Hong Kong refugees); 1970 House Hearings,
supra note 192, at 188, 190 (discussing whether to amend the INA's refugee section to
add an explicit firm resettlement provision and the definition of firm resettlement). As
discussed in the next section, it was well-known to Congress that Soviet Jews were
being found to have not been firmly resettled and were being admitted as refugees even
when they had gone to Israel first and lived there as citizens for some months.
297. H.R. REP. NO. 96-781, at 19 (1980) (Conf. Rep.).
298. See discussion of the administrative standards supra note 158 and infra
text accompanying notes 363-69.
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resettlement standard would not even meet the threshold test of
being a refugee under the statutory definition. It is unlikely that
Congress intended that outcome, given that it chose a phrase, "any
country," that differs from the Convention and can be interpreted
consistently with the traditional U.S. firm resettlement doctrine.
A more general theme concerning the underlying purpose of
refugee admission, which was often invoked as the Refugee Act made
its way through Congress, can also help to explain why Congress
would want to retain aspects of prior U.S. law which, unlike the
Convention, allowed people who could avail themselves of the
protection of another country of nationality to enter as refugees, and
also allowed refugee status to be predicated on past persecution
alone, even if future persecution was unlikely. The United States'
self-image as a country founded by refugees seeking freedom from
political and religious persecution, a country that welcomes refugees
in order to shame and undermine oppressive regimes, reward victims
of tyranny who deserve a better life, reaffirm its identity as a haven
for the oppressed, and be enriched by those who share a commitment
to freedom, is deeply rooted in the national political consciousness.
The ideal has often not been lived up to in practice, but its rhetorical
power runs deep.299 Joseph Califano, President Carter's Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare, expressed these notions vividly when
he testified in support of the Refugee Act:
There are relatively few moments in our national life when . . . what we
choose to do about a political problem expresses what we really are as a
nation .... By our choice on this issue, we will reveal to the world-and
more importantly, to ourselves-whether we truly live by our ideals, or
simply carve them on our monuments. In this case, the words etched in
299. The image of the United States as a haven for refugees has deep roots in
the nation's political discourse. Thomas Paine's revolutionary war pamphlet described
the new nation as an "asylum for mankind" ready to "receive the fugitive" from "[e]very
spot of the old world . .. overrun with oppression." THOMAS PAINE, Common Sense
(1776), in THE GREAT WORKS OF THOMAS PAINE 35 (1877). George Washington
declared "[t]he bosom of America is open to receive ... the oppressed and persecuted of
all [niations." Address of December 2, 1784, 27 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON 254 (1938). Andrew Jackson's Nullification Proclamation described the
United States as "the asylum where the wretched and the oppressed find a refuge and
support." JON MEACHUM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 228
(2008) (quoting proclamation of December 10, 1832). The Supreme Court opened a
seminal First Amendment decision with a paean to a country whose cities are
populated by "children of those who sought refuge in the new world from the cruelty
and oppression of the old, where men have been . . . driven into exile in countless
numbers for their political and religious beliefs." Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 120 (1943). Ronald Reagan invoked the arrival of Indochinese and Caribbean
"boat people" and Iron Curtain refugees in his nomination acceptance speech and
asked: "Can we doubt that only a Divine Providence placed this ... island of freedom
here as a refuge for all those people yearning to breathe free?" Ronald W. Reagan,
Presidential Nomination Acceptance Speech (July 17, 1980), quoted in BOSTON GLOBE
NEWSPAPER, July 18, 1980, at 10.
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stone are . . . those heartstopping words . .. on the base of the Statute
of Liberty about the "tired, poor, huddled masses yearning to breathe
free.". . . When we help refugees ... ,the gift is not so much to them as
to ourselves. . . . [Today's refugees] are seeking the same thing our
parents and grandparents and ancestors were seeking: The clear air of
liberty . . . . And just as our parents and grandparents enriched the
United States, these new refugees are enriching this Nation. 300
When asked during the hearings how he would define the U.S.'s
refugee policy, Attorney General Griffin Bell responded similarly:
"[O]ur policy is ... based on the historical fact that our country began
as a haven."30 The Congressional reports on the Refugee Act
emphasize its grounding in "one of the oldest themes in America's
history-welcoming homeless refugees to our shores" 302 and "this
country's tradition of welcoming the oppressed of other nations."303
Kennedy, writing shortly after the Act's passage, believed that
"America's immigrant heritage, more than any other factor, was
responsible for successful Congressional action" in the face of
mounting concerns about refugee numbers and costs. 304
The pre-1980 refugee definition, with its focus on flight from
persecution, past or feared, and its very un-Convention-like lack of
attention to the availability of national protection, resonated with the
idea that those oppressed in countries not part of the "free world"
should be welcomed to highlight the lack of freedom in those regimes,
enrich the United States with people who identify with its values, and
reward those who have suffered for their beliefs. Congress, in the
Refugee Act, recognized that the ideological and geographic
restrictions of the old definition were inconsistent with the human
rights justifications traditionally offered for U.S. refugee policies, but
left the old framework otherwise largely intact and unquestioned.
This played out both on the level of general standards (e.g., keeping
past persecution in the refugee definition, maintaining the firm
300. 1979 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 200, at 223, 226. Subcommittee
chair Elizabeth Holtzman thanked Califano for this "very eloquent and important
testimony." Id. at 226.
301. Id. at 26.
302. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1 (1979).
303. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 17 (1979); see also id. at 2 (quoting Elizabeth
Holtzman opening the 1979 Refugee Act hearings by invoking "our country's
humanitarian tradition of extending a welcome to the world's homeless"). In both the
Senate and House reports, conforming to American tradition is mentioned before and
given stronger emphasis than conforming to the Convention.
304. Kennedy, supra note 191, at 148. The country's refugee heritage was a
prominent theme in the House and Senate floor debates. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC.
23239 (1979) (Sen. Boschwitz stating that the United States "is the only country that is
a country of refugees . . .. [It] has been energized and given substance by people who
came to our country to start anew."); id. at 35816 (Rep. Fish: "Most of us in this
Chamber trace our ancestry to . . . earlier refugees. We have before us an opportunity




resettlement framework) and in Congress's strong support for the
ongoing U.S. policy of taking in as refugees all who managed to
escape the Soviet Union, especially Soviet Jews. As discussed in the
next section, if the Refugee Act had incorporated the strict
Convention approach to national protection, the ability of the United
States to continue to grant refugee status to all Soviet Jews who
wanted to come would have been in doubt-a result that the Refugee
Act's drafters and Congress as a whole would not have supported.
4. The Case of Soviet Jews
During the period when the Refugee Act was being drafted and
considered by Congress, Soviet Jews were the most politically popular
of refugees. 305 Starting in the 1960s, the American Jewish community
built a highly effective advocacy movement on their behalf, using
mass public demonstrations and letter-writing campaigns to pressure
the USSR to liberalize its exit policies and convince the U.S.
government to make the issue a high priority in Soviet-US
relations. 306 The movement found a receptive audience in Congress,
where its message resonated with traditional anti-Communist
sentiment and lingering guilt at the U.S.'s failure to admit Jewish
refugees during the Holocaust. 307 In 1974 Congress passed the
Jackson-Vanik Amendment tying trade concessions to liberalized
Soviet emigration policies.308 The number of Jews allowed, to leave
rose from about 15,000 a year in 1975-1977 to nearly 29,000 in 1978
and over 51,000 in 1979.309
The Jews who left the USSR traveled with Israeli immigrant
visas issued with Israel's authorization by the Dutch embassy in
Moscow.3 10 Under Israel's nationality laws, they were entitled to
305. So much so that when foreign policy officials asked President Carter to
adopt an Indochinese refugee policy distinct from the overall refugee bill, the Justice
Department strongly objected on the ground that there would be "less opposition to
admitting Indochinese refugees if linked to a more comprehensive policy including the
admission of Soviet Jews." Draft Memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stu
Eizenstat, to the President (Feb. 27, 1978), Domestic Policy Staff-Annie Guttierez's
Files (Civil Rights and Justice), "Refugee Policy [O/A 8110][1]," Box 31, Jimmy Carter
Library (recounting Justice Department concerns).
306. See FRED. A. LAZIN, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVIET JEWRY IN AMERICAN
JEWISH POLITICS 28-30 (2005) (describing the origins, goals, and tactics of the
American Jewish Conference on Soviet Jewry).
307. See id. at 41-45, 295 (discussing the movement's activities and the sources
of its political appeal); LOESCHER & SCANLON, supra note 263, at 88-95 (describing its
influence on U.S. policy).
308. See LOESCHER & SCANLON, supra note 263, at 91-94; LAZIN, supra note
306, at 45-50 (both discussing the Jackson-Vanik amendment).
309. LAZIN, supra note 306, at 311.
310. See id. at 31; PETRUS BUWALDA, THEY DID NOT DWELL ALONE: JEWISH
EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION, 1967-1990, at 54-55, 76 (1997) (describing the
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Israeli citizenship, effective as soon as they set foot on Israeli soil. 3u
But by 1977, a majority of Soviet Jews arriving in Vienna (the transit
point for the trip to Israel) refused to go on to Israel and instead
sought admission to the United States; in 1979 the proportion
reached nearly two-thirds.312 In addition to these dropouts (or
noshrim, the Hebrew word), there were several thousand Soviet Jews
during the 1970s who, after initially going to Israel, decided to leave.
These yordim, as they were called, went to Rome, where they applied
for refugee admission to the United States.313
It was clearly-announced U.S. policy that all Jews leaving the
Soviet Union qualified as refugees, and the United States would
accept all who wished to come.314 In the second half of the 1970s,
process of obtaining visas at the Netherlands embassy in Moscow). Only small numbers
who had first-degree relatives in the United States were allowed to travel on U.S.
visas. Those seeking to come to the United States as refugees had to leave the USSR
first because § 203(a)(7) required that application be made in a non-Communist
country. After 1980, the Refugee Act allowed for the possibility of in-country
processing, but that provision was never invoked, probably because U.S. officials
realized that the USSR would not be willing to grant exit visas to people labeled
refugees. See BUWALDA, supra, at 57-59 (explaining why Soviet Jews generally could
not leave with U.S. visas).
311. See The Law of Return, §§ 1-2, 4 LSI 114 (1950) (Isr.), amended by 24 LSI
28, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Immigration/TextofLaw
of Return.html_[http://perma.cc/M5ST-KKUW] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (granting
every Jew the right to settle in Israel); Nationality Law, § 2(b)(2), 6 LSI 50 (1952) (Isr.),
available at http://www.israellawresourcecenter.orglisraellaws/fulltext/nationalitylaw.htm
[http://perma.cc/FW42-RAXR] (archived Aug. 31, 2014) (regarding acquisition of
nationality); Shachar, supra note 41, at 236; Claude Klein, The Right of Return in
Israeli Law, 13 TEL. AVIV U. STUD. L. 53, 60-61 (1997) (both discussing automatic
conferral of nationality upon arrival).
312. LAZIN, supra note 306, at 80, 310; COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES, REPORT TO CONGRESS, U.S. ASSISTANCE PROVIDED FOR RESETTLING SOVIET
REFUGEES, No. ID-76-85 (1977) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT], at 3, 31
(listing and discussing changes in the annual percentage of departing Soviet Jews who
declined to go to Israel). In Vienna, the Jewish 6migrbs were received by
representatives of the Israel-affiliated Jewish Agency, which tried to persuade them to
continue on to Israel. Those who insisted on "dropping out" were turned over to the
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), which moved them to Rome, where the United
States processed their applications for entry. LAZIN, supra note 306, at 80-82; see also
BUWALDA, supra note 310, at 59-60; Rita J. Simon, Soviet Jews, in HAINES, supra note
194, at 181, 185 (both discussing HIAS' role).
313. See LAZIN, supra note 306, at 88; COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra
note 312, at 34-35 (both discussing the situation of Soviet Jews who left Israel and
sought resettlement in the United States.).
314. See Gregg A. Beyer, The Evolving United States Response to Soviet Jewish
Emigration, 3 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 30, 32-33 (1991) (discussing the U.S. "open door"
policy); LAZIN, supra note 306, at 84,186 (explaining that until the late 1980s it was
U.S. policy to accept all Soviet Jews as refugees and provide them with "freedom of
choice" as to their destination); S. COMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
94TH CONG., REP. ON ITS TRIP TO THE SOVIET UNION: EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS 3-4
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS] (explaining that since
1971 the United States maintained an "open door" policy for persons leaving the USSR
who expressed a desire to go the United States, using refugee visas up to the available
limits and parole when needed).
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most of the 17,400 refugee visas available each year under INA
section 203(a)(7) were set aside for Soviet 6migr6s, and when visas
ran out parole was used to let in the rest.3 15 Yordim were also
accepted as refugees, despite their acquisition of Israeli citizenship,
unless it was determined that an applicant's stay in Israel amounted
to firm resettlement.3 16 Those who had been in Israel for less than a
year were usually deemed not firmly resettled and eligible for
admission.3 17
As the proportion of Soviet Jews dropping out in Vienna grew, a
heated dispute arose between Israel and the American Jewish
community over the treatment of Soviet Jews as refugees. The debate
was particularly intense during the years from 1976-1981, just as the
Refugee Act was making its way through Congress.3 18 Israel was
315. See LOESCHER & SCANLON, supra note 263, at 94, 125, 154; LAZIN, supra
note 306, at 83-84, 130-31 (both describing set-asides of refugee visas and repeated
resorts to parole to meet the demand for admission).
316. EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS, supra note 314, at 4. In a January 1975 legal
opinion, the INS General Counsel instructed agency staff that acquisition of Israeli
nationality under the Law of Return did not in itself disqualify a person from refugee
status under § 203(a)(7), and the involuntary acquisition of Israeli nationality, in the
absence of any overt act signifying acceptance, would not be considered evidence of firm
resettlement. If an individual had applied for admission to Israel as an immigrant, an
initial presumption of firm resettlement would apply, but that presumption could be
rebutted if the person presented evidence showing that, under all the circumstances, he
or she was not in fact firmly resettled. Opinion from Sam Bernsen, INS General
Counsel, Conditional Entry Eligibility of Soviet Jews Who Initially Emigrated to Israel
(Jan. 6, 1975) [hereinafter INS General Counsel Opinion], at 1, 6-8, copy in HIAS
Files, "USSR Nerida and Neshrim," Box 1141; see also COMPTROLLER GENERAL
REPORT, supra note 312, at 34, 46 (discussing the legal opinion). Part of INS counsel's
reasoning was that U.S. law does not recognize the involuntary acquisition of a
nationality, INS General Counsel Opinion, supra, at 4-6, but the opinion also made it
clear that "with or without acquisition of Israeli nationality," the decisive question was
whether the individual became firmly resettled in Israel. Id. at 1, 6-7.
317. The State Department considered all Soviet Jews who spent less than a
year in Israel not firmly resettled, and provided them with refugee assistance in Rome.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 312, at 35-36 (describing the State
Department policy). INS, which adjudicated their applications for admission, applied a
case-by-case firm resettlement standard and sometimes denied applications even when
the person had been in Israel less than a year. See id. at 35 (describing INS' rejection of
fifty-one such cases even though the State Department had granted refugee
assistance). However, INS guidelines stated that "[r]esidence of less than one year in a
third country would not ordinarily create a presumption of resettlement," Guidelines
For Firm Resettlement, supra note 260, and it was the impression of American Jewish
resettlement agencies that most yordim who had spent less than a year in Israel were
being admitted. Memorandum from Philip Bernstein to Ralph Goldman and Joan
Wolchansky, Council of Jewish Federations, Inc., Re: Statement on Soviet Jewish
Emigration at 5 (May 29, 1979), copy in HIAS Files, "Noshrim - Statements, Telexes,
Press Releases, 'Papers,' etc.," Box 1024.
318. See GAL BECKERMAN, WHEN THEY COME FOR Us, WE'LL BE GONE: THE EPIC
STRUGGLE TO SAVE SOVIET JEWRY 356-63 (2010); LAZIN, supra note 306, at 2, 79-178;
Stephen F. Windmueller, The "Noshrim" War, in A SECOND EXODUS: THE AMERICAN
MOVEMENT TO FREE SOVIET JEWS 161-72 (Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin
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desperate to increase its Jewish population and wanted to be the only
available destination for those who lacked family-based grounds for
immigrating to the United States. It urged the U.S. government to
stop admitting Soviet Jews as refugees and put pressure on the
American-based Jewish organizations aiding the dropouts in Europe,
the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and the Joint Distribution
Committee (JDC), to curtail their activities.319 Israel's bulldog on the
issue, Arye Leon Dulzin of the Jewish Agency, took every opportunity
to argue that Soviet Jews were not genuine refugees. 320 As he put it,
"A refugee means someone who has nowhere to go. But today all
Soviet Jewish emigrants have Israeli visas-and Israel is ready to
absorb them and assist them."321
The American Jewish community overwhelmingly favored
"freedom of choice" for Jews departing the Soviet Union and
supported the U.S. policy of accepting all those who did not wish to
resettle in Israel. They resisted Israeli demands that HIAS and the
JDC stop helping the dropouts. 322 A commitment to liberal principles,
the belief that Jews in the USSR were in danger and should be
encouraged to leave, and revulsion at the prospect of turning away
eds., 1999); DAVID A. HARRIS, THE CONTROVERSY OVER REFUGEE STATUS OF SOVIET
JEWISH EMIGRES 3 and passim (1987); WILLIAM W. ORBACH, THE AMERICAN
MOVEMENT TO AID SOVIET JEWS 75-76 (1979) (all discussing the dispute over Soviet
Jewish noshrim).
319. See generally sources cited supra note 318 (discussing the dispute between
Israel and American Jewish organizations); see also David Landau, Special Interview:
Dulzin Cites Need to End Dropout of Soviet Jews, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, June 18,
1979 (reporting on Dulzin's desire to redirect Soviet Jewish emigrants to Israel).
320. See David Landau, Israeli and U.S. Jewish Leaders Reach No Conclusions
on Drop-out Issue, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, June 29, 1979 (noting Dulzin's frequent
references to the dropout problem as a "calamity" for Israel). The Jewish Agency is
Israel's quasi-official migration agency.
321. Landau, supra note 319 (quoting Dulzin); for similar Dulzin statements, see
Murray Zuckoff, Dulzin Tells CJFAssembly Israelis, Diaspora Jewry Bound to 'Agenda
of Common Concerns," JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, Nov. 19, 1979 ("A refugee is
someone who is compelled to leave his country and has no place to go . . .. [T]oday
there are no Jewish refugees."); David Landau, Behind the Headlines: Dulzin Not
Against Aiding Soviet Jews Who Reach the U.S., JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, July 11,
1979 ("No Jew leaving the Soviet Union can be considered a refugee since Israel is
ready to receive him with open arms.").
322. See LAZIN, supra note 306, at 95-96 (noting that the American Jewish
community supported freedom of choice); see generally sources cited supra note 318; see
also Landau, supra note 320 (discussing statements made by American Jewish leaders
"that they would oppose measures to restrict the work of HIAS and the JDC on
grounds that every Jew deserves the right of free choice as to where he wants to live");
David Landau, Fisher Says U.S. Jews Will Not End Aid to Soviet Jewish "Drop-Outs",
JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, June 29, 1978 (reporting statement by the Jewish
Agency's chair that he and "most American Jewish leaders" opposed Israeli demands
for an end to aid for the "drop outs"). In 1973, HIAS and the JDC gave in to Israeli
pressure to suspend assistance to 6migrbs from Israel (the yordim), but by 1977 HIAS
had resumed helping them apply for refugee admission to the United States. See
LAZIN, supra note 306, at 88-90, 133 (describing HIAS's involvement with the yordim).
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refugees as the United States had in the 1930s all played a role in
their position. 323
The positions of the two sides were framed in legal terms as well
as on moral and policy grounds. Dulzin and his allies argued that
Jews leaving with Israeli visas effectively already held Israeli
nationality and were under Israel's protection, and therefore could
not satisfy the UN's definition of a refugee. 324 They distributed copies
of an internal UNHCR legal opinion supporting this view.325 When
the Refugee Act was enacted, Israeli officials publicly urged that it
not be interpreted to confer refugee status on Soviet Jews holding
Israeli visas. 326 HIAS argued in response that the mere possession of
an Israeli visa did not make the dropouts Israeli nationals and thus
they remained refugees within the meaning of the Convention;327 as
323. See LAZIN, supra note 306, at 2-3, 95-96 (discussing the impact of
memories of the American government turning away refugees trying to flee Hitler's
Germany, as well as liberal values and attachment to the communal tradition of
rescuing Jews in danger, as factors underlying American Jews' strong commitment to
freedom of choice); see also Gil Sedan, Meeting in Washington May 16 to Deal With
Soviet Dropout Problem, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, Apr. 17, 1980 (quoting Howard
Squadron, President of the American Jewish Congress, stating: "What they (the
Israelis) are asking us to do is to repudiate the values we have always stood for and
fought for."); SCA Says All Soviet Jews Should Be Aided Regardless of Their
Destination, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, Dec. 31, 1976 (describing Synagogue Council
of America's resolution that the Jewish community has a "sacred obligation" to assist
Soviet Jews who wish to come to the United States).
324. See Yitzhak Shargil, U.S. Refugee Act Seen as Having Negative Effect on
Soviet Jewish Emigration to Israel, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, Apr. 4, 1980 ("Dulzin
said ... Jews leaving the USSR are not political refugees because they . .. are already
citizens of Israel under the Law of Return"); Sarah Honig, Olim Could Be "Refugees" in
U.S., JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 30, 1980, at 6 (quoting Dulzin statement that "a Jew who
leaves the Soviet Union . .. is a priori a citizen of Israel"); Arye Dulzin, Memorandum
Relating to the Legal Definition of the Term "Refugee," sent to Gaynor Jacobson, HIAS
(Mar. 27, 1980), copy in HIAS Files, Box 1227, Noshrim Correspondence 1980-81
folder, at 2-3 (analyzing the Convention refugee definition and arguing that it does not
apply to visa holders to whom Israel has extended national protection); see also infra
text accompanying note 360 (discussing Israeli attempt to convince Rep. Joshua
Eilberg that Soviet Jews were not refugees) .
325. See Landau, supra note 321 (discussing Jewish Agency official's citation of
the 1973 UNHCR opinion as support for the argument that Soviet Jewish emigrants do
not qualify for refugee status); infra note 333 and accompanying text (discussing the
UNHCR opinion).
326. See Begin Chides U.S. on Soviet Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1980 (quoting
Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin's statement that the new Refugee Act, while
"noble and humanitarian, ... it should not apply to Jews with Israeli visas in their
travel document," and that he was considering raising the issue with President Carter);
Gil Sedan, supra note 323 (Dulzin urging that the law not be applied "to Soviet Jews
who have Israeli visas and certainly not to would be yordim from Israel); Shargil, supra
note 324 (Dulzin urging Begin to "explain to the U.S. President that Soviet emigrants
cannot be considered political refugees since they all have exit visas to Israel").
327. See Letter from Gaynor Jacobson to Arye Leon Dulzin, at 1-2 (Mar. 4,
1980), copy in HIAS Files, "Noshrim Correspondence 1980-81," Box 1227 (explaining
HIAS's interpretation of the Convention).
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support, it brandished a legal opinion by former UNHCR legal
director Paul Weis.328 But at the same time, HIAS argued that U.S.
law provided-and the new Refugee Act would maintain-a standard
more generous than the Convention's. In a widely-distributed March
1980 letter to Dulzin, HIAS's Gaynor Jacobson wrote, "As a matter of
U.S. law, . . . a refugee continues to be a refugee as long as he does
not acquire a new nationality and has [not] been firmly resettled in
the country of his new nationality"; thus, the letter argued, all the
dropouts, as well as yordim who spent less than a year in Israel and
were not firmly resettled, would continue to be eligible. 29
If Congress had adopted the Convention's approach to
nationality, it would have been throwing the existing policy toward
Soviet Jews into doubt. The dropouts' status under the Convention
was murky. As a starting point, their nationality vis-A-vis the country
they were leaving was unclear. Because they were forced to surrender
their Soviet nationality, they could be classified as stateless. But Atle
328. David Landau, Differing View of Jewish "Refugees," JTA DAILY NEWS
BULLETIN, July 12, 1979 (stating that an "authoritative source" had provided a lengthy
1974 legal opinion by Paul Weis concluding that "Jews from Eastern Europe who are
assisted by HIAS are not ordinary emigrants but are to be regarded as refugees"). In
1979, HIAS sent a copy of the Weis opinion to Hamilton Fish, an ally on the House
Judiciary Committee, to help him respond to concerns raised by "one or two ... [House]
colleagues" who had questioned the Soviet Jews' refugee status. Letter from Gaynor
Jacobson to Rep. Hamilton Fish (Dec. 11, 1979), copy in HIAS Files, "Noshrim
Correspondence," Box 1024. The Weis legal opinion actually had nothing to say on the
question of whether Soviet Jewish emigrants were Israeli nationals and therefore not
Convention refugees. Weis prepared the opinion to help HIAS respond to a letter from
the British Inspector of Taxes contending that HIAS's migration assistance activities
were not charitable in nature because the Jews were emigrating voluntarily rather
than "being driven from their country of residence by outright official persecution."
Weis therefore focused his opinion on showing that Jews in Iron Curtain countries
faced persecutory conditions and were fleeing for that reason; he carefully avoided
raising the question of whether the availability of national protection in Israel affected
their refugee status. See Paul Weis, untitled draft of legal opinion (Mar. 26, 1974),
available in Paul Weis Archive, Bodleian Social Science Library, University of Oxford,
Ref. No. PW/PR/PMSC/17 (giving his opinion on whether Jewish individuals from
Eastern Europe assisted by HIAS should be regarded as emigrants or refugees).
329. Letter from Jacobson to Dulzin, supra note 327, at 2-3. Israeli officials, in
their responses to HIAS's March 1980 letter, essentially conceded the legal point that
dropouts and yordim could satisfy the U.S. refugee definition, and shifted to arguing on
policy grounds that the U.S. government and resettlement agencies should, as a matter
of discretion, refuse to admit them or provide them with aid. See Letter from Arye
Dulzin to Gaynor Jacobson (Mar. 27, 1980); Letter from Yehuda Avner, Adviser to
Prime Minister Menachim Begin, to Gaynor Jacobson, HIAS (Mar. 12, 1980), copies in
HIAS Files, "Noshrim Correspondence 1980-81," Box 1227; see also Honig, supra note
324, at 6 (discussing the understanding of Israeli officials that the new U.S. Refugee
Act would confer refugee status on Soviet Jews who went to Israel but were not firmly
resettled). But see Sedan, supra note 323 (reporting that a background paper prepared
for the American Jewish Committee said that Soviet Jews who went to Israel and
automatically became Israeli citizens would not qualify under the new refugee
definition).
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Grahl-Madsen, the leading refugee scholar of the time, took the view
that when loss of nationality results from persecution or flight, a
person should still be considered to have their former nationality for
purposes of Article 1A(2).3 30 The more crucial issue was whether they
should be classified as Israeli nationals given that they traveled with
Israeli immigrant visas that entitled them to citizenship upon arrival.
If so, they could not qualify as refugees under the Convention, either
because they were dual nationals who did not have a well-founded
fear of persecution in both countries, or because they were no longer
stateless but were now nationals of a country that would not
persecute them. On the other side, arguments could be made that the
dropouts did not acquire Israeli nationality unless and until they
actually arrived in Israel,3 3 ' or that the absence of other ways to
leave the Soviet Union made their acquisition of Israeli nationality
involuntary and therefore invalid. 332 The uncertainty of the situation
is reflected in reports of conflicting views within UNHCR. A 1973
legal opinion prepared by UNHCR staff had taken the view that the
Soviet Jews in Vienna were under Israeli national protection and
were dual nationals ineligible for refugee status unless they could
show a risk of persecution in both the Soviet Union and Israel.33 3 But
Paul Weis, the former director of the UNHCR's legal division,
330. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 55, at 158-60. As Grahl-Madsen pointed out, if
it were otherwise, a persecuting government could prevent a non-resident citizen from
claiming refugee status by denationalizing him; if classified as stateless, such a person
would not qualify as a refugee because he does not fear persecution in his country of
habitual residence. But see Paul Weis, The Concept of the Refugee in International Law,
87 J. Du DROIT INT'L 928, 972 (1960) (arguing that nationality under the Convention
should be determined solely by "whether the person is considered [a national] by the
authorities of that country").
331. But, as we have seen, many refugee tribunals have refused to grant
Convention refugee status to people who have a right to a safe country's nationality but
decline to use it. See supra notes 71, 78, and accompanying text.
332. Under Israeli law, foreign nationals entering on Israeli visas can avoid
acquiring Israeli nationality if they express that wish before or within three months
after their arrival, but stateless persons are not given that option. Because nearly all
exiting Soviet Jews were stripped of their Soviet citizenship, Israel treated them as
citizens upon arrival, regardless of their wishes. INS General Counsel Opinion, supra
note 316, at 2-3. Although international law may prohibit states from naturalizing
foreign nationals against their will, involuntarily conferring nationality on stateless
persons has been seen as permissible. See PAUL WEIs, NATIONALITY AND
STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113-19 (1956) (discussing acquisition of
nationality).
333. The opinion reasoned that "[s]ince Jewish immigrants from the Soviet
Union are Israeli-protected persons from the moment of their arrival in Austria, they
cannot be considered as refugees under the UN High Commissioner's mandate. Jewish
immigrants not wishing to proceed to Israel, in view of the availability of the protection
and services of the Israel government through the Jewish Agency, cannot claim UN
High Commissioner assistance as refugees unless they are able to fulfill the eligibility
criteria, vis a vis the Soviet Union and Israel." Landau, supra note 321 (quoting from
the UNHCR staff opinion).
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reported in an opinion he drafted in 1974 that UNHCR had made a
number of eligibility determinations for Jews seeking resettlement,
and found most of them to be eligible for refugee status. 334
It was clear, however, that the yordim could not meet the
Convention's refugee definition. They unquestionably had acquired
Israeli nationality as soon as they arrived in Israel.335 Under Article
1C(3), refugee status ceases when a person "has acquired a new
nationality, and enjoys the protection of the country of his new
nationality." Unlike the cessation clauses that follow and precede it,
the word "voluntarily" is not used.336 Accordingly, Article 1C(3) has
been applied without regard to whether a new nationality was
obtained with an individual's consent or by operation of law.3 37
Refugee tribunals had regularly relied on it to hold that post-World
War II refugees who had gone to Israel and benefited from its Law of
Return lost their refugee status.3 3 8
At the time of the Refugee Act's passage, both Congress and the
Executive were strongly committed to maintaining the U.S. policy of
allowing all Soviet Jews who had not been firmly resettled to enter as
refugees. They would not have favored an interpretation of the Act's
refugee definition that would have cast doubt on Soviet Jews'
eligibility. Reading the Refugee Act's textual differences from the
Convention-its use of the phase "outside any country of such
person's nationality" and omission of the Convention's dual national
clause-as a meaningful difference intended to preserve the U.S.'s
flexibility to admit refugees even if they held another country's
334. Weis, supra note 328, at 11-12. That passage is crossed out in pen in the
surviving draft, and might not have been included in the final legal opinion.
335. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
336. Cf. Convention, supra note 3, art. 1C(1) ("He has voluntarily re-availed
himself of the protection of his country of nationality"); art. 1C(2) ("Having lost his
nationality, he has voluntarily reacquired it"); art. 1C(4) ("He has voluntarily re-
established himself in the country which he left or outside which he remained owing to
fear of persecution").
337. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 55, at 395-96 (explaining that art. 1C(3)
"is not subject to the proviso of voluntariness" and "applies irrespective of the way in
which the person concerned acquires a new nationality, whether by . . . grant on
application . . . or by operation of law in any manner whatsoever"); Weis, supra note
328, at 978 (describing as an example of this principle a UN advisory ruling that ethnic
German refugees in Austria no longer fell within the UNHCR's mandate when
Germany enacted legislation declaring them nationals). It remains the prevailing view
that voluntariness is not required. See Susan Kneebone & Maria O'Sullivan, Article 1C,
in THE 1951 CONVENTION, supra note 58, at 481, 499 ("Art. 1 C, para. 3 clearly
contemplates situations involving both voluntary and involuntary action, or automatic
acquisition of nationality.").
338. Weis, supra note 328, at 976, 978; GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 55, at 396
(both describing a series of decisions by the French Commission des Recours).
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citizenship would thus be highly consistent with what can reasonably
be presumed to have been Congress's goal.8 39
The policy of welcoming all Soviet Jews as refugees had
overwhelming support in Congress, and was not questioned even in
the face of rapidly rising applications that created processing
backlogs and strained resettlement funds. 340 Congress's desire to
facilitate and regularize the admission of Soviet Jews, together with
the Indochinese crisis, provided much of the impetus for the Refugee
Act's passage. 341 During its first consultation with Congress under
the new Act, the State Department made it clear that the open door
policy would continue. In April 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
told Congressional committees that it was and "will remain" U.S.
policy "to offer a haven to any refugee from the Soviet Union who
wishes to resettle in this country."342 In 1981, the State Department
publicly criticized Israeli plans to stop referring the dropouts to HIAS
for U.S. resettlement and reaffirmed that "United States policy has
always been and will continue to be that Soviet Jewish refugees
arriving in Vienna should have freedom of choice with regard to
where they wish to resettle."343
339. As is often the case in statutory interpretation, trying to ascertain what
Congress as a whole intended is necessarily an exercise in "imaginative
reconstruction," given that most in Congress probably gave no thought at all to how the
language they enacted differed from the Convention's and what the differing language
should be taken to mean. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226-27 (2d ed. 2006) (explaining imaginative
reconstruction). There is, however, specific reason to believe that Joshua Eilberg, who
drafted the relevant statutory language, was deeply concerned with the refugee status
of Soviet Jews and likely to have been conscious of how niceties of wording could affect
their eligibility. See infra text accompanying notes 344-61.
340. See LOESCHER & SCANLON, supra note 263, at 94 (discussing the continuing
political support for Soviet Jewish admissions). The strength of Soviet Jews' political
support is also reflected in the disproportionate share of resettlement funding they
received as compared with other groups. See LAZIN, supra note 306, at 84-85 and 132-
33 (citing a Senator complaining in private of the disparity of "$2,400 to help a Soviet
Jew . . . $600 to assist a Cuban . . . 50 cents per person to help a Vietnamese"). A rare
note of Congressional dissent can be seen in comments appended to the House report
on the Refugee Act by two members who complained that its refugee definition would
cover Soviet Jews despite the fact that they have "a valid destination in a democratic
hospitable country where they are wanted, needed, and cared for." H.R. REP. No. 96-
608, at 61-62 (1979) (Additional Minority Views of Reps. Henry Hyde and Harold
Sawyer); see also 125 CONG. REC. 37224 (1979) (similar comments by Hyde on House
floor).
341. LOESCHER & SCANLON, supra note 263, at 154; see 1977 House Hearings,
supra note 196, at 15 (Rep. Fish describing Soviet Jewish and Indochinese refugees as
the central concerns of the subcommittee); see also 1979 House Judiciary Hearings,
supra note 200, at 30, 73 (statements by Reps. Lungren and Holtzman).
342. U.S. Refugee Programs, supra note 260, at 4, 7 (testimony of Secretary
Vance).
343. Helen Silver, State Department Says Soviet Jewish Migrants Should Have
Freedom of Choice on Where They Want to Settle, JTA DAILY NEWS BULLETIN, Aug. 27,
1981 (quoting State Department spokesman Dean Fisher); see also Bernard
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The practice of granting refugee status to Soviet Jews who had
lived as citizens in Israel for a brief time was in place throughout the
period the Refugee Act was being considered by Congress and had
quiet (because of Israeli sensitivities) 344 but steady support from key
Congressional players and State Department officials. As early as
1970, at a House Immigration Subcommittee hearing, then-Chair
Michael Feighan (with Joshua Eilberg also present) sought assurance
from the INS General Counsel that Jews who went to Israel from Iron
Curtain countries and "almost automatically" became citizens would
not be considered firmly resettled in Israel and ineligible for U.S.
refugee admission. INS counsel responded that time spent in Israel
as a "bystation or stopping place" before seeking entry to the United
States would not necessarily result in a finding of firm resettlement,
even if the stay lasted "a couple of years."345 In 1973, Eilberg, now the
subcommittee's chairman, praised the "fine statement" given by
Gaynor Jacobson of HIAS when Jacobson, in response to a committee
Gwertzman, U.S. and Israel Disagree on Giving Soviet Choice Where to Settle, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1981 (reporting on the dispute with Israel and the State Department's
stance). An attempt in 1987 by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzchak Shamir to convince the
United States that Soviet Jews with Israeli visas should not be admitted as refugees
was rebuffed by Secretary of State George Shultz, who made it clear that as long as the
American Jewish community favored freedom of choice, it would remain the U.S.
position. LAZIN, supra note 306, at 199-200. In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union
began to eliminate exit restrictions and the prospect of a mass migration loomed, the
United States ended its commitment to accepting all Soviet Jews who wished to come.
Even then, they were not deemed ineligible for refugee status based on their ability to
go to Israel; INS Commissioner Alan Nelson was careful to reassure Congress that
"freedom of choice" remained the U.S. policy. Soviet Refugees, Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Int'l Law, House Comm. on Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 92 (1989) (testimony regarding Soviet refugees). Instead, numerical limits on
annual refugee admissions from the USSR and individualized assessments of whether
each applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution were used as the screening
mechanisms. See BECKERMAN, supra note 318, at 530-32 (discussing the institution of
entry quotas); LAZIN, supra note 306, at 275-77 (describing the negotiations that led to
numerical limits). Although Congress and the American Jewish community accepted
the need to set admission quotas, continuing Congressional sentiment in favor of Soviet
Jews was reflected in the 1989 enactment of the Lautenberg Amendment, which
effectively created a presumption that Soviet Jews satisfied the refugee definition's
well-founded fear test. See Victor Rosenberg, Refugee Status for Soviet Jewish
Immigrants to the United States, 19 TOURO L. REV. 419, 426-36, 440-43 (2003)); Beyer,
supra note 314, at 52-53; LAZIN, supra, at 270-81 (discussing the Lautenberg
Amendment).
344. Israel found the idea of labeling citizens emigrating from Israel as refugees
particularly offensive. See Honig, supra note 324, at 6 (reporting on Israeli concerns
that the new Refugee Act would encourage emigration from Israel by allowing yordim
to qualify as refugees); Memorandum, Summary Comments on Meeting in Jerusalem
on Issue of Handling by HIAS of Russian Refugees Departing Israel, at 12, copy in
HIAS Files, "Mtgs. Noshrim," Box 1024 (quoting Prime Minister Rabin as telling
American Jewish organizations in a 1974 meeting that "[n]o government in Israel can
accept the fact that a yored is a refugee. This would be the end of Zionism.").
345. 1970 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 190 (exchange between Rep.
Feighan and INS General Counsel Charles Gordon); see also id. at 175 (listing
members present at hearing).
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member's question, recounted a sympathetic story to illustrate why
yordim should be allowed to come to the United States as refugees. 346
In 1976, a report on Soviet Jewish emigration issued by a
Congressional study group chaired by Eilberg noted that yordim were
being allowed in as refugees based on case-by-case determinations of
whether they had firmly resettled in Israel.3 4 7 A 1977 Comptroller
General Report to Congress extensively described the INS case-by-
case approach and the State Department's practice of treating all
Soviet Jews who had lived in Israel for less than a year as
refugees. 348 In August 1977, a group of Congressional and Executive
Branch officials monitoring implementation of the Helsinki accords
reported to Congress that the situation of about 300 yordim living in
"pitiful conditions" in Italy after being denied refugee status on firm
resettlement grounds could be exploited by the Soviets for
propaganda purposes, and recommended that they be paroled into the
United States. 349 Around the same time, the U.S. government quietly
asked HIAS to resume helping Soviet Jews who had left Israel and
were seeking refugee admission to the United States.35 0 In 1979, the
INS was still approving most applications of Soviet Jews who had
lived in Israel less than a year. 351
346. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 303-04. Jacobson described the
situation of a "young engineering student I spoke to in Rome, who had learned English
intending to immigrate to the United States. . . . He was imprisoned in Leningrad
because he was a leader in the fight for human rights. He was finally able to exit to
Israel. He worked to pay back all of his immigration debts and then arrived in Rome to
achieve what he said has been his destination, the United States." Id. at 303.
347. EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS, supra note 314, at 4. Later in 1976, HIAS, at
Eilberg's request, submitted a letter containing a detailed description of the situation
of Soviet Jews in Rome. It noted that yordim who had stayed in Israel less than a year
were receiving U.S. funded refugee assistance and being admitted to the United States
as refugees. Letter from Carl Glick to Rep. Joshua Eilberg (Mar. 9, 1976), copy in HIAS
files, "Carl Glick Noshrim Jan-April 1976," Box 1292.
348. See COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 312, at 34-36, 46
(describing the State Department and INS approaches).
349. See COMM'N ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT OF THE
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS Two YEARS AFTER HELSINKI 173-74 (1977) (discussing situation of
the "Ostia Jews"). Some of them were later resettled in the United States. See LAZIN,
supra note 306, at 133, 164 n.17 (describing the commission's recommendation and
subsequent resettlement efforts).
350. See id. at 133 (quoting HIAS official explaining in 1977 that "we have been
quietly requested by American government officials to assume responsibility for
processing these individuals"). In 1973, HIAS and the JDC, at Israel's request, had
suspended assistance to the yordim in Rome. See supra note 322. Until HIAS resumed
providing services, they were helped by the International Rescue Committee and other
non-Jewish groups (still with U.S. government funding), while HIAS handled their
resettlement once they arrived in the United States. See 1976 Letter from Carl Glick,
supra note 347 (describing HIAS' activities in Rome).
351. See supra note 317. .
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Given the political salience of the Soviet Jewry issue and
Congress's close attention to the processing of their refugee claims, if
the new refugee definition had been meant to incorporate a strict
Convention approach to nationality that would have made all Soviet
Jews who had spent any time in Israel ineligible and raised doubts as
to all the rest, one would expect this to have received some notice-
especially when the Act's Congressional shepherds, Eilberg,
Holtzman, Rodino, and Kennedy, were all strong proponents of an
"open door" for Soviet Jews. 352 But there is no indication in the
legislative history that anyone in Congress thought that the new
definition would pose any obstacle to the continuation of current
practices.
The fact that it was Joshua Eilberg who inserted the phrase
"outside any country of . . . nationality"353 provides particular reason
to believe that this language was meant to preserve existing practices
toward Soviet Jews. As we have already seen, Eilberg paid close
attention to the implications of wording differences from the
Convention, and he had previously expressed sympathy for the view
that possession of a second nationality should not stand as a bar to
refugee status. 354 Eilberg was a close ally of the American Soviet
Jewry movement. While his overall approach to refugee issues was
more conservative than Kennedy's,355 his advocacy for an open door
policy toward Soviet Jews was unwavering. Although skeptical of the
Executive Branch's authority to parole in refugees, Eilberg repeatedly
lobbied for paroles of Soviet Jews to speed up their admission. 356 His
352. In 1971, when Attorney General John Mitchell said he lacked statutory
authority to use the parole power to let in Soviet Jewish refugees, Rodino, who then
chaired the House immigration subcommittee, persuaded him to change his mind. See
1973 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 161. Rodino and Holtzman later pressed the
Carter Administration to speed up paroles of Soviet Jews. See Letter from Reps. Peter
Rodino, Elizabeth Holtzman, Robert McLory and Hamilton Fish, Jr. to Attorney
General Griffin Bell (Mar. 29, 1979), copy in HIAS Files, "USSR Parole 1978/79," Box
1024 (urging that processing commence immediately). Kennedy pushed for the open-
ended use of parole to admit Soviet refugees. See Bernard Gwertzman, State
Department Seeking to Admit 10,000 Vietnamese, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1977, at 1, 18
(describing Kennedy's stance). On Eilberg, see infra text accompanying notes 353-61.
353. See supra note 211 and text accompanying notes 288-89 (discussing
Eilberg's introduction of this change in his Refugee Act of 1977).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 211-15 and 277-83.
355. See Kennedy, supra note 191, at 144 (describing Eilberg's versions of the
Refugee Act as "conservative and restrictionist"). Eilberg's bill set a relatively low
annual limit of 20,000 on annual refugee admissions, placed stringent limits on
Presidential authority to exceed that number, and included restrictions designed to
make it harder for "economic migrants" and illegal entrants to be granted relief. See
Anker & Posner, supra note 192, at 31-42; see also Martin, supra note 190, at 94
(noting Eilberg's and Kennedy's contrasting views).
356. See Gwertzman, supra note 343, at 18 (discussing Eilberg's requests for
emergency paroles of Soviet Jews in 1976 and 1977); Joseph Polakoff, Action Asked for
Entry into U.S. of 2000 Soviet Jews Now in Rome, JTA, Feb. 11, 1975 (Eilberg
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relationship with HIAS was particularly close.35 7 When the State
Department's 1977 budget proposal cut appropriations for HIAS's
resettlement work, Eilberg lobbied strenuously to have the funds
restored.358 After Israel accused HIAS of pressuring Soviet Jews in
Vienna to go to the United States rather than Israel, Eilberg issued a
report and press release in February 1978 that emphatically cleared
HIAS of the charges and implicitly rebuked Israel for "pointing the
finger" rather than looking at the underlying causes of Soviet Jews'
preference for the United States.359 Two months later, Eilberg
informed HIAS that he had been visited by an Israeli official who
tried to convince him that the dropouts were not refugees. 360 Eilberg
was also quite familiar with U.S. policy concerning the yordim and
favorably inclined toward letting in those not firmly resettled in
Israel.361 It is particularly unlikely that Eilberg, when changing the
Convention's wording to "any country" in his bill at the very same
time that Israel was vociferously arguing that dropouts and yordim
were not refugees under the Convention, would have intended that
his change in wording be understood to incorporate the Convention's
approach.
It is also revealing that the Executive Branch understood the
new refugee definition to not require any change in existing policies.
A Carter Administration "Q and A" briefing book on the new law
included these responses to anticipated queries:
pressuring the State Department and Attorney General to authorize paroles). On
Eilberg's often-expressed view that refugee paroles lacked legal legitimacy, see Martin,
supra note 190, at 94.
357. When Eilberg got into legal trouble, Carl Glick, HIAS's President, even
offered to testify as a character witness on his behalf. Letter from Carl Glick to Rep.
Joshua Eilberg (Feb. 6, 1978), copy in HIAS Files, "Noshrim - Statements, Telexes,
Press Releases, 'Papers,' etc.," Box 1024.
358. See Letter from Reps. Charles Vanik, Jonathan Bingham and Joshua
Eilberg to Senate Appropriates Comm. Chair John McLellan (Mar. 23, 1977), copy in
HIAS Files, "USSR Legislation Bills (appropriations etc.) 1976-77," Box 1048 (asking
the committee to consider increasing the State Department's budget for HIAS's
resettlement work).
359. Press Release, Office of Congressman Joshua Eilberg, HIAS Not Diverting
Soviet Jews to U.S., Eilberg Report Shows (Feb. 1, 1978), copy in HIAS Files, "Noshrim
- Statements, Telexes, Press Releases, 'Papers,' etc.," Box 1024; see also LAZIN, supra
note 306, at 134 (Eilberg defending HIAS); 1978 Letter from Carl Glick, supra note 357
(expressing pleasure that "your information coincides almost exactly with our
statements" and stating that the report will be an "antidote" to the "politically inspired
venom" of an Israeli official who had recently "emitted a loud yowl about HIAS's
activities in Vienna"); Congressional Report Says HIAS Is Not Diverting Soviet Jews to
the U.S., JTA, Feb. 2, 1978 (reporting on Eilberg's comments).
360. Letter from Carl Glick to Elie Wiesel (Apr. 20, 1978), copy in HIAS Files,
"Noshrim - Statements, Telexes, Press Releases, 'Papers,' etc.," Box 1024 (describing
what Glick was told about a visit Eilberg received the previous week from Shmuel
Adler, an advisor to the Israeli Knesset's Committee on Immigration and Absorption);
see also LAZIN, supra note 306, at 133-34 (recounting Adler's statement to Eilberg and
his staff that Soviet 6migr6s were not political refuges).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 345-47.
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Question: [Iun the past, Soviet Jews have resettled in Israel and then
come to the United States as refugees. How do you explain that?
Answer: Some Soviet Jewish emigres who have gone to Israel have been
granted refugee admission to the United States in the past because INS
ruled, on a case-by-case basis, that these particular individuals were
not firmly resettled there. INS has held that acquisition of Israeli
nationality, in and of itself, does not necessarily mean that the
individual is firmly resettled in Israel. The new law does not widen or
otherwise change this existing avenue of admission.
Question: The Israelis are concerned that the new law considers some
Soviet Jews to be refugees even after they are resettled in Israel. How
do you explain that?
Answer: If they have been firmly resettled in Israel, Soviet Jews would
not qualify for admission to the U.S. as refugees. The concept of firm
resettlement has been an integral part of U.S. refugee law since 1948,
and is specifically included in the new act. In addition, Soviet Jews
firmly resettled in Israel would no longer meet the definition of
refugees in the Refugee Act and in the UN Convention and Protocol on
Refugees, as those persons who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of
political persecution in their country of nationality. 3 6 2
Acquiring Israeli nationality was not seen as a bar to refugee status
under the new Refugee Act unless the applicant had also firmly
resettled in Israel.
The Attorney General's June 1980 regulations continued to
define "firm resettlement" in a manner that did not bar refugee status
for persons who had citizenship or residence rights in a country but
did not actually go there.363 However, for those who did travel to and
enter a country with an offer of citizenship, the presumption of firm
resettlement was made harder to overcome, requiring a showing that
the person's conditions of residence were "so substantially and
consciously restricted by the authority of the country . . . that he was
not in fact resettled."364 Under this new standard, the Soviet Jewish
362. Refugee Policy Q & A 1980, undated, Records of the Cabinet Secretary
(Carter Administration)-Stephen Page's Files, "Refugee Policy Q & A 1980," Box 131,
Jimmy Carter Library. Although the date, author and distribution of the document is
not specified, the contents suggest it was prepared in March or April 1980 (one answer
states that it was unclear whether a drop in Soviet Jewish exit visas in the first few
months of 1980 represented a new and more restrictive Soviet policy; by May or June
this had become clear). The Q & A book may have been put together to help officials
preparing to appear before the House and Senate Judiciary committees for the first
consultations under the Refugee Act in April 1980.
363. Dep't of Justice, INS, Refugee and Asylum Procedures, Interim
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 3791, 3793, 2795 (June 2, 1980), codified at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 207.1(b), 208.14 (1981); see supra note 158 (quoting regulation).
364. Refugee and Asylum Procedures, supra note 363. It appears that this
reflected a longstanding INS view that the firm resettlement standards had generally
been too lenient. See Problems Under the Refugee Act of 1980 Discussed, 57
INTERPRETER RELEASES 212-13 (1980) (reporting that INS Central Office officials told
resettlement agencies at a May 1980 conference that regulations soon to be issued
under the Refugee Act would "tighten up" firm resettlement); U.S. Refugee Programs,
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yordim would no longer qualify for admission-but only because they
were deemed firmly resettled, not because they failed to satisfy the
definition of a "refugee." The significance of this distinction was
underscored in 1984, when the Jewish Agency informed HIAS that
Israel was considering formally granting citizenship to Soviet Jews
before they departed the USSR for Vienna, so that dropouts would no
longer qualify for refugee status. HIAS responded with a legal opinion
concluding that if this were done, the emigrants would not be
refugees under the UN definition, but "under United States law, they
would still be considered refugees because the law states that for
someone to be firmly resettled in a new country, they must not only
be offered a permanent 'home' but must be physically present in that
country."365 State Department officials reportedly concurred with this
analysis.36 6 In 1987, at a time when there were widespread reports
that the Soviet Union was poised to accept Israeli proposals to put
emigrating Jews on direct flights to Israel,3 67 the U.S. issued
proposed asylum regulations that re-liberalized the firm resettlement
standard by allowing people who spent time in another country with
citizenship or residence rights to overcome the presumption of firm
resettlement by showing that going to that country was a necessary
consequence of the flight from persecution, the stay was no longer
than necessary, and the person did not establish significant ties
there.3 68 There were reports in the press at the time that the revision
supra note 260, at 33 (April 1980 Congressional testimony by Ingrid Walter of the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies stating that the INS firm resettlement
guidelines adopted in the late 1970s were the result of "lengthy discussions" with
resettlement agencies and had survived "repeated attempts to whittle them down"); see
also COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 312, at 34-36 (discussing INS's
determinations that some Soviet Jews who had been in Israel for less than a year were
firmly resettled, which was more restrictive than the State Department's stance).
365. HIAS Exec. Comm. minutes (Oct. 16, 1984), Jewish Agency Suggestion re
Nationality of Soviet Jewish Emigrants, at 7, copy in HIAS Files, "USSR Noshrim
Jan.- Oct. 1984," Box 1223 (describing Israeli proposal and legal opinion submitted by
HIAS Associate Secretary and immigration lawyer Dale Schwartz); see also Summary
of Staff Analysis of Effects of Conferring Israeli Nationality on Soviet Jewish Emigres
(Sept. 12, 1984 (same box and folder) (concluding that, under the firm resettlement
standard of U.S. law, "[i]n the case we are considering, the Soviet emigre may hold
Israeli nationality, but will not have stepped upon Israeli soil and, therefore, could still
qualify as a refugee under U.S. law").
366. HIAS Exec. Comm. minutes, supra note 365, at 7 (stating that "[s]ources in
the U.S. State Department concurred in the above legal opinion").
367. See LAZIN, supra note 306, at 221-25 (describing discussions of direct flight
plans). The "direct flights" under discussion would have included a stop-over in
Romania, but in contrast with Vienna, there would be no real opportunity for Soviet
Jews to "drop out" in a Communist dictatorship. Id. at 223.
368. Dep't of Justice, INS, Proposed Rules, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,552, 32,557 (Aug. 28,
1987) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.15). The revised firm resettlement rule was enacted in
1990 and has stayed essentially unchanged since. See supra notes 158-60. Although
the revised rule applied only to asylum, comments from Justice Department sources
suggested that the INS would apply the same standard to refugee admissions. See
Israel and U.S. Compete for Exiting Soviet Jews, REFUGEE REPORTS (U.S. Comm. for
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was intended to ensure that Soviet Jews who had no choice but to go
directly to Israel would not be precluded from traveling on to the
United States as refugees.369 Whether or not that was the motivation,
the Attorney General's regulation clearly rests on the assumption
that the U.S. refugee definition does not exclude a person fleeing
persecution in her home country merely because she also is a national
of another country that would not persecute her.
D. The Standards for Exercising Discretion
Recognizing that the U.S. refugee definition covers multiple
nationals who face persecution in any one country of their nationality
does not mean that they are all entitled to asylum or refugee
admission. It only makes them eligible to be considered for these
forms of relief, which are discretionary in nature.370 The Attorney
General, by regulation, and the Board of Immigration Appeals,
through precedential adjudication, can establish criteria to govern the
appropriate exercise of discretion in such cases. 371
An appropriate model can be found in regulations that address
the closely analogous situation of internal relocation. The regulations
provide that asylum applicants who could avoid persecution by
relocating to a different part of their country of nationality will be
denied asylum if "under all the circumstances it would be reasonable
to expect the applicant to do so."372 In assessing whether relocation is
reasonable, adjudicators are instructed to consider a broad range of
factors, including but not limited to "whether the applicant would
face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any
ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or
judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and
Refugees) [hereinafter 1988 REFUGEE REPORTS], July 15, 1988, at 11, 12-13 (quoting
Justice Department sources as stating they did not want two different standards for
refugee admission and asylum, although they were "not jumping" to rewrite the
admission regulation).
369. 1988 REFUGEE REPORTS, supra note 368, at 12 (discussing June 1988
Evans and Novak column stating that Justice Department regulations cleared by the
State Department 'will give Soviet Jewish refugees flown to Israel via Romania a new
right to come immediately to the United States as 'refugees,' despite the fact that they
would be granted Israeli citizenship automatically under Israel's Law of Return"); A.M.
Rosenthal, On My Mind; Justice at State, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1988 (reporting that if
direct flights were instituted and Soviet Jews would no longer have the opportunity to
drop out in Vienna, the State Department planned to amend immigration regulations
to ensure that those going to Israel could still immigrate to the United States).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 83-89.
371. This has been done, for example, in regulations that set out the
circumstances in which applicants who satisfy the refugee definition because of past
persecution should be granted asylum as a matter of discretion, without being required
to demonstrate that they have a well-founded fear of future persecution. 8 C.F.R.
§ [1]208.13(b)(1) (2013).
372. 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii) (2013).
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cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and
family ties."373
There is no logical reason why applicants who could relocate to
another country of nationality should be treated less favorably than
those who could avoid the risk of persecution by relocating within
their home country.374 (As will be discussed in Part V, in light of the
underlying purposes of refugee protection there is, if anything,
stronger reason to expect someone to stay within their home country
than to resettle in a nominal country of nationality that was not their
actual home.375) The same sorts of considerations that are set out in
the internal relocation regulation are equally relevant to determining
whether it is reasonable, under all the circumstances, to expect a
multiple national to go to another country of nationality. The
scenarios set out at the beginning of this Article illustrate some
circumstances where it would be unreasonable to expect relocation-
situations where a person fleeing persecution would face serious
hardships or barriers to integration that would make it very difficult
to build a new life in that country.
Factors that the BIA has used to assess whether a discretionary
grant of asylum is appropriate when an individual could have sought
asylum in another country before traveling to the United States are
also transferable to the situation of those who could have gone to a
second country of nationality. The BIA has considered, inter alia,
whether the person had any significant ties to the safe country where
asylum could have been sought, and, on the positive side of the
ledger, "whether the alien has relatives legally in the United States
or other personal ties to this country which motivated him to seek
asylum here rather than elsewhere." 376 Similarly, an applicant's
373. 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(3) (2013); see Doe v. Holder, 736 F.3d 871, 879-80
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the regulations' "reasonableness" test does not require
a showing that the applicant would face persecution in the place of proposed relocation;
lesser hardships such as discrimination, inability to find work, and lack of family
connections may suffice).
374. The situations cannot be distinguished on the ground that there is a
greater likelihood of persecution if the person remains in the same country. The
reasonableness of expecting relocation is only considered under the regulations if there
has first been a finding that the applicant would be able to avoid future persecution by
relocating. See 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(1)(i)(B), (b)(2)(ii) (2013).
375. See infra Part V.B.
376. Matter of Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467, 474 (BIA 1987). In that case, the
applicant fled persecution in Yugoslavia and spent six weeks in Belgium before
traveling to the United States. The BIA, in determining that a discretionary asylum
grant was warranted, emphasized that he did not seek asylum in Belgium because he
wanted to join relatives in the United States, whereas in Belgium he had "no
significant ties." Id. at 468-70, 475; see also Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357,
359, 367-68 (BIA 1996) (favorably exercising discretion in the case of an applicant who
spent two months in Germany after fleeing her home country; the BIA found she had
valid reasons for not seeking refuge in Germany because she had no relatives there but
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family or personal ties to the United States, as balanced against a
lack of significant ties in a country of nationality to which the person
might have gone, could militate in favor of a discretionary asylum
grant.377
Political and cultural affinities might also be considered in the
balance. Imagine the case of an Ethiopian national who attended
college in the United States, studying American political institutions
and international human rights. After returning to Ethiopia he
speaks out in favor of democratic reforms and is arrested and
tortured. He flees to the U.S. and applies for asylum. But he is also
an Italian citizen: his grandfather, who died many years ago, was a
soldier during the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia and his
parents were able to procure an Italian passport and citizenship
certificate for him when he was a child. Granting asylum to this
applicant would be consistent with the U.S. tradition of viewing itself
as a haven for the persecuted that is enriched by those who are
drawn by and share a commitment to its ideals of freedom and
democracy-a theme emphasized throughout the Refugee Act's
legislative history.378 His experiences and values make him well-
suited for participation in the U.S. political community,379 and his
American education and English-language skills will facilitate his
integration. His ties to Italy are, in contrast, fortuitous and thin.
Considering cultural and political affinities does run the risk of
opening the door to unjustifiable discrimination in favor of ethnic or
religious groups with well-organized constituencies, or against those
who belong to disfavored groups or hold unpopular views. The way
that during the 1970s and 1980s more generous standards were
did have relatives in the United States); Matter of Soleimani, 20 I. & N. Dec. 99, 101-
02, 107-08 (BIA 1989) (granting asylum to a woman who spent ten months in Israel
and could have remained there if she wished; applying Pula's balancing test, the BIA
gave strong weight to the fact that she had several close relatives in the United States
while only her grandmother lived in Israel).
377. Cf. Deborah E. Anker, Discretionary Asylum: A Protection Remedy for
Refugees Under the Refugee Act of 1980, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 46-47, 63-65 (1987)
(arguing that "[a]n evaluation of the real qualities of contacts and connections that an
applicant has with a country" is needed to determine whether discretionary denial
based on a reasonable alternative source of refuge is appropriate, but questioning the
relevance of U.S. family ties).
378. See supra text accompanying notes 299-304. Cf. John A. Scanlon & O.T.
Kent, The Force of Moral Arguments for a Just Immigration Policy in a Hobbesian
Universe, in OPEN BORDERS? CLOSED SOCIETIES? THE ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES
61, 80-84 (Mark Gibney ed., 1988) (discussing the appropriateness of basing
immigration policies on values that citizens ascribe to the nation as a whole, including
the self-image of the United States as a nation committed to human rights and
welcoming refugees); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 49 (1983) (arguing that a
country's ideological affinities with those facing persecution based on shared values can
give rise to an obligation to admit them as refugees).
379. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Creedal Citizenship, 9 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1,
3-4 (2011) (discussing the idea of granting citizenship based on a person's
demonstration of commitment to a nation's "founding and animating" principles).
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applied to Soviet Jews than to similarly-situated Indochinese
refugees, who were routinely denied admission if they had prospects
of resettlement elsewhere, provides reason for pause. 380 But an
individualized assessment of whether a person forced from home by
persecution has good reasons for coming to the United States rather
than another country is not in itself objectionable, and the criteria for
exercising discretion can explicitly prohibit giving positive or negative
weight to a person's nationality, ethnicity, or religion.38 1
Consideration of an applicant's political affinities to the United States
poses obvious potential for abuse (picture an immigration judge
rejecting an applicant on discretionary grounds because her socialism
or support for an Islamist political party is "un-American"), but at a
very basic level-favoring those who share a commitment to core U.S.
values such as democracy, human rights, and tolerance-is
defensible.382 These are the same values that underlie U.S. asylum
law and the Refugee Convention.3 83 Refugee adjudication routinely
makes inescapably political distinctions resting on human rights and
anti-discrimination norms when it labels some governmental actions
persecution and others legitimate punishment for violations of law.38 4
380. See H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 63 (1979) (pointing out that Indochinese
refugees, unlike Soviet Jews, were disqualified from participation in the U.S. refugee
program if another country was willing to take them); see also Kate Aschenbrenner,
Discretionary (In)justice: The Exercise of Discretion in Claims for Asylum, 45 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 595, 624, 631 (2012) (arguing that the inherent vagueness of discretion
invites inconsistent application).
381. The Refugee Convention requires that states apply its provisions "without
discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin." See Convention, supra note 3,
art. 3.
382. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 379, at 3 (arguing that "creedal" criteria for
citizenship should rest on acceptance of core principles but allow for contestation "at
the level of detail"). The case for taking political affinities into account may be at its
strongest in situations where the person's other country of nationality is undemocratic
or has a politics rooted in ethnic or religious identity rather than tolerance and
pluralism. (Consider the Bosnian asylum applicant described at the beginning of this
Article who was repulsed by the ethnic nationalism of her second country of
nationality).
383. See HATHAWAY, supra note 43, at 101-24 (discussing the foundational role
of human rights norms in defining the concept of persecution); see also Daniel
Steinbock, Interpreting the Refugee Definition, 45 UCLA L. REV. 733, 787-96 (1998)
(viewing nondiscrimination and the protection of belief and expression as the core
values underlying the refugee definition); Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Asylum: The Law and
Politics of Change, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 2-4, 17-18 (1995) (arguing that tolerance is
the central value reflected in refugee protection and asylum).
384. See -generally Daniel Kanstroom, Loving Humanity while Accepting Real
People: A Critique and Cautious Affirmation of the "Political" in U.S. Asylum and
Refugee Law, in DRIVEN FROM HOME: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF FORCED MIGRANTS
115 (David Hollenback ed., 2010) (critiquing and cautiously affirming the "political" in
U.S. asylum and refugee law); MATTHEW E. PRICE, RETHINKING ASYLUM 24-94 (2009).
Compare, e.g., Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2013) (holding it is not
persecution for Germany to punish home-schooling parents who for religious reasons
refuse to comply with compulsory school attendance laws), with Matter of Izatula, 20 I.
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The degree of persecution and trauma a person has suffered is
also an appropriate discretionary factor to consider. The U.S. refugee
definition (in contrast with the Convention's) has, since its earliest
days, allowed for refugee status based on past persecution alone,
reflecting a humanitarian and compensatory impulse to provide relief
to those who have suffered for their beliefs or identities, regardless of
whether they would face further persecution if the United States
turns them away.385 The Attorney General's regulations already
recognize that those subjected to severe forms of persecution, or who
were persecuted in the past and would suffer serious harm (other
than persecution) if removed, are deserving of a favorable exercise of
discretion.386 Applicants with multiple nationalities who were
severely persecuted in the country they fled, or who endured past
persecution and would face further hardships if removed to a second
country of nationality, should similarly receive favorable
consideration.
Discretionary criteria for multiple nationality cases could
provide for denial of asylum in situations where the applicant neither
faced nor fears persecution in the country of nationality that she lived
in, and would only be at risk if she went to another country of
nationality that was not her home. Such a person literally falls within
the U.S. refugee definition, but has no reason to go to the country of
nationality that would persecute her. She can reasonably be expected
to return to her home country.387
The discussion so far has focused on discretionary criteria for
asylum, not the admission of refugees through the resettlement
program. While the legal framework for asylum contemplates that
every person applying in the United States or at its borders is
entitled to an individualized determination of whether he or she
satisfies the refugee definition and deserves a favorable exercise of
discretion,388 more drastic triage mechanisms are necessarily applied
to winnow down the world's estimated 15.4 million refugees for the
70,000 or so resettlement slots the United States offers each year.889
& N. Dec. 149, 153-54 (BIA 1990) (holding that it is persecution rather than legitimate
prosecution for a dictatorship to punish those who seek to forcibly overthrow it in
countries where a coup is the only way to effect a change in the political regime).
385. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91, 250-51.
386. 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(1)(iii) (2013).
387. Denying a discretionary grant of asylum in this situation would also be
consistent with Congress's statement in the Refugee Act that the goal of U.S. refugee
policy is to respond to the needs of those "subject to persecution in their homelands."
See supra text accompanying note 290.
388. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2014) ("Any alien who is physically present in the
United States or who arrives in the United States . . . irrespective of such alien's
status, may apply for asylum .. ").
389. See U.S. Dep'ts of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human
Services, Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2014: Report to the Congress 1, 5
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The Refugee Act provides that, within an overall annual ceiling set by
the President in consultation with Congress, admissions "shall be
allocated among refugees of special humanitarian concern to the
United States." 390 This is done through sub-ceilings that allocate slots
by region, and priority categories established by the State
Department to limit the types of refugee claims that will be
considered.391 Only those who make it through this funnel are
evaluated on an individual basis to determine whether they meet the
refugee definition and should be admitted as a matter of discretion.392
The committee reports on the Refugee Act listed as factors
relevant to determining whether refugees are of "special
humanitarian concern" "the extent of persecution to which they have
been subjected and the severity of their present situation[, family
ties, historical, cultural or religious ties, the likelihood of finding
sanctuary elsewhere, and previous contact with the United States
government."393 That list is broadly similar to the factors I have
proposed for discretionary consideration of multiple national asylum
applicants, but in the refugee admission context the extreme scarcity
of available slots justifies giving much stronger negative weight to
"the likelihood of finding sanctuary elsewhere." When establishing
the priority categories or exercising discretion, a general presumption
that people who could live safely in another country of citizenship do
not make the cut would be reasonable. But there may be special
circumstances where a compelling case could be made for offering
resettlement. The current priority categories include Iraqis exposed
to persecution as a result of their employment by the U.S.
government or other U.S.-based organizations. 394 Moral obligations
toward someone who took on great risks as an interpreter for the U.S.
military could warrant giving strong weight to that person's desire to
be resettled in the United States rather than having to go to a second
country of nationality beset by poverty and civil strife. Another
preference category consists of refugees of certain nationalities with
immediate family members living in the United States;395 family
reunification might provide a sufficiently compelling reason to offer
resettlement even if the person could relocate to another country of
citizenship where she has few connections and lacks family ties.
The zero-sum-game aspect of refugee admission (every person
granted takes a slot away from other worthy claimants) does not
(2013) [hereinafter Refugee Admissions] (estimating number of refugees worldwide and
showing annual admissions ceilings and actual refugee arrivals since fiscal year 2012).
390. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2)-(3) (2014).
391. Refugee Admissions, supra note 389, at 5-13.
392. Id. at 14-15.
393. H.R. REP. No. 96-608, at 13 (1979); see also S. REP. No. 96-256, at 6 (1979)
(containing a similar list that also includes U.S. "foreign policy interests").
394. Refugee Admissions, supra note 389, at 10-11.
395. Id. at 11-13.
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apply to asylum. To be sure, as David Martin has cogently argued,
asylum can be viewed as a scarce resource in the sense that its
political viability depends on public confidence that it is reserved for
those genuinely deserving of protection. If standards are defined too
broadly it may lead to a surge in applications and perceptions of fraud
and abuse which generate a restrictionist backlash.396 But asylum
applications from multiple nationals, while more prevalent than in
the past, will continue to be but a small fraction of asylum claims.
Recognizing that the refugee definition does not exclude them will not
create any entitlement to asylum, and immigration judges and
asylum officers are unlikely to issue discretionary grants in
unsympathetic circumstances. Here we can give Joshua Eilberg, the
progenitor of the U.S. refugee definition, who was ever mindful of the
dangers of uncontrolled refugee flows,397 the last word. At a 1973
hearing on refugee legislation, discussing with a witness why people
fleeing persecution in Northern Ireland ought to be eligible for
asylum in the United States even though both the UK and Ireland
would recognize them as citizens, Eilberg observed that allowing
their claims will "not materially affect our economy or population,
and yet, it would be very meaningful to those few individuals
involved."398
V. RECONSIDERING THE CONVENTION'S STANCE
A. The Incongruity of the Multiple Nationality Clause's Approach
The previous Part of this Article has shown that the distinctive
wording and history of U.S. refugee definition provides strong
grounds for interpreting it to cover multiple nationals who would be
ineligible for refugee status under the Convention. But what about
other countries whose refugee laws are based on the Convention?
Should they also reconsider their approach to multiple nationals'
asylum claims?
Amending the Convention refugee definition is not a realistic
possibility. A 1977 UN conference aimed at negotiating a new
Convention on Territorial Asylum foundered when it became
396. David A. Martin, The Refugee Concept: On Definitions, Politics, and the
Careful Use of a Scarce Resource, in REFUGEE POLICY: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 30 (Howard Adelman ed., 1991); see also Scott Busby, The Politics of Protection:
Limits and Possibilities in the Implementation of International Refugee Norms in the
United States, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 27, 33-37 (1997) (discussing policy concerns
that make decision-makers reluctant to accept a broad definition of refugee).
397. See supra note 355.
398. 1973 House Hearings, supra note 192, at 330; see supra text accompanying
notes 278-83 (discussing and quoting from Eilberg's colloquy with John Collins).
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apparent that nations could not reach consensus on any expansion of
existing obligations and might even weaken them.3 9 9 Nonetheless,
the UNHCR, as part of its mandate to supervise international
protection of refugees, has had considerable success in influencing
state practice through its Handbook, other guidelines, and the
Conclusions issued by its Executive Committee (Excom).400 UNHCR's
views not only provide guidance on the Convention's interpretation;
they have also been influential in spurring states to go beyond the
Convention's minimum requirements. For example, the UNHCR
Handbook, while acknowledging that under the Convention only
"statutory" refugees (those recognized pre-1951) may maintain
refugee status based on past persecution if no longer at risk in their
home country, states that "[t]his exception . . . reflects a more general
humanitarian principle, which could also be applied to refugees other
than statutory refugees . .. that a person who-or whose family-has
suffered under atrocious forms of persecution should not be expected
to repatriate."40 1 This approach has received broad international
acceptance and has been incorporated into domestic asylum
standards by, among others, the United States and the European
Union.402
399. See ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM 61-68 (1980); Paul Weis,
The Draft United Nations Convention on Territorial Asylum, 50 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 151,
169 (1979); see also Joan Fitzpatrick, Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention, 9
HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 229, 234 (1996) ("The reluctance of the international community to
abandon the 1951 foundation reflects . . . a pragmatic awareness that hoped-for
advances might instead dilute standards of protection.").
400. See Convention, supra note 3, art. 35; Protocol, supra note 3, art. II (setting
out UNHCR's role supervising the application of the Convention and Protocol and the
duty of states to cooperate); see also Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Dynamic of International
Refugee Law, 25 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 651, 655-58 (2014) (discussing how UNHCR's
Handbook and guidelines have influenced the progressive development of state
practice); Jennifer Moore, Restoring the Humanitarian Character of U.S. Refugee Law:
Lessons from the International Community, 15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 51, 52-53 (1997)
(explaining that because Excom consists of over 50 states with a strong interest in
refugees, its Conclusions provide significant evidence of evolving international
consensus).
401. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 1 136.
402. See 8 C.F.R. § [1]208.13(b)(1)(iii) (authorizing grants of asylum based on
past persecution alone where an applicant shows compelling reasons for being
unwilling to return arising from the severity of past persecution or a reasonable
possibility of other serious harm); Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third-
Country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection,
For a Uniform Status for Refugees or For Persons Eligible for Subsidiary Protection,
and For the Content of the Protection Granted (recast), art. 11(3) [hereinafter
Qualification Directive] (providing a similar exception for those "able to invoke
compelling reasons [for unwillingness to return] arising out of previous persecution");
Joan Fitzpatrick & Raphael Bonoan, Cessation of Refugee Protection, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 489, 501-512, 519 (Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003)
(listing twelve examples of countries adopting this approach in national legislation).
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Two important UNHCR pronouncements address situations
closely analogous to that of multiple national asylum-seekers and can
provide a conceptual foundation for moving state practice in the
direction of a more nuanced and humane approach to their claims.
Excom Conclusion 15, issued in 1979, calls upon states to adopt
common criteria to govern when asylum may be denied on the ground
that refuge could be sought elsewhere, based on the following
principles:
The criteria should take into account the duration and nature of any
sojourn of the asylum-seeker in other countries; . . . The intentions of
the asylum-seeker as regards the country in which he wishes to request
asylum should as far as possible be taken into account; . . . Regard
should be had to the concept that asylum should not be refused solely
on the ground that it could be sought from another State. Where,
however, it appears that a person, before requesting asylum, already
has a connection or close links with another State, he may if it appears
fair and reasonable be called upon first to request asylum from that
State.4 0 3
The issue of internal relocation-whether a person who could
avoid persecution by moving to a different part of his or her home
country qualifies for refugee protection-is addressed in the UNHCR
Handbook, which states, "In such situations, a person will not be
excluded from refugee status merely because he could have sought
refuge in another part of the same country, if under all the
circumstances it would not have been reasonable to expect him to do
so."404 This reasonableness test has won wide acceptance. 405 It was
further elaborated in guidelines UNHCR issued in 2003, which
explain that reasonableness should be assessed by asking whether
the claimant would be able to "lead a relatively normal life without
403. UNHCR, Exec. Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, Refugees
Without an Asylum Country, (h)(ii)-(iv), 16 October 1979, Conclusion No. 15 (XXX) -
1979, available at http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain?page=printdoc
&docid=3ae68c960 [http://perma.cc/TAY8-VBFG] (archived Aug. 31, 2014); U.N.
GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 12A at 17, U.N. Doc. A/34/12/Add.1 (1979); see also
Legomsky, supra note 43, at 664 (noting that in the context of interstate agreements
allocating responsibility for determining asylum claims, "the consistent position of
UNHCR has been that asylum seekers should not be returned to third countries with
which they lack sufficient connection").
404. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 91.
405. See generally Reinhard Marx, The Criteria of Applying the "Internal Flight
Alternative" Test in National Refugee Status Determination Procedures, 14 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 179, 199-212 (2002) (discussing general international acceptance of this
reasonableness test, albeit with considerable variance in how countries interpret and
apply it); see also Januzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [20061 UKHL
5 7-8 (discussing adoption of UNHCR's reasonableness test in Canada, New
Zealand, Australia, and the UK). The European Union's directive setting minimum
standards for member states' refugee determinations follows UNHCR's approach. See
infra text accompanying note 435. As previously discussed, so do the U.S. asylum
regulations. See supra text accompanying notes 372-73.
994 [VOL, 47-905
MULTIPLE NATIONALITYAND REFUGEES
facing undue hardship" in the area of proposed relocation. 40 6 The
individual's personal circumstances must be considered, including
"factors such as age, sex, health, disability, family situation and
relationships, social or other vulnerabilities, ethnic, cultural or
religious considerations, political and social links and compatibility,
language abilities, educational, professional and work background
and opportunities, and any past persecution and its psychological
effects."40 7
Multiple nationality is not intrinsically different. It is one type of
situation in which safety from persecution could be found in another
country, the general scenario addressed by Excom Conclusion 15. And
like internal relocation, it is a situation where nationality confers the
right to live in a country, but the person chooses to seek asylum
elsewhere. If we interrogate the Convention's underlying purposes
and ask why it is that persons subjected to certain types of
persecution are afforded international protection, we can see that
taking into account the nature of the asylum-seeker's links to another
country of nationality and whether it is reasonable to expect her to
live there is more in keeping with refugee protection's goals than the
sharp exclusionary lines drawn by the Convention's multiple
nationality clause.
B. Multiple Nationality and the Purposes of Refugee Protection
Refugee protection exists to provide a remedy when states fail to
protect basic human rights and conditions become so intolerable that
a person cannot reasonably be expected to remain home and seek
redress from national authorities. National protection takes
precedence because the bonds of loyalty and protection that exist
between a country and it nationals are generally presumed to provide
the most effective and least disruptive mechanism for safeguarding
basic human rights.408 States are in the best position to protect
citizens living within their borders and to provide them with redress
406. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: "Internal Flight or
Relocation Alternative" within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 23, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/03/04
(July, 23, 2003).
407. Id. T 25. Whether rights of fundamental importance to the individual are
respected in the area of proposed relocation is another factor to be considered. Id. T 28.
408. See GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 55, at 79 (stating that the defining feature
of a refugee is "that the normal mutual bond of trust, loyalty, protection, and
assistance between an individual and the government of his home country has been
broken (or simply does not exist)"); Andrew E. Shacknove, Who Is a Refugee? 95 ETHICS
274, 277-78 (1985) (noting that the prevailing conception of refugeehood rests on the
idea that there has been a rupture in the "normal, minimal bond of trust, loyalty,
protection, and assistance [that] has always existed between virtually every human
being and some larger collectivity-be it clan, feudal manor, or modern state").
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when their rights are violated. A country's nationals therefore are
expected to make reasonable efforts to seek the remedies available in
their home country. As James Hathaway puts it,
Refugee law has traditionally embraced only those who are
fundamentally excluded from the national community, in the sense that
it is unlikely that they will be in a position to vindicate their claim to
protection from within their own country. Those whose human dignity
has been infringed in a manner which is internally remediable by
working within or to restructure the national community . . . have not
been treated as refugees. 4 0 9
The fact that refugee status is not available to all who face
deprivations of fundamental rights in their home countries, but only
those with a well-founded fear of persecution, dovetails with these
reasons for giving precedence to national protection. Persons facing
less severe kinds of harm, conduct that is rights-violating but not so
intolerable that it leaves no reasonable option but to flee, can be
expected to endure the risks and work from within to seek change,
rather than abandoning the ties of nationality and calling upon the
international community for protection.4 10
These rationales for giving priority to national protection apply
with much less force when the country in question is not the country
that was the refugee's home and site of the feared persecution, but
instead a nominal country of nationality with which the person lacks
significant ties. In such cases there are no existing close bonds to
preserve, no ability on the part of the state to prevent the persecution
or enact reforms to ensure it won't happen again, and no human
rights gains to be had from incentivizing people to work for change
from within. Asylum-seekers who could have found safety from
persecution by relocating within their home country are not
automatically denied refugee status; there is even less reason to
disqualify those who would have to go to a different country where
the person was never, in any real sense, part of the political and
social community.
The only justification that can be offered for a bright-line rule
denying refugee status to multiple nationals is a desire to preserve as
much as possible of the traditional prerogative of states to exclude
non-nationals from their territory, by limiting their protection
responsibilities to situations where no other nation has a duty to take
the person in. But other key goals of the international protection
regime provide reason to reconsider the prevailing approach and
adopt a reasonableness standard. When persecution forces flight from
home, the availability of asylum elsewhere provides not only a
409. James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights
Protection, 4 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113, 123 (1991).
410. See Martin, supra note 396, at 41-42.
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surrogate mechanism for safety, but a way to restore some self-
determination and autonomy to persons deprived of agency.4 11 It is
also aimed at restoring membership. One of the most basic
deprivations faced by a refugee is the loss of membership in the
community to which she belonged. That loss can be at least partially
restored through repatriation, if changed conditions in the home
country make that possible, or through acceptance into a new
community where the individual has reasonable prospects to build a
new life.4 12 If an asylum-seeker is deflected to a country where he or
she has few real ties and would face obstacles to successful
integration or hardships that stand in the way of rebuilding a normal
life, neither the agency-restoring nor integration-promoting objectives
of the system are well-served. Relocation to a nominal country of
nationality that was never "home" does not effectively substitute for
the real community ties that were sundered by persecution, and often
it will decrease the prospects for successful integration into a new
community. 413
Affording asylum seekers some agency in their choice of
destination is also consistent with the Convention's focus on
persecution based on the five protected grounds of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social
group. Persecution inflicted for other reasons, such as personal
vendettas or indiscriminate violence, does not give rise to refugee
411. Cf. Hathaway, supra note 409, at 120, 124 (arguing that refugee status
should be viewed as an international entitlement that appropriately responds to the
deprivation of human dignity in the refugee's country of origin by reserving for
refugees "a sphere of autonomy" which empowers them to leave abusive situations,
"facilitates self-determination," and "gives people some amount of direct control over
their own lives").
412. Cf. WALZER, supra note 378, at 29, 48-49 (suggesting that states may have
special duties toward refugees because they have been deprived of "membership itself,"
so that their needs cannot be satisfied by exporting resources but "can be met only by
taking people in"); PRICE, supra note 384, at 13, 164-68, 173-74 (arguing that because
persecuted individuals have been "targeted for harm in a manner that repudiates their
claim to political membership," providing surrogate membership in a state of refuge is
the appropriate remedy, serving both an expressive and a restorative function).
413. Even from a strictly state-centered viewpoint, there is something to be said
for assigning responsibility for an asylum claim to a country where family ties or other
affinities enhance the prospects for successfully integration, rather than sending the
person to a place where such ties are lacking or there are other obstacles to successful
resettlement. Even if each individual asylum claim imposes a resource burden on the
host state, in the long run states tend to benefit from taking the asylum-seeker's
connections into account. Cf. Legomsky, supra note 43, at 667 ("Meaningful links ...
permit speedier and more successful integration, a crucial benefit for both the
applicant and the host society . . .. [A] willingness to consider the relationship between
the applicant and each of the two countries additionally fosters international solidarity
and equitable responsibility-sharing.").
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status.414 The Convention's five protected grounds all relate to
persecution that discriminatorily targets and subordinates people
based on characteristics that are immutable or fundamental.415 The
privileging of these types of persecution can be seen as a reflection of
the centrality of nondiscrimination and freedom of belief and
expression as international human rights norms, and as an
expression of the international community's view that persecution
inflicted on these grounds is especially destructive of the foundations
of free societies and deserves special condemnation-and special
consideration for its victims. 416 In the words of Jean-Frangois
Durieux,
[T]he refugee definition is not intended to describe those aliens whom
we cannot deport, but, positively, those aliens whom we want to
protect. . . . [It] represents the consensus over a positive and collective
commitment to protect specific categories of persons, and to resolve the
problems caused by their exodus and exile. This positive inclination,
which significantly extends to solutions as well as protection, sets
refugees . . . apart from those other persons who also . . . need
protection against forcible return to . . . danger.4 1 7
One thing distinctive about persecution aimed at people based on
their fundamental identities or beliefs is that it is particularly
destructive of agency and self-determination. I do not want to
414. Although it sometimes may give rise to other non-refoulement protections,
such as the Convention Against Torture's prohibition on return to a place where
torture is likely, or the European Union's provision of "subsidiary protection" to
persons facing serious risks of severe harm for reasons not covered by the Refugee
Convention. See generally Jane McAdam, The European Union Qualification Directive:
The Creation of a Subsidiary Protection Regime, 17 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 461 (2005)
(discussing subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive).
415. See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 234 (BIA 1985) (explaining that
all five of the Convention grounds involve "an immutable characteristic . . . a
characteristic that either is beyond the power of the individual to change or is so
fundamental to their individual identities or consciences that it ought not be required
to be changed"); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 733-39 (Can.)
(finding that the five Convention grounds rest on anti-discrimination human rights
principles and should be interpreted accordingly). The Convention begins with a
reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and "the principle that human
beings shall enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination."
Convention, supra note 3, pmbl. 1.
416. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL & McADAM, supra note 43, at 92-93; Steinbock,
supra note 383, at 787-96; Walker, supra note 44, at 603-04.
417. Jean-Frangois Durieux, Salah Sheekh is a Refugee: New Insights into
Primary and Subsidiary Forms of Protection 17 (Refugee Studies Ctr. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 49, Univ. of Oxford, 2008). The Convention's numerous provisions
requiring states to provide refugees with economic, social, and political rights, its
requirement that states "as far as possible" facilitate their integration and
naturalization, and its affirmation of the international community's "profound concern
for refugees" and commitment to "assure refugees the widest possible exercise of [their]
fundamental rights and freedoms," all support Durieux's point. Convention, pmbl. 2
and arts. 3-31, 34.
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overstate the point; a threat of torture and death based on a gambling
debt is just as terrifying and potentially dangerous as any other
threat of death or torture. But persecution that targets people based
on who they are-aspects of their identity they cannot or should not
be required to change--or their exercise of the freedoms of conscience
and expression, constitutes a direct attack on a person's ability to
lead an authentic life, express core beliefs, and act in ways aimed at
improving one's own life and the lives of others. 4 18 In that sense, it
particularly undermines a refugee's autonomy. Giving refugees a
measure of self-determination in choosing their destination when
they are forced to flee a former home is thus an appropriate response
to their situation, one that reflects the international community's
positive concern for their plight. Once a refugee has arrived in a
country and asked for asylum, to disregard her reasonable
preferences and send her to a place where she lacks genuine ties or
would face serious hardships compounds the loss of agency inherent
in becoming a refugee with additional disruption and trauma. 419 The
basic approach of the internal relocation guidelines and Excom
Conclusion 15 appropriately balances the autonomy-restoring
functions of refugee status with state interests by asking whether, in
light of the individual's circumstances and social ties, it is reasonable
to expect her to live somewhere else. The same considerations should
apply with no less force when the "elsewhere" is a country of only
nominal nationality.
C. Toward a More Inclusive Approach: UNHCR and the European
Union
UNHCR, to date, has restricted its comments on multiple
nationality to reiterating the Convention's literal requirements and
admonishing states not to fall beneath that threshold by denying
refugee status in situations where a person might be able to obtain
but has no current entitlement to another country's nationality, 420 or
where the person is a national but the country in question would not
provide actual protection.421 It should consider issuing new guidance
on multiple national asylum-seekers that urges states to go beyond
418. Cf. Matthew Lister, Who Are Refugees?, 32 LAW & PHILOSOPHY 645, 669-70
(2013) (arguing that persecution based on the Convention-covered grounds can be more
serious and threatening than persecution based on "merely contingent or idiosyncratic
factors" because it targets "aspects of our lives that are ... central to our identities").
419. Cf. Legomsky, supra note 43, at 667 (arguing that that when determining
which country is responsible for an asylum claim, there are strong humanitarian
reasons to consider an asylum-seeker's preferences and links to the countries in
question in order to avoid inflicting further trauma and disruption).
420. See UNHCR Comments on QD, supra note 69, at 14-15.
421. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 1 107.
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the Convention's text in order to better serve the underlying purposes
of refugee protection. As discussed in Part III, UNHCR's statutory
mandate is broader than the Convention's refugee definition,
encompassing those unwilling to seek a country of nationality's
protection "for reasons other than personal convenience."4 22 This
makes it particularly appropriate for UNHCR to take a leading role
in promoting a reasonableness test for multiple nationals' asylum
claims.
UNHCR took a small step in this direction in its 1999 guidelines
on cessation of refugee status. Under Article IC(3) of the Convention,
a person ceases to be a refugee if "[h]e has acquired a new nationality,
and enjoys the protection of the country of his new nationality." In its
commentary, UNHCR states that this clause should not be applied to
a person who lacks genuine ties with the country and is unwilling to
avail herself of its protection, citing as example the situation of a
refugee who acquires a new nationality by marriage but has not
established any genuine link with the spouse's country.4 23 UNHCR
presented this as an interpretation of the phrase "enjoys the
protection," which is textually dubious and at odds with the
Handbook, which takes the phrase to mean simply that the new
country of nationality is willing and able to provide effective
protection.424 As a statement of appropriate standards that go beyond
the Convention's minimum requirements, however, it makes good
sense, and points toward similarly considering the applicant's links
and preferences in assessing whether a multiple national qualifies for
refugee status in the first place. New UNHCR guidelines on the
subject could go a long way in fostering state practice that responds
more appropriately and humanely to the plight of persons forced from
the country of nationality that was their home who have strong
reasons not to go to a nominal country of nationality in which they
lack real ties or would face serious hardships. 425
The European Union's Qualification Directive (QD), which sets
out minimum standards for member states' refugee determinations,
also has the potential to move state practice in a more
accommodating direction. The QD is one of the central pillars in the
EU's efforts, growing out of the 1999 Tampere European Council, to
establish a "Common European Asylum System, based on the full and
422. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
423. UNHCR, The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on their Application, April
1999, 17.
424. UNHCR Handbook, supra note 20, 129-30; see also Kneebone &
O'Sullivan, supra note 337, at 499-500.
425. The fact that refugee tribunals in various countries have noted the harsh
and unfair results often produced by the Convention's multiple nationality cause and
looked for ways to mitigate its impact suggests that UNHCR guidance on the subject
would have some influence on state practice. See supra text accompanying notes 68-81.
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inclusive application of the Geneva [Refugee] Convention" and
"absolute respect of the right to seek asylum."426 An interpretation
that offers multiple nationals broader access to asylum would be
consistent with the directive's text, and it would help to solve an
interpretive puzzle that has troubled commentators.
The puzzle is this: Article 4(3)(e) of the QD lists among the
factors adjudicators must take into account in making an evidentiary
assessment of a claim for refugee protection "whether the applicant
could reasonably be expected to avail himself or herself of the
protection of another country where he or she could assert
citizenship."427 This procedural requirement implies a corresponding
substantive standard, but the QD contains no provision that directly
addresses how multiple nationality affects eligibility for refugee
status. If Article 4(3)(e) were taken to mean that member states are
authorized to deny protection even if the applicant has no definite
right to citizenship elsewhere, it would contravene the minimum
requirements of the Convention.4 28 Commentators have proposed
that, so as not to violate the Convention, it should be construed to
allow states to consider the availability of citizenship elsewhere only
if the person has an existing entitlement to it or previously resided in
a country where he or she was recognized as a de facto national.429
426. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, pmbl. 3; Presidency Conclusions,
Tampere European Council, Oct. 15-16, 1999, 13 [hereinafter Tampere Conclusions],
http://www.europarl.europa.eulsummits/tam-en.htm [http://perma.cc/9WR2-D74R]
(archived Aug. 31, 2014). The QD was initially promulgated in 2004, and substantially
revised in 2011. For an overview of the origins and development of the Common
European Asylum System, see Maryellen Fullerton, A Tale of Two Decades: War
Refugees and Asylum Policy in the European Union, 10 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
87 (2010).
427. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, art. 4(3)(e). This provision was
enacted as part of the original QD in 2004. Council Directive (EC) No. 2004/83 of 29
April 2004, art. 4(3)(e) [hereinafter QD 2004]. It remained unchanged in the 2011
revision.
428. UNHCR has criticized the provision on the ground that the Convention
does not allow refugee status to be denied based on the possibility of "asserting"
citizenship in another country; the multiple nationality clause of Article 1A(2) applies
only to those who have multiple nationality, while Article 1E excludes only those who
have "taken residence" in a country that grants them rights and obligations equivalent
to nationality. See UNHCR Comments on QD, supra note 69, at 14-15.
429. HEMME BATTJES, EUROPEAN ASYLUM LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 266
(2006); Gregor Noll, Evidentiary Assessment in Refugee Status Determination and the
EU Qualification Directive, 12 EUROPEAN PUBLIC L. 295, 308-09 (2006); see also KK &
ors v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2011] UKUT 92 (I.A.C.), 41, affd sub nom.
Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. SP (North Korea) & ors, [2012] EWCA Civ. 114
(C.A. 2012) (discussing expert submission of Guy Goodwin-Gill contending that, in
order to interpret the QD consistently with the Refugee Convention, Article 4(3)(e)
should be read as if the words "of which he is a citizen" appeared rather than "where he
could assert citizenship").
10012014/
VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
But if Article 4(3)(e) applies to persons with an existing right of
citizenship, 430 it necessarily follows that the QD contemplates a
substantive eligibility standard for multiple nationals that is more
generous than the Convention's. Article 4(3)(e) expressly states that
the availability of citizenship elsewhere counts against the applicant
only if he or she "could reasonably be expected" to go to that country.
Commentators have generally assumed that the QD's definition of
"refugee" is no broader than the Convention's, 431 but if this were so,
reasonableness would be irrelevant-a well-founded fear of
persecution would be the only acceptable ground for not availing
oneself of a country of nationality's protection. A close reading of the
QD's text, however, makes for a strong case that the same
reasonableness standard that applies when a person could avoid
persecution through internal relocation provides the governing
standard for multiple nationals as well.
As a starting point, the QD's refugee definition incorporates only
part of the Convention definition: while it closely tracks the first
sentence of Article 1A(2), it omits the Convention's multiple
nationality clause. 432 In addition, the QD definition refers to an
individual who is outside "the country of nationality." This use of the
singular does not in itself prove much; the Convention, after all, uses
the same phrase and defines it to mean "each of the countries of
which he is a national." But compare the phrase used in the QD's
definition of the term "country of origin": "the country or countries of
nationality"433 It is a generally accepted principle in interpreting EU
legislation that all provisions should be given an effet utile, so that
distinctly-worded provisions are taken to reflect a difference in
430. In addition to ensuring that the QD is not interpreted so as to deny refugee
status to those entitled to it under the Convention, this interpretation does no violence
to the text of Article 4(3)(e). A person who holds or is entitled to citizenship in another
country is necessarily someone who "could assert citizenship" in that country.
Qualification Directive, supra note 402, art. 4(3)(e).
431. See, e.g., Jane McAdam, The Qualification Directive: An Overview, in THE
QUALIFICATION DIRECTIVE: CENTRAL THEMES, PROBLEM ISSUES, AND IMPLEMENTATION
IN SELECTED MEMBER STATES 7, 10 (Karin Zwann ed., 2007) (stating that the QD's
definition of "refugee" is "substantively identical" to Article 1A(2) of the Convention
except that it is narrower in that nationals of EU member countries cannot qualify as
refugees); SIDORENKO, supra note 50, at 65 (making the same observation).
432. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, art. 2(d) (article 2(c) in the 2004
QD). As originally drafted by European Commission, the QD would have incorporated
by reference the refugee definition set forth in Article 1A of the Refugee Convention.
See Comm'n of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive, Sept. 12,
2001, at 10. This was modified in Council to make the definition freestanding. See
Council of the European Union, Asylum Working Party, Outcome of Proceedings, Sept.
6, 2002, Doc. No. 11356/02 ASILE 40 (adopting an autonomous refugee definition).
433. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, art. 2(n) (article 2(k) in the 2004
QD) (emphasis added).
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intended meaning. 434 When the QD's drafters wanted to refer to
multiple countries of nationality, they knew how to say so. Thus, it
can reasonably be inferred that the omission of the "country or
countries" wording from the QD's refugee definition-together with
the omission of the Convention's multiple nationality clause-means
that for purposes of the QD definition it is enough for an individual to
be outside any one country of his or her nationality owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution.
The express inclusion of individuals with multiple nationalities
in the QD's definition of "country of origin" is particularly significant
because that term provides the gateway to the application of the QD's
article on internal relocation. Article 8 allows for the denial of an
application for refugee protection "if in a part of the country of origin"
the individual would be effectively protected against persecution,
"and can reasonably be expected to settle there."4 35 The QD's
substantive standards for granting refugee protection can thus be
read in a way that harmonizes with Article 4(3)(e). A person with
more than one nationality is not ineligible merely because he or she
could live in one of her countries of nationality (or in some part
thereof) without fear of persecution; in order to deny the application,
it must be reasonable, under all the circumstances, to expect the
person to resettle there.436
The fact that the QD was adopted for the stated purpose of
establishing common criteria to guide member states in their
application of the UN Convention437 does not stand in the way of
reading its text in a manner that goes beyond the minimum
requirements of the Convention in order to better serve the
434. See Durieux, supra note 417, at 16.
435. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, art. 8(1) (emphasis added).
436. A standard focusing on whether the applicant can reasonably be expected
to live in another country of nationality would also be consistent with the "safe third
country" ground for refusing to consider an asylum application in the EU directive on
asylum procedures. Under the Procedures Directive, an application may be deemed
inadmissible if the person could seek refuge in a safe third country and the decision is
made in accordance with "rules requiring a connection between the person seeking
asylum and third country concerned on the basis of which it would be reasonable for
that person to go that country." Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on
Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing
Refugee Status, arts. 25(2)(c) & 27(2)(a). This echoes the approach of Excom Conclusion
15. See supra text accompanying note 403.
Another provision in the Procedures Directive allows member states to apply a
rebuttable presumption that an asylum application is "unfounded" if a person is a
national of a country designated a "safe country of origin." Council Directive
2005/85/EC, supra, arts. 23(4)(c), 31, & Annex II. This provision, however, addresses
whether an individual comes from a country so manifestly safe that the person's claim
of facing persecution there is not credible, rather than the question of whether
persecution could be avoided by going elsewhere.
437. See Qualification Directive, supra note 402, pmbl. 1 23-24.
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underlying purposes of refugee protection. 438 The QD's preamble
treats the Convention as "provid[ing] the cornerstone of the
international regime for the protection of refugees,"439 but a
cornerstone exists to serve as a foundation to be built on. The
directive's stated goal is to provide for a "full and inclusive" approach
to the Convention's application, one that "seeks to ensure full respect
for human dignity" and "fundamental rights" as well as meeting the
Convention's minimum requirements.44 0 The autonomy and
membership-restoring purposes of refugee protection, which provide
the basis for the reasonableness standard used to adjudge whether a
refugee ought to go elsewhere within her own country, apply with
equal force to the situation faced by multiple national asylum-
seekers.4 4 1 Giving the QD an interpretation that its text can readily
support, in order to provide access to asylum for multiple nationals
who have valid objections to being sent to a country in which they
lack real ties or would face significant obstacles to successful
integration, would be consonant with the goals of the European
Asylum System.
VI. CONCLUSION
In a world where multiple national affiliations are ever more
prevalent and need not reflect any real ties between the individual
and a state of nationality, refugee-receiving nations ultimately must
choose whether to view refugee status solely as a last resort reserved
for those with no place else to go, or as a compensatory and
restorative measure that gives persons forced from home by
persecution an opportunity to regain some control over their lives.
438. See QD & AH v. Secretary of State for the Home Dep't, [2009] EWCA (Civ)
620, [18] (Eng.) (stating that the Qualification Directive "has to stand on its own legs
and be treated, so far as it does not expressly or manifestly adopt extraneous sources of
law, as autonomous"); cf. Hugo Storey, EU Qualification Directive: A Brave New
World?, 20 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1, 9-11 (2008) (acknowledging the force of, although
ultimately rejecting the view that the Directive's refugee definition must be interpreted
on its own terms and not as simply incorporating the approach of the Convention). The
QD clearly goes beyond the Convention's text in its provision adopting UNHCR's
"humanitarian principle" that refugee status can be maintained even if changed
conditions in the home country eliminate the risk of persecution, when an individual
has compelling reasons arising from past persecution for not returning. Qualification
Directive, supra note 402, art. 11(3); see supra text accompanying notes 401-02.
439. Qualification Directive, supra note 402, pmbl. 4.
440. Id. pmbl. TT 3, 16; Tampere Conclusions, supra note 426, 1 13. The
European Court of Justice has held that the QD "must ... be interpreted in the light of
its general scheme and purpose" as set forth in the recitals in its preamble. Joined
Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, Aydin Salahadin Abdulla et al. v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. 1532, 51-54.
441. See supra Part V.B.
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Countries that feel under siege from uncontrolled refugee flows may
gravitate toward the former view, and the minimum requirements of
the Refugee Convention allow them ample room to do so. But for
countries or confederations that view themselves, by virtue of history
or ideology, as havens for the persecuted-such as the United
StateS442 and European Union 443-going beyond the Convention's
minimum requirements by accepting multiple nationals who have
good reasons not to go to another country of nationality is consistent
both with their founding principles and the core purposes of refugee
protection. U.S. and EU asylum laws differ from the Convention's
wording in significant ways, and reading those differences to embrace
a broader approach to multiple nationals' eligibility is justified both
by textual and purposive considerations. The UNHCR should
recognize that the international regime for refugee protection is best
served when persons forced from their real home country by
persecution are not unreasonably forced to relocate to a nominal
country of nationality, and encourage state practice that provides a
more humane response to their asylum claims. The approach
advocated in this Article represents a return to the original principles
of the international refugee regime, which recognized that persons
forced from home by persecution who have "valid objections" to
seeking a country of nationality's protection should not be required to
do so. 44 4
442. See supra text accompanying notes 299-304.
443. The Tampere European Council, which established the framework for the
Common European Asylum System, declared that, "It would be in contradiction with
Europe's traditions to deny . . . freedom to those whose circumstances lead them
justifiably to seek access to our territory." Tampere Conclusions, supra note 426, 1 3.
444. U.N.G.A. Res. 8(I) and IRO Constitution, supra notes 53-54; UNHCR
Statute, supra note 55.
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